
RETHINKING PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES
SERIES EDITORS:
OLIVER P. RICHMOND · ANNIKA BJÖRKDAHL · GËZIM VISOKA
Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution
Second Edition
Edited by
Christine Schliesser
Martin Leiner
palgrave
macmillan

Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies

This agenda-setting series of research monographs, now more than a decade old, provides an interdisciplinary forum aimed at advancing innovative new agendas for peace and conflict studies in International Relations. Many of the critical volumes the series has so far hosted have contributed to new avenues of analysis directly or indirectly related to the search for positive, emancipatory, and hybrid forms of peace. Constructive critiques of liberal peace, hybrid peace, everyday contributions to peace, the role of civil society and social movements, international actors and networks, as well as a range of different dimensions of peace (from peacebuilding, statebuilding, youth contributions, photography, and many case studies) have been explored so far. The series raises important political questions about what peace is, whose peace and peace for whom, as well as where peace takes place. In doing so, it offers new and interdisciplinary perspectives on the development of the international peace architecture, peace processes, UN peacebuilding, peacekeeping and mediation, statebuilding, and localised peace formation in practice and in theory. It examines their implications for the development of local peace agency and the connection between emancipatory forms of peace and global justice, which remain crucial in different conflict-affected regions around the world. This series' contributions offer both theoretical and empirical insights into many of the world's most intractable conflicts, also investigating increasingly significant evidence about blockages to peace.

This series is indexed by Scopus.

Christine Schliesser · Martin Leiner
Editors

Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution

Second Edition

palgrave
macmillan

Editors
Christine Schliesser
University of Zürich
Zürich, Switzerland

Martin Leiner
Jena University
Jena, Germany

ISSN 1759-3735 ISSN 2752-857X (electronic)
Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies
ISBN 978-3-031-74904-9 ISBN 978-3-031-74905-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

When Palgrave Macmillan approached us about a second edition of this book, we found it remarkable how very little has changed since 2017, the year we completed the first edition. Seven years later, it is even clearer that military "solutions" for conflict have been less effective than we described in our Introduction to the first edition. The withdrawal of the US and other NATO countries' armies from Afghanistan in 2021 exemplifies that more than 20 years of war and military presence did not lead to sustainable peace. Instead, it resulted in 240,000 deaths, 5.5 million refugees, and immense misery, poverty, and suffering.

In most cases, those who start wars are not the ones who win them. This truth was evident earlier in the twentieth century, with both World Wars teaching this lesson to Germany, Austria, and Japan. The same happened to France and the USA in Vietnam and to the Soviet Union and NATO allies in Afghanistan. Even strongly asymmetric wars are being lost by those who started them. Faced with this evidence, it seems quite incomprehensible that many countries continue to invest immense resources in weapons and military, while investing very little in alternative and non-violent approaches to conflict resolution.

We are, therefore, convinced that the purpose of this book—to shed light on real-life, proven-to-work alternative approaches to conflict resolution—is as vital as ever, seven years after the publication of the first edition. To this end, we have updated and expanded this second edition. We are grateful for the new contributions by Azza Karam (USA), Elisabet

le Roux (South Africa), Katherine Marshall (USA), and Philip McDonagh (Ireland). We especially thank Lee-Anne Roux for her amazing editorial skills and support.

Fribourg, Switzerland — Christine Schliesser
Jena, Germany — Martin Leiner
Summer 2024

Praise for *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*

"This volume comes at the right time. Conflict resolution and reconciliation are some of the most urgent challenges we face in a time in which the world seems to fall back into patterns of hate and violence that we had hoped to have overcome after the end of the cold war. The editors have assembled an impressive number and variety of authors which represent different contexts and can help us to understand ways to overcome violence. May this book inspire many to find new trust that a different world is possible!"

—Heinrich Bedford-Strohm, *Moderator of the WCC central Committee*

"Expertly edited by Christine Schliesser and Martin Leiner, this comprehensive and well-structured volume collects a number of very useful contributions to the 'general theme' of peace-making and conflict resolution. The overall impact of these uniformly excellent chapters is to change our perception on what is the right thing to do before, in, and after conflicts. Highly recommended to anyone with an interest in this topic, including students, scholars, and practitioners."

—Jeffrey Haynes, *London Metropolitan University, United Kingdom*

"This timely publication is a gift to societies all over the world. Building upon insights from different contexts, a diversity of disciplines, and

various spheres of society, this book develops a constructive approach to the terrain of conflict resolution studies, that does not only seek to understand conflict and violence, but that seeks ways of building peace, reconciliation, and justice in a world of violence and conflict. It is demonstrated how reconciling justice, and justice-seeking reconciliation in all walks of life advance the quest for an ethos and culture of peace. The constructive and innovative approach is also demonstrated in the exploration of the role of various forms of art in the advancement of peace."

—Nico Koopman, *Vice-rector for Social Impact, Transformation and Personnel, Stellenbosch University, South Africa*

"Is there a way to overcome the deadlock in peace negotiations, or keep security from being derailed by suspicion, basic services disrupted, development truncated by competing interests, collective memory captured by trauma or guilt, and justice construed only as a vehicle for revenge? In *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution,* the authors portray the need for a deep reconciliation process as the essential glue that can repair a torn social fabric or facilitate ripeness rather than wait for it as a diplomatic prerequisite. Their analysis and illuminating case studies provide a window into the re-emergence of people-to-people peacebuilding roles that non-traditional actors can play, raising awareness of foundational values, providing trusted channels for truth-telling and healing, facilitating the process of bonding, and building a social contract to meet the needs of all."

—David Steele, *Consultant in Conflict Transformation and Adjunct Faculty, Brandeis University, USA*

"Alternative approaches to resolving violent conflicts are urgently needed in the opening decades of a century which has already exposed the limitations of top-down state and legal interventions. This superb volume reflects the paradigm shift within the study and practice of conflict resolution that recognizes the importance of neglected local cultural and religious factors. It is to be welcomed by all scholars and practitioners who are seeking a fresh understanding of the role of negotiation, religion and gender, reconciliation, and the arts in peace-building on the ground."

—William Storrar, *Center of Theological Inquiry in Princeton, USA*

"This collection opens up and interrogates two of the most important areas of current debate on peace and reconciliation. It suggests how, and why, the role of gender and the role of religion are an unavoidable part of any serious conversation about current conflict and conflict transformation."

—David Tombs, *Centre for Theology and Public Issues, University of Otago, New Zealand*

Contents

1 Introduction 1
Christine Schliesser and Martin Leiner

Part I Alternative Approaches—Negotiation

2 Introduction to Negotiation 21
Martin Leiner

3 Justice in Negotiations and Conflict Resolution 27
Rudolf Schuessler

4 Beyond Official Negotiations: The Experience of the Community of Sant'Egidio 39
Cesare Zucconi

5 Understanding 'Resistance' to Transitional Justice 49
Julie Bernath, Adou Djane Dit Fatogoma, and Briony Jones

Part II Alternative Approaches—Gender

6 Introduction to Gender 63
Elisabet le Roux

7 Made for Goodness? Women, Ethnic Conflict, and Reconciliation 67
Carolina Rehrmann

8 Challenging the Status Quo: The Role of Women in Peace Processes 79
Elisabet le Roux

9 Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation: Where Are the Women? 95
Katherine Marshall

Part III Alternative Approaches—Religion

10 Introduction to Religion 111
David P. Gushee

11 Religious Dimensions in Conflict Transformation: A Tentative Approach Toward a Reconciliation Methodology 115
Richard Friedli

12 A Critical Realist Engagement with Glen Stassen's 'Just Peacemaking' Approach 131
David P. Gushee

13 The Multilateral Imperative: Seeking the Common Good 143
Azza Karam

Part IV Alternative Approaches—Reconciliation and Forgiveness

14 Introduction to Reconciliation and Forgiveness 157
Christine Schliesser

15 Forgiveness Is 'The Wrong Word': Empathic Repair and the Potential for Human Connection in the Aftermath of Historical Trauma 163
Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela

16 Alternative and Innovative Approaches to Reconciliation: A South African Perspective 177
Christo Thesnaar

17 The Politics of Reconciliation in Post-genocide Rwanda 189
Christine Schliesser

Part V Alternative Approaches—The Arts

18 Introduction to the Arts 201
Mary Zournazi

19 Genocide, Memory, and the Arts: Memorial Projects in Rwanda of 'Upright Men' and 'The Garden of Memory' 207
Bruce Clarke

20 A Notebook on Peace: Reflections on Cinema and Perception 219
Mary Zournazi

21 Poetry and the Politics of the Twenty-First Century 227
Philip McDonagh

Part VI Alternative Approaches—Conclusion

22 Conclusion: From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation 247
Martin Leiner

Index 263

Notes on Contributors

Julie Bernath, Dr., is Senior Researcher at swisspeace, an associate research institute of the University of Basel, where she teaches in the Department of Social Sciences. Her research centers on the interactions between survivors and victims of massive human rights violations and transitional justice measures and institutions; diaspora mobilization for transitional justice; and the politics of international interventions in (post-)conflict contexts. Her work focuses on the Cambodian and Syrian contexts. She is the author of *The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: Power, Politics and Resistance in Transitional Justice* (2023, The University of Wisconsin Press).

Bruce Clarke a visual artist and photographer, studied Fine Arts at Leeds University. Based in Paris, he is a committed artist and was an important figure in the anti-apartheid movement. His visual artwork has been exhibited across Europe, Africa, and the United States. Clarke published *Dominations* with Homnisphères publishing house in 2006, and *Les Fantômes de la Mer* with ARTCO Gallery in 2016.

Adou Djane Dit Fatogoma, Dr., obtained his Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Abidjan Cocody, Côte d'Ivoire, in 2013. His research expertise includes governance, transitional justice, statehood, peacebuilding, humanitarian action studies, and the politics of environment and health. In various capacities, he has conducted field research in Côte d'Ivoire, such as on the dynamics of humanitarian action for the

French Red Cross. Dr. Fatogoma was a recipient of the Swiss Government Excellence Postdoctoral Scholarship (2015–2016). Currently, he heads the Economic and Social Systems research axis at the Centre Suisse de Recherches Scientifiques en Côte d'Ivoire. He is a research associate at swisspeace, Switzerland.

Richard Friedli, Prof. Dr., is Professor Emeritus in Comparative Sociology of Religions at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. He has taught development ethics at the National University of Rwanda (1966–1971), intercultural theology at the University of Fribourg (1971–1992), comparative history of religions at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities at the University of Fribourg (1992–2006). He also led the "religion" unit at the World Peace Academy, Advanced Study Centre, University of Basel (2009–2013). Currently, he serves as a visiting lecturer on networks focusing on inter-religious issues (Kinshasa, Jerusalem, Geneva Center for Security Policy, Geneva).

Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, Prof. Dr., the 2024 Templeton Prize Laureate, is the South African National Research Foundation's Research Chair in Violent Histories and Transgenerational Trauma and Director of the Centre for the Study of the Afterlife of Violence and the Reparative Quest (AVReQ) at Stellenbosch University. She has won several academic awards, including the Harry Oppenheimer Fellowship Award, the most prestigious academic award in Africa; the Harvard Radcliffe Institute Fellowship; an honorary Doctor of Theology from Friedrich Schiller University; and an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from Rhodes University. Her critically acclaimed book, *A Human Being Died that Night*, which has been reprinted as a Mariner Classic, has won the Alan Paton Prize in South Africa and the Christopher Award in the United States.

David P. Gushee, Dr., is Distinguished University Professor of Christian Ethics at Mercer University and Chair of Christian Social Ethics at Vrije Universiteit ("Free University") Amsterdam. He is also Senior Research Fellow at the International Baptist Theological Study Centre. Gushee is the elected past-president of both the American Academy of Religion and the Society of Christian Ethics. He is the author, co-author, editor, or co-editor of 29 books and over 175 academic book chapters, journal articles, and reviews. His most recognized works include *Kingdom Ethics and Changing Our Mind*.

Briony Jones, Dr., is Reader of International Development in Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick and Director of the Warwick Interdisciplinary Research Centre for International Development. She is also Associated Senior Researcher with the Dealing with the Past Team at swisspeace. Her research focuses on citizenship, political identity and activism, transitional justice, and the politics of knowledge.

Azza Karam, Dr., serves as Founding President and CEO of Lead-Integrity—a global consultancy firm dedicated to serving the common good, through the leadership, competence, and integrity, of women professionals, inspired by their faiths. She serves as a member of the Board of Trustees of International Alert, the Temple of Understanding, and the Parliament of World Religions, as well as the Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies in Amman, Jordan. She is a member of the United Nations' Secretary General High-Level Advisory Board on Multilateralism.

Martin Leiner, Prof. Dr., is Chair for Systematic Theology and Ethics at Jena University, Germany, and Extraordinary Professor at the Faculty of Theology of Stellenbosch University, South Africa. He is Founder and Director of the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies (JCRS). In 2018, he founded the Academic Alliance for Reconciliation Studies in the Middle East and North Africa (AARMENA), which has since built up one doctoral school and five MA programs. Leiner is also the founding president of the International Association for Reconciliation Studies (IARS) and served as its president from 2020 to 2024. His research focuses on reconciliation studies, media ethics, and the history of ethics. He is the author and editor of numerous books and articles on reconciliation, as well as the main editor of the book series *Research in Peace and Reconciliation* (RIPAR).

Elisabet le Roux, Dr., is Research Director of the Unit for Religion and Development Research at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. She has more than 17 years of experience leading research projects in multiple country contexts across the world. Her expertise lies in the prevention of and response to gender-based violence, harmful practices, gender equality, and women's participation in peace processes, disabilities, intersectionality, and the role of religion and culture, with an emphasis on work in fragile and conflict-affected settings. She has conducted this research with

and for intergovernmental agencies, government departments, development networks, faith-based organizations, non-governmental organizations, and research networks.

Katherine Marshall's life journey has focused on international development for over five decades and on all continents, including a long stint at the World Bank. Currently, she leads efforts on religion and development at Georgetown University's Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, where she teaches various courses on the ethics of development work. She serves as Executive Director of the World Faiths Development Dialogue, an NGO that works to bridge different sectors and institutions, and as Vice President of the G20 Interfaith Association. Additionally, she sits on several NGO boards and advisory councils and is an active speaker and writer in diverse settings.

Philip McDonagh is Adjunct Professor at Dublin City University and the Director of the Centre for Religion, Human Values, and International Relations. As an Irish diplomat, he was involved in the process leading up to the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement and later served as an ambassador in a number of postings, including India and the Russian Federation. Philip McDonagh is the co-author of *On the Significance of Religion for Global Diplomacy*. His volumes of poetry include *The Song the Oriole Sang*.

Carolina Rehrmann is a research assistant at the Institute of Political Science and coordinator at the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies (JCRS) at Jena University, Germany. She is concluding her Ph.D. on discourse theory, emotions, and identities in the Cyprus Conflict. In her research, she focuses on the comparison of intractable conflicts, nationalism, collective memory, and socio-emotional reconciliation. She is also a co-editor of *Societies in Transition: The Balkan and the Caucasus between Conflict and Reconciliation* (2017).

Christine Schliesser, PD Dr., is Senior Lecturer in Systematic Theology and Ethics at Zurich University and serves as Director of Studies at the ecumenical Center for Faith & Society at Fribourg University, Switzerland. She is also Research Fellow in Studies in Historical Trauma and Transformation at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. Her academic interests include peace and reconciliation studies, the theology and ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Public Theology, and the role of religion in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). She

is co-editor of the inter-religious book series *Religion Matters. On the Significance of Religion in Global Issues* (Routledge). Her most recent book is *On the Significance of Religion for the SDGs. An Introduction* (Routledge 2023), which is available as an open access source at: https://www.routledge.com/On-the-Significance-of-Religion-for-the-SDGs-An-Introduction/Schliesser/p/book/9781032364940.

Rudolf Schuessler, Prof. Dr., is Chair of Philosophy II at the University of Bayreuth, Germany, a member of Processes of International Negotiation (PIN), associated with the Geneva Center of Security Policy, and the Diplomatic Academy of the UAE. One of Schuessler's areas of research is the interface between ethics, rationality, and negotiation practice. He is the author of *"Adjusted Winner" (AW) Analyses of the 1978 Camp David Accords—Valuable Tools for Negotiators?* (2007) and, together with J.W. van der Rijt, *Focal Points in Negotiations* (2019).

Christo Thesnaar, Prof. Dr., is Professor of Practical Theology in the Department of Practical Theology and Missiology at the Faculty of Theology at Stellenbosch University, specializing in pastoral care and counseling. He is responsible for two master's courses on pastoral caregiving based on the Dialogical Intergenerational Pastoral Process. His research interests include reconciliation, memory, transgenerational trauma, justice, healing, and restitution, and he has published extensively on these topics. Notable contributions include chapters in *Transdisciplinary Approaches on Reconciliation Research: Studies in Honor of Martin Leiner*, edited by Martin Leiner and Francesco Ferrari (2024), and in the *Anthology of Pastoral Ministry and Leadership*, edited by Honoured Taruona, R Simangaliso Kumalo, and Herbert Moyo. Thesnaar is also a founding member and current board member of The Institute for the Healing of Memories in South Africa.

Mary Zournazi, Prof. Dr., is an Australian filmmaker, scholar, and author. She has written and directed two recent award-winning documentary films: *Dogs of Democracy* (2017) and *My Rembetika Blues* (2021). She is also the author of several books, including *Inventing Peace* (2013), co-written with German director and filmmaker Wim Wenders, and *Justice and Love* (2021), with Rowan Williams. Zournazi has co-written the theatrical play *Solomon's Dream* with Christos Tsiolkas and is currently developing a fiction film, *The Cousins*, which she will direct and co-write

with Tsiolkas. She is Professor in the School of Social Sciences at the University of New South Wales, Australia.

Cesare Zucconi, Dr., taught at the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Rome and is currently a visiting professor at the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena, Germany. His publications focus on the history of Central-Eastern Europe, conflict studies, and inter-religious dialogue. Dr. Zucconi has been actively involved with the Community of Sant'Egidio for many years, serving as its Secretary General since 2008 and as a member of the International Board. He is also a member of the Advisory Board on International Relations, Conflict Prevention, and Conflict Resolution, and serves as the Community of Sant'Egidio delegate for Western Europe and the Middle East. Additionally, he is on the Board for Inter-religious and Inter-cultural Dialogue.

Abbreviations

BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration
DFG	*Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* (German Research Foundation)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EHR	Evangelicals for Human Rights
EU	European Union
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army
FoRB	Freedom of Religion and Belief
Frelimo	Mozambique Liberation Front
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHI	Global Hunger Index
GIWPS	Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security
ICC	International Criminal Court
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IS	Islamic State
JCRS	Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies
LGBTQ	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer or Questioning
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NURC	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
PDCI-RDA	Party of Côte d'Ivoire African Democratic Rally
PIN	Processes in International Negotiations
Renamo	Mozambican National Resistance

RF	Restitution Foundation
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SACC	South African Council of Churches
SNSF	Swiss National Science Foundation
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WiB	Women in Black
WILPF	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
WIPNET	Women in Peace Network
WPS	Women, Peace, and Security

List of Figures

Fig. 11.1	A Fundamentalistic Perception	119
Fig. 11.2	An Open Space Perception	122
Fig. 19.1	'The Garden of Memory' Ceremony at the Garden of Memory with young survivors, 2009, Photo: Bruce Clarke	213
Fig. 19.2	'Upright Men' Upright Men project as projected on Rwamagama Church. Photo: Bruce Clarke, 2014	215

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Christine Schliesser and Martin Leiner

Abstract Conflicts around the world, as well as the threat of terrorism, have given new momentum to the search for conflict resolution strategies. While ongoing and expanding conflicts have dramatically shown the limits of traditional military interventions, the quest has turned to alternative approaches. Here, we bring together alternative and innovative approaches that have proven successful and effective in conflict transformation. We address five different areas of conflict resolution, ranging from (1) negotiations, to (2) gender and (3) religion, and from (4) reconciliation and forgiveness to (5) the arts. Experts from academia, NGOs, and politics share their insights as they discuss what worked and why, and what did not work and why not.

C. Schliesser (✉)
Zurich, Switzerland
e-mail: christine.schliesser@sozethik.uzh.ch

M. Leiner
Jena, Germany
e-mail: martin.leiner@uni-jena.de

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_1

Keywords Conflict resolution · negotiations · gender · religion · reconciliation · forgiveness · arts

Persistent and newly emerging conflicts around the world have made the search for successful and sustainable conflict resolution imperative. With traditional military intervention repeatedly leading to the transformation of entire regions into zones of instability and violence (e.g., Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan), the study of alternative and less violent approaches to conflict resolution has gained momentum.

To this very day, we know much more about the nature of violent conflicts and wars than about ways to end the violence and bring former enemies together. Dating back to the times of Herodotus and Thucydides, there have been a myriad of works written by historians and cultural or social scientists that attempt to explain why violent conflicts have broken out, what the precise reasons were for each party, how the conflicts evolved, how it was possible that ordinary people were motivated to kill other people, and which side was victorious. Military experts, secret services, and national security-related services and enterprises accumulate a lot of knowledge to stay up to date on how to create security, how to weaken and eliminate potential and real enemies, how to prepare a war, and how to win it. The media and our entire culture seem to be fascinated with violence.[1]

In a time of global interdependence and weapons of mass destruction capable of eradicating human life on earth within mere hours, a different set of questions *and* answers is needed. We need insights into how to prevent violent conflicts, how to find ways for peace and reconciliation already in the midst of conflict, and how to deal with former enemies—with both victims and perpetrators after the first ceasefire has taken effect. The work in this field started only in the twentieth century with a small number of peace research programs.[2] Since the 1970s, an increasing number of institutions have started to work on topics such as 'peace studies,' 'conflict resolution/transformation,' 'transitional justice,' and 'reconciliation.' Now we have over one hundred of these institutions in the United States (US) alone, with urgently needed expertise as well as an increasing number of highly significant emerging studies. Their theoretical grounding and practical impact have benefited from the study of different reconciliation processes as the ones in Northern

Ireland, South Africa, and—though more contested—in the Balkans, as well as in different countries in Latin America, South-East Asia, and Rwanda.[3] Another case of successful reconciliation is exemplified by post-war Germany and its relationships with France, Israel, and Poland (Gardner Feldman 2013).

The academic research in this field is still both new and diverse concerning the disciplines involved, the paradigms and methods employed, and the results reached. There is still no agreement on the exact name for the research area in question, with four different labels being used simultaneously: peace studies, conflict resolution/transformation, transitional justice, and reconciliation. In addition, there are approaches that focus exclusively on specific disciplines such as theology, psychology, law, economics, and political science, or on the experiences of practitioners. However, a comprehensive overview and synthesis of these approaches from a transdisciplinary perspective are still lacking.[4] As a result, practitioners today work with a heterogeneous set of measures from different disciplines to foster peace and reconciliation, which they adapt to the current situation. The sheer dynamics of this new field account for some of the difficulties for innovations and paradigm changes to gain a foothold.

This volume is based on the observation that we are currently witnessing the development and implementation of significant and successfully tried and tested alternative approaches in conflict resolution. They have the potential to change our perception of what is the right thing to do before, during, and after conflicts.

In November 2015, some of the protagonists of these innovative approaches gathered at an international and interdisciplinary conference on 'Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution' in Zurich, Switzerland. The present volume is the fruit of this conference, guided by the principle of not simply reproducing the presentations but providing the reader with a concise and useful summary of some of the most innovative and effective ideas in conflict resolution theory and practice from recent years. The contributions focus on initiatives from four different areas: negotiation, gender and religion, reconciliation and forgiveness, and the arts.

What makes these approaches 'alternative'? The approaches we have chosen are not only alternative in the sense that they propose nonviolent or less violent solutions to conflicts, but they also reflect new developments in current research on reconciliation. Compared to previous

approaches, a transition in favor of cultural and social processes has taken place. This transition is mainly the result of the unsatisfying outcomes of reconciliation processes that have relied strongly on top-down projects, sometimes being even implemented from outside the conflict by 'interventionist peacemaking.' For example, the peace processes in the Balkans after the wars in the 1990s focused on international law, integration into the European Union (EU), and economic incentives. While these factors were significant, the peace process failed to adequately address both the culture of memory and positive encounters between former enemies. The years that followed exposed the inherent problems of such a deficient peace process and led to a critical rethinking of peacebuilding.[5]

Similar reflections have come from many parts of the world. Regarding the peace process between Israel and Egypt, Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov wrote in 2004: "Reconciliation is probably the most important condition for shifting the current peace towards stable peace. Only reconciliation can build mutual trust and provide mutual assurances for maintaining peace" in the Middle East (p. 237). Paradoxically, "part of the fragility of peace processes is that reconciliation is professionalized [...] and not taken ownership of by society at large" (Brewer 2010, p. 3).

Researchers recognized that forming a culture of peace would be key to achieving stable peace. Karina Korostelina (2012) took up these issues in her work, *Forming a Culture of Peace*, which includes the long-neglected aspects of public and private communication, narratives, and history education. We view our book as a continuation of Korostelina's approach. In this second and revised edition, we focus on five different fields where dynamic new developments have taken place, indicating a paradigm shift in the study and practice of conflict resolution and reconciliation. In the field of *negotiation*, it is now a commonly agreed upon conviction that no conflict partner should be excluded, not even on so-called 'moral grounds,' if they are ready to talk. This change is particularly effective because diplomacy has become a much more flexible instrument for peacemaking, including Track One, Track One-and-a-Half, and Track Two Diplomacy.

A second key feature of this changing landscape is a new and strong focus on the positive role of formerly neglected actors in conflict. This includes *women* in particular. Research in past years has shown women as constructive and active role players in striving to end conflicts. The Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies (JCRS) has introduced the 'Hölderlin

perspective' that focuses on groups as well as individuals and their experiences of reconciliation and normality in the middle of a conflict (Leiner and Flämig 2012, pp. 7–20). Their research has shown women to be 'turning factors' in conflicts. The Liberian experience with Leymah Gbowee leading an inter-religious women's movement to end more than a decade of civil war is a case in point.

Next to the often neglected impact of women in peace processes, it is, thirdly, the role of *religion* that is highlighted here. With over 80% of the planet's population adhering to a faith tradition, religion significantly influences how people think and act—and sometimes choose not to act. Although any faith tradition can be ambivalent (Appleby 2000), it is often the problematic and violent sides of religion that are emphasized in conflict settings. Through our section on alternative approaches and religion, we aim to shed light on the constructive sides and the vast resources that religion offers for reconciliation and sustainable peace.

A fourth aspect indicating the comprehensiveness of the present change can be cast in conceptual terms. For years, the concept of 'transitional justice' had been the overarching framework that included subordinated aspects such as reconciliation, forgiveness, truth and reconciliation commissions, et cetera. Now, *reconciliation* is emerging as the overarching concept encompassing transitional justice, but at the same time going beyond it by providing a transformative framework for the problem-laden transitional justice approach. Nevin Aiken (2013) points out "that transitional justice interventions will contribute to reconciliation to the degree that they are able to serve as crucial catalysts for social and psychological processes of 'social learning' between former enemies."

Finally, recent years have seen a number of cultural turns that have expressed a renewed interest in peace and reconciliation research. Peace studies have become integrated within different fields of the cultural landscape such as *the arts*. The arts' impact as aesthetical and 'moral imagination' has greatly developed during recent years (Lederach 2005). Our media culture is prone to violence, not least due to the fact that violence is much easier to depict and envision. Peace, on the other hand, is much more challenging to perceive and portray. Artists are discovering ways to "transform our habitual way of looking" through a new dialogue on perception, thereby opening up new spaces for envisioning a culture of peace (Wenders and Zournazi 2013, p. 12).

The study and practice of conflict resolution and reconciliation present a dynamic field. The four alternative approaches to conflict resolution

discussed in this volume—negotiation, gender and religion, reconciliation, and the arts—are by no means comprehensive. Multiple supplementary approaches, such as recent developments in economics, restorative justice, or new technologies, are continually emerging. For now, we hope to provide an overview of recent developments by introducing these four areas.

Negotiation

A first fundamental change took place in the field of negotiation. Whereas before the focus was on the preconditions for negotiations, today many practitioners and researchers argue that negotiations should be conducted (1) already in the middle of a conflict, (2) even if the highest level of representatives are not (yet) willing to participate, and (3) also with, if necessary, persons who are morally problematic (Powell 2014, pp. 25–30). Furthermore, private-led Track Two Diplomacy is increasingly employed to supplement the traditional government-led Track One Diplomacy.

The following contributors take up various aspects of changing perspectives in negotiations. In his contribution "Justice in Negotiations and Conflict Resolution," Rudolf Schuessler, professor of philosophy at Bayreuth University and the German representative for the international non-governmental organization (NGO) Processes in International Negotiations (PIN), examines the role of justice in negotiation processes and conflict resolution. While it is widely accepted that justice does matter in these processes, the pluralism of moral opinions and concepts of justice also introduces a new set of problems. His chapter shows that considerations of procedural justice and meta-justice generally fail to offer a safe way out of this impasse, because they too are subject to a pluralism of approaches. It follows that a guiding view of justice in negotiations and conflict resolution also needs to be negotiated. This places particular emphasis on the responsibility and conflict-mitigating attitudes of the negotiating parties and on norms of mutual respect that support a shared quest for mutually acceptable views on justice.

Cesare Zucconi, a member of the community of Sant'Egidio in Rome, examines Track Two Diplomacy in close detail from his own experience in his chapter, "Beyond Official Negotiations: The Experience of the Community of Sant'Egidio." Sant'Egidio gained international acclaim

for successfully hosting and facilitating peace negotiations in Mozambique in 1992. These negotiations took place amidst an ongoing civil war and were guided by new approaches that focused on building trust and fostering an awareness of common concerns. According to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Sant'Egidio provided "a new mixture between institutional and non-institutional work" (Zucconi 2012, p. 304), the 'Italian formula' which effectively combines Track Two with Track One Diplomacy, secret and public talks, and bottom-up and top-down approaches.[6] Track Two Diplomacy does not replace official international relations or interactions at an institutional level, yet it does offer what institutions seem to be lacking in our times: a flexible, informal, and personalized approach.

The joint contribution of Swiss-German political scientist Julie Bernath, Adou Djane Dit Fatogoma, a sociologist from Côte d'Ivoire, and British development studies expert Briony Jones provides insights into the work of swisspeace, a practice-oriented Swiss foundation devoted to the research of peace and conflict transformation. In their chapter "Understanding 'Resistance' to Transitional Justice," the authors ask what we can learn if we truly engage with resistance-to-transitional-justice processes as an object of enquiry. Embedded in critical transitional justice scholarship and critical peace studies, it conceives of transitional justice as a political process of negotiation between different actors. Resistance thus becomes a necessary element in the empirical unfolding of transitional justice processes. The authors present conceptual and methodological approaches and discussions of a three-year, multi-country research project on "Resisting Transitional Justice? Alternative Understandings of Peace and Justice" of swisspeace and the University of Basel (2012–2015). It focuses on findings from the case study of Côte d'Ivoire to illustrate key insights, as well as the challenges, of adopting a critical research agenda on resistance to transitional justice.

Gender

Other innovative approaches focus on the importance of the role of gender, particularly women, in conflict resolution. Often victims, women carry much of the burden of violent conflicts, yet they rarely function as combatants themselves. Over the past few decades in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, and most notably in Liberia, women have made significant contributions to ending violent conflicts. Recently, the hypothesis became

stronger holding that women refuse the strict separation between the military/political/public sphere and the private sphere. Killed children are still killed children even if they wear uniforms (McAleese 1999). From antiquity onward, women are known to find creative solutions, build effective networks, and start sex boycotts, as in Liberia 2003, Mindanao 2011, or Togo 2012.[7]

In her chapter "Made for Goodness? Women, Ethnic Conflict, and Reconciliation," German political scientist Carolina Rehrmann draws on basic concepts of gender studies as she traces the potential of women and women's associations for conflict transformation and reconciliation. Rehrmann begins with a critical review of what has been criticized as a 'masculinist bias' in traditional approaches to conflict resolution that disregards gender in its potential to explain and resolve conflict. She argues that seeing male and female roles in a dialectic reference to one another, tracing and acknowledging their common impact on all levels of social and political life, first, is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of conflict risk and conflict structures, and second, illuminates the specific potential of women's engagement for transethnic and crossethnic dialogue, trauma reprocessing, and reconciliation. In the second part, Rehrmann focuses on case studies of women's activism in (post) conflict settings with a particular focus on Cyprus, illustrating common achievements of challenging traditional patriarchal structures, seemingly natural nationalist affiliations, and related gender roles.

In her chapter, South African scholar Elisabet le Roux from Stellenbosch University explores "Challenging the status quo: The role of women in peace processes." Across the world, women are involved in peace processes in multiple ways. However, increased recognition of the roles of women in peace processes has unfortunately not led to an increase in their formal inclusion. This is why this chapter argues that challenging the status quo is needed. Drawing on examples from peace processes in Liberia and Burundi, le Roux discusses the nature of women's involvement in peace processes and the barriers they face. Three key areas around which a further challenge of the status quo is needed are explored. First, reconciliation and gender justice need to become a priority in peace processes. These processes must take more seriously the opportunity for advancing women's rights and gender equality. Second, women-centered agendas need to be given space and allowed to influence the focus and aims of peace negotiations. Third, the reality of women's intersectional identities has implications for peace processes.

In a similar vein, US American peace expert Katherine Marshall, from the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, highlights the role of women in peacebuilding and conflict transformation when she asks in her chapter "Where are the women?" According to Marshall, the striking absence of women in formal peacemaking settings reflects both prejudices and institutional structures that are changing, albeit too slowly. There are positive examples of women's roles both in negotiations and, more significantly, in the wide gamut of "peacebuilding," which includes identifying the seeds of conflict, preventing violence, and the crucial work of reconciliation to move toward harmonious societies. Among the topics that need to be addressed are the invisibility of creative work by women from various sectors of society and effective ways to overcome barriers to understanding and action. Appreciating the complex roles that women play, and integrating this awareness and respect into the broader conflict transformation field, can, as Marshall argues, enrich understandings of the roots of conflict and strengthen efforts to work for peaceful and prospering societies.

Religion

Religion often appears as a factor promoting or contributing to violence in conflicts. A closer view, however, reveals religion's ambivalence. The same religion can foster violence and non-violence, conflict and reconciliation (Appleby 2000, pp. 81–166). Recent research, therefore, asks *how* religion is socially effective regarding violence and/or peace. What distinguishes pro-peace interpretations of religion from interpretations legitimating and fostering war? What are the respective roles of religious factors and non-religious factors, such as the economic and political situations or historical experiences, within a given cultural context? The following contributions take up these and other questions.

In his contribution "Religious Dimensions in Conflict Transformation," Swiss religion sociologist Richard Friedli, from the University of Fribourg, develops a tentative approach toward a reconciliation methodology. According to Friedli, each concrete political context manifests an overlapping reality where religions are key components. Islamic or Christian traditions are therein involved, as well as Hindu or Buddhist communities. Therefore, in view of realistic reconciliation dynamics, a precondition is the analysis of the theoretical and practical dimensions of religion-based violent phenomena: manifest and latent, personal and

structural, economic and cultural. In doing so, three major dimensions need to be considered: the fundamental narratives, the socially accepted norms, and the collective memories. These factors are often used to legitimize destructive and/or segregational practices. Yet embedded in the same deep-culture configuration are also potentials for reconciliation. This contribution illustrates two case studies of conflicts wherein both the destructive—even genocidal—as well as the constructive religious dynamics are involved: (1) the discussion surrounding the Islamic veil, and (2) the *ubuntu* philosophy in Rwanda.

With the contribution of Friedli presenting a perspective *on* religion, David P. Gushee, from Mercer University, presents a perspective from *within* a religious faith, namely the Christian (Baptist) tradition. In his contribution "A Critical Realist Engagement with Glen Stassen's 'Just Peacemaking' Approach," theologian and ethicist Gushee, widely regarded as one of the premier ethical thinkers in American Christianity, critically examines just peacemaking theory as pioneered by Glen Stassen of Fuller Theological Seminary (Pasadena, California). Stassen, from a Mennonite-Baptist tradition himself, represented a distinctly religious voice in American public debate and developed ten practices that were meant to prevent or solve violent conflict based on New Testament principles. After exploring the personal and intellectual origins of Stassen's just peacemaking theory, the paper describes and critiques its ten practices, which include nonviolent direct action, independent initiatives, acknowledgment of responsibility, and cooperative conflict resolution. The essay concludes that despite its weaknesses and limits, just peacemaking theory or practice has a substantial contribution to make to contemporary global peacemaking efforts.

Expanding the Christian perspective to a multi-religious horizon, Azza Karam, Founder and Director of "Lead Integrity" and member of the United Nations Secretary General's "High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism," argues in her chapter for "The Multilateral Imperative: Seeking the Common Good." Karam points out that individually, religions, through their respective institutions (e.g., mosques, synagogues, temples, etc.), their diverse faith leaders, and their affiliated NGOs, have been serving the common good since the beginning of history. She continues to argue that there are several very good reasons why religions matter to international development, foreign policy, and constantly increasing humanitarian needs. If peace and security are to be understood as the manner in which people behave toward one another,

what they believe in, and how they think, then religions, as the dictators of so much behavior and thought, must be factored in as a critical variable of public policy.

Reconciliation and Forgiveness

The topics of reconciliation and forgiveness have emerged as a major idée-force within the last two decades (Bar-Siman-Tov 2004). Reconciliation has become a leading term in political discourse, often used and misused. One of the warring parties in the second Liberian civil war, for instance, had called itself Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), a name hardly befitting a party that became infamous for its ruthless use of child soldiers turned against the country's civilian population. Yet to talk about reconciliation usually implies the desire to go beyond the technical resolution of a conflict by legal, economic, and political measures. Reconciliation also encompasses dealing with narratives, trauma, guilt and forgiveness, stereotypes, as well as encounters between former enemies.

Reconciliation tends to be more of a process than a result. This is due to the fact that severe violent conflicts hardly ever find complete closure; rather, they remain as bitter memories while also facing the constant threat of being reignited. Because reconciliation often does not go very deep, scholars have developed a broader concept of reconciliation that is sometimes called 'instrumental' or 'thin' reconciliation. Nevertheless, recent results have shown the effectiveness and productivity of different elements of reconciliation. One example is forgiveness and its benefits for the victim. Empirical research points to the fact that victims who forgive experience freedom from remaining fixated on the past and have a better chance of dealing successfully with the present and the future. While the value of forgiveness has long been recognized in the private realm, such as in interpersonal psycho-therapeutic contexts, its positive effects become increasingly significant for political contexts as well (Tutu and Tutu 2014; Cantacuzino 2016).[8] Forgiveness, however, can never be demanded by the perpetrator. It always remains the original right of the victim.

The issue of the human capacity for forgiveness after traumatic experiences is taken up by South African psychologist Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela in her chapter "Forgiveness is 'the Wrong Word': Empathic Repair and the Potential for Human Connection in the Aftermath of Historical Trauma." Drawing from her own experience as a psychologist

for South Africa's great experiment in national healing, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela argues that forgiveness is the wrong word to describe what takes place in victim-perpetrator encounters. Rather, she suggests it is "the emergence of the unexpected" that arises from witnessing each other's pain, which includes empathic care and repair. This position goes beyond forgiveness and serves two possible functions. First, it seeks to 'restore' the survival of the lost loved one who was murdered by the perpetrator. Second, by showing the kind of caring and containment that can assist in preventing disintegration in the perpetrator, the victim creates a new relational experience with them, which reconstitutes the memory of the loss as a positive narrative. First-hand experiences and interviews serve to illustrate Gobodo-Madikizela's position.

Complementing Gobodo-Madikizela's perspective from a theological outlook, Christo Thesnaar, professor of pastoral care and counseling at Stellenbosch University, critically examines the failures and omissions that have accompanied South Africa's reconciliation policies. In his chapter "Alternative and Innovative Approaches to Reconciliation: A South African Perspective," Thesnaar describes how, twenty years after the transition in South Africa, the violence of the current student protests resembles that of a ticking 'time bomb' on the brink of explosion. In an attempt to understand this complex reality, the author briefly assesses the role of the TRC process during this time. Although throughout the post-TRC period the faith communities were predominantly absent in terms of their calling to reconcile the people of South Africa, this contribution argues that they should indeed play a more proactive role when it comes to healing and reconciling the nation. In seeking to find suitable ways to accomplish this challenge, Thesnaar engages critically with two alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation and healing, namely the re-enactment of the TRC faith hearing and the approach adopted by the Restitution Foundation (RF).

Christine Schliesser, theologian and ethicist at the Center for Ethics at Zurich University, Switzerland, complements the focus on reconciliation in South Africa by taking a closer look at the current politics of reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. In 1994, Rwanda experienced the fastest genocide in recent history, resulting in the death of up to 1,000,000 people. In her contribution "The Politics of Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda," Schliesser provides a critical reading of Rwanda's current politics of reconciliation as a specific way of dealing with

the past, indicating both the strengths as well as the weaknesses of these politics. After a brief sketch of the context, she delineates the different components of Rwanda's politics of reconciliation such as the gacaca courts. In a third step, Schliesser draws the connection between reconciliation and remembrance, arguing that both are inseparably connected. Due to their interconnectedness, problematic aspects in one area can have negative effects on other areas.

The Arts

Religions contain worldviews. They invite us to view the world through the eyes of a believer, that is, through the eyes of somebody touched by revelation. This specific point of view, this *blick* (Hare 1962), also plays a pivotal role in the arts. Art makes possible and reveals new ways of seeing the world, which accounts for its tremendous potential for conflict resolution. In our own perception of reality, we tend to focus on dangers and obstacles, provoking both fear and anger within us. This, in turn, serves to reinforce our perception of reality, leaving ever less space for peace. What is needed is a change in the ways we look at problems and conflicts, a change of perception. Another significant factor surfaces when we give attention to the fact that the realm of the arts reaches beyond the realm of words. What might be impossible to express via spoken language can be conveyed through different means such as music, dance, or visual arts.

Politically engaged artist Bruce Clarke, from Paris, France, in his essay "Genocide, Memory, and the Arts: Memorial Projects in Rwanda of 'Upright Men' and 'The Garden of Memory,'" explores questions of how to "depict the undepictable, of how to remember that which cannot be remembered."[9] Clarke discusses the realization and philosophy behind his commemorative and memorial projects 'Upright Men' and 'The Garden of Memory' produced in Rwanda in the years following the Tutsi genocide. They are part of a longer reflection on the role art can play in a commemorative historical process, with the condition that it is based on an informed position. In addition to creating memorial spaces, the intention is to redefine art's role as a historical discipline and to place the genocide in Rwanda into the public arena at home and elsewhere in the world so that it cannot be ignored. Clarke argues that art can be a tool to raise consciousness about this major historical event, which is often misrepresented in the West and sometimes subject to denial theories.

A different approach is taken up by creative writer and philosopher Mary Zournazi from the University of New South Wales, Australia, who argues for the need for a different perspective on peace in her contribution, "A Notebook on Peace: Reflections on Cinema and Perception." Her chapter looks at questions of violence and the urgent need to invent a visual and moral language for peace. It examines various filmmakers who provide alternative means to violence and who provide a framework for considering the conditions for peace. Zournazi discusses her own film *Dogs of Democracy* (2016), in which she captures the care and concern people have for the street animals in Athens—a city facing social and economic crises. Art, most often, and cinema in this case, can allow a space to approach and respond with sincerity to violent situations rather than reacting in retaliation with the same force or violence. It is some of these techniques and skills that are explored and offered as Zournazi supports her claim that we need to learn how to form a new perception. In other words, we need to 'invent peace.'

> Inventing peace involves a genuine dialogue with the world and ourselves so that we can transform our habitual ways of looking at it. Economic, legal and political actions to prevent war and to protect human rights are fundamental to any quest for peace, yet at the same time, if we do not invent new ways of looking at these questions, we remain locked in habitual political patterns of power and resistance (Wenders and Zournazi 2013, p. 12).

Focusing on "Poetry and the Politics of the 21st Century," former Irish diplomat Philip McDonagh examines the public, prophetic role of many poets, from Hesiod in ancient Greece to Thomas Moore, W.B. Yeats, and Seamus Heaney in modern Ireland. According to McDonagh, poetry can supply the 'missing ingredient' in contemporary diplomacy: the capacity for cross-cultural deliberation and discernment from a long-term perspective. Poetry can 'foreknow the spirit of events,' opening a window to the future. Recognizing the 'poetic truth' of a situation means discerning the seeds of change that lie beneath the surface of politics. There is a 'poetic truth' that on all sides, the men, women, and children damaged by conflict are victims of a situation beyond their control. Therefore, part of our responsibility, argues the author, is to regain control by reframing and transforming a distorted social reality. Poetry can give us the courage

to affirm our deepest values and trust that political change, like poetry itself, is in the end 'given.'

In the concluding chapter, Martin Leiner, founder and director of JCRS at the University of Jena, brings together the different aspects presented in this volume. While these aspects differ in approach, outlook, and context, they are united by the fact that they all constitute alternatives in conflict resolution. Furthermore, all are tied to concrete contexts and have proven their effectiveness and productivity in the laboratory of history. In his "Conclusion: From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation," Leiner argues that reconciliation ought to be conceived as an overarching approach to conflict resolution with a focus on rebuilding relationships. Its goal is to create 'normal,' 'trustful,' and if possible 'good' and 'peaceful' relationships. Leiner defends reconciliation as an alternative approach to conflict resolution against four criticisms. These points of critique include debates on the sources of reconciliation, on whether reconciliation might be more appropriately considered a mechanism or an approach, on whether reconciliation is an idealistic goal or a process, and on the right timing for reconciliation processes to begin. Leiner concludes by showing how reconciliation as a long-term project can, in fact, work. He names justice, truth, and resilience as fundamental components of reconciliation processes.

Combining the knowledge and insights of experts from academia and NGOs, civil society and politics alike, it is our hope that this book builds bridges to connect these distinct areas. With its different contributions containing an abundance of current, constructive, and valuable information, we like to think of it as a toolbox for academics and practitioners alike in our joint quest for a more peaceful world. Peace, we learn from German pastor and theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who was killed for his resistance against the Nazi regime, cannot be reached along the way of safety. It must be dared.[10]

Notes

1. Cf. the contribution of Mary Zournazi in Chapter 16 of this volume as well as Wenders and Zournazi, 2013.
2. The first peace-studies program was established at Manchester College in Indiana in 1948 for about twenty years. The college was run by the Church of the Brethren. For some of their insights they relied on previous work dating back to antiquity.

3. For an overview of the different regions of the world concerning reconciliation processes, such as in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, or Asia Pacific, see Leiner and Flämig, 2012.
4. This is evident even in handbooks that seem to provide a global overview with significant research and insights, yet fail to provide an integration of the different relevant disciplines. Cf. Lederach and Moomaw Jenner, 2002 (for a practitioners' approach); Collier et al., 2003 (for an economical approach); Nadler et al., 2008 and Malley-Morrison et al., 2013 (for a psychological approach).
5. Two transitional justice measures were dramatically unsuccessful. A right to return was given to all, that is at least 2.2 million displaced persons in the conflict, yet only a bit more than half a million accepted to live in their former homes (cf. Ther 2016). The process against Slobodan Milosevič in the international court was transmitted by television in Serbia. It demonstrated clearly that by his speeches, Milosevič could find a platform for successful propaganda for his narratives.
6. See Dambach (2010) for an account on how his contribution as a non-politician helped facilitate peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea and within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
7. Research indicates that the importance of education, emotions, and human needs is intuitively more obvious to women (cf. Avruch and Mitchell 2013).
8. For various spiritual and psychotherapeutic contexts, see Kornfeld 2008; Meyer 2012; Tipping 2004.
9. Visit www.bruce-clarke.com.
10. Cf. Bonhoeffer (1994, p. 300).

References

Aiken, Nevin T. 2013. Identity, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice. In *Transitional Justice Theories*, ed. Susanne Buckley-Zistel, et al. New York: Routledge.

Appleby, Scott R. 2000. *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Avruch, Kevin, and Christopher Mitchell, eds. 2013. *Conflict Resolution and Human Needs: Linking Theory and Practice*. New York: Routledge.

Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov, ed. 2004. *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. 1994. Rede auf der Fanø-Konferenz. In *London 1933–1935*, ed Keith W. Clements, 298–301. Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works no 13. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus.

Brewer, John D. 2010. *Peace Processes: A Sociological Approach*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Cantacuzino, Marina. 2016. *The Forgiveness Project: Stories for a Vengeful Age*. London: Jessica Kingsley.

Collier, Paul, et al. 2003. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Dambach, Chic. 2010. *Exhaust the Limits: The Life and Times of a Global Peacebuilder*. Baltimore: Apprentice House.

Gardner Feldman, Lily. 2013. *Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Hare, Richard M. 1962. *The Language of Morals*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kornfeld, Jack. 2008. *The Wise Heart: A Guide to the Universal Teachings of Buddhist Psychology*. New York: Bantam.

Korostelina, Karina. 2012. *Forming a Culture of Peace: Reframing Narratives of Intergroup Relations, Equity, and Justice*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lederach, John Paul. 2005. *The Moral Imagination*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lederach, John Paul, and Janice Moomaw Jenner. 2002. *A Handbook of International Peacebuilding: Into the Eye of the Storm*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Leiner, Martin, and Susan Flämig. 2012. Reconciliation in the Middle of Dispute: Introduction to the Series. In *Latin America between conflict and reconciliation*, ed Martin Leiner and Susan Flämig, 7–20. Research in Peace and Reconciliation no. 1. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Malley-Morrison, Kathleen, Andrea Mercurio, and Gabriel Twose. 2013. *International Handbook of Peace and Reconciliation*. New York: Springer.

McAleese, Mary. 1999. *Love in Chaos: Spiritual Growth and the Search for Peace in Northern Ireland*. New York: Continuum.

Meyer, Joyce. 2012. *Do Yourself a Favor Forgive: Learn How to Take Control of Your Life through Forgiveness*. Nashville: FaithWords.

Nadler, Arie, Thomas E. Malloy, and Jeffrey D. Fisher, eds. 2008. *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Reconciliation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Powell, Jonathan. 2014. *Talking to Terrorists: How to End Armed Conflicts*. London: Bodley Head.

Ther, Philipp. 2016. *The Dark Side of Nation-States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern Europe*. War and Genocide no. 19. New York: Berghahn.

Tipping, Colin. 2004. *Radical Forgiveness*. Louisville: Sounds True.

Tutu, Desmond, and Mpho Tutu. 2014. *The Book of Forgiving: The Fourfold Path for Healing Ourselves and Our World*. San Francisco: HarperOne.

Wenders, Wim, and Mary Zournazi. 2013. *Inventing Peace: A Dialogue on Perception*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Zucconi, Cesare. 2012. Die Friedensarbeit der Gemeinschaft Sant'Egidio. In *Friedensfähigkeit und Friedensvisionen in Religionen und Kulturen*, ed. Mariano Delgado, Adrian Holderegger, and Guido Vergauwen, 295–318. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

PART I

Alternative Approaches—Negotiation

CHAPTER 2

Introduction to Negotiation

Martin Leiner

Abstract The three chapters in Part I by Rudolf Schuessler, Cesare Zucconi, Julie Bernath Adou Djane Dit Fatogoma, and Briony Jones touch on negotiation for conflict resolution. Recent decades have brought two fundamental shifts to negotiation theory and its application in conflict resolution. First, fields of potential negotiation partners and arenas are broadening beyond those of conventional interstate diplomacy. Second, communication with non-state adversaries proves effective in many circumstances. With the emergence of alternative approaches engaging partners who are not official government representatives (e.g., diplomats or politicians) known as Track Two Diplomacy, such interactions build trust and humanize out-group adversaries. This creative conceptual expansion continues to develop, providing insights into the interdependence and relevance of many non-political entities involved in and/or impacted by conflict.

M. Leiner (✉)
Jena, Germany
e-mail: martin.leiner@uni-jena.de

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_2

Keywords Rudolf Schuessler · Cesare Zucconi · Julie Bernath · Adou Djane Dit Fatogoma · Briony Jones · Negotiation · Conflict resolution · Track Two Diplomacy

Introduction

Recent decades brought two fundamental shifts to negotiation theory and its application in conflict resolution. First, fields of potential negotiation partners and arenas have been broadened significantly beyond those of conventional interstate diplomacy. Second, communication with non-state adversaries has proven effective in many circumstances.

The first shift began with the emergence of alternative approaches engaging partners who were not official government representatives such as diplomats or politicians. Labeled as 'Track Two Diplomacy' by William D. Davidson and Joseph V. Montville (1981–1982), the original conception for Track Two included activities in fields of culture and science. Such interactions build trust and humanize the out-group adversaries. This creative conceptual expansion continued to develop ever since, providing insights into the interdependence and relevance of many non-political entities involved in and/or impacted by conflict.[1]

Multi-Track Diplomacy was well established by 1991 as outlined in Louise Diamond's and John McDonald's system of tracks one through nine, with a goal of comprehensively accounting for groups involved in conflict (1991).[2] Their approach includes business, religion, funding, media, government (Track One); private citizens, peace activists, research (training and education), and professional conflict-resolution mediators (Track Two). Other scholars and practitioners have, in addition to that system, focused on cultural diplomacy, for example, through music and sports or on special phenomena such as emergency aid. Together with the insights gained since these early developments is a concurrent reframing of conflict-resolution interventions confined not so much to 'diplomacy' but rather peacebuilding and fostering reconciliation. And these activities are guided by mediators and facilitators specifically trained to do so.

The second shift is more recent and controversial. Non-state conflict adversaries, often labeled 'terrorists,' proved a quagmire for governments and non-government organizations (NGOs). How do you negotiate with groups when that negotiation itself provides the adversary with the victory

of recognition? In 1990, the Community of Sant'Egidio based in Rome started peace talks with the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) rebels known for their cruelties as 'Black Khmer' and the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) government known for massacres of civilians. The contribution in this volume by Cesare Zucconi, Secretary-General of Sant'Egidio (Chapter 4), gives some insights into those negotiations. To the surprise of many, they succeeded in negotiating a peace that has proven sustainable for almost two decades now.

Other examples include diplomatic exchanges with North Korea, the British government deciding to negotiate with Irish Republican Army (IRA) leaders, Nelson Mandela negotiating with Constand Viljoen, and in 2016, Colombia concluding a peace treaty with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (FARC) guerrilla group thereby ending the world's longest-running civil war. These and more negotiation experiences support the conviction not to exclude groups from talks regardless of violent pasts. Jonathan Powell's book, *Talking to Terrorists* (2014), demonstrates that entering negotiations changes terrorist groups and opens chances to overcome violence. Refusing communication is a high-risk strategy. In 2004, for example, Vladimir Putin refused to talk with violent groups during the Beslan school attack where 330 hostages were killed. More recently, European and United States (US) officials refused to negotiate with autocratic leaders and radical groups in Libya and Syria, where there has been a great subsequent loss of life.

These two innovative shifts described above form the basis of a present broadening of negotiation understanding. The phrase 'alternative approaches' for this volume, we as editors believe, is being built on that broadening. Many contexts continue to resist such insights despite recent accomplishments.[3] Thus the continuing goal is to document, investigate, and develop a theory to learn from new experiences—successes and failures—and thereby provide well-structured foundations regarding processes and tracks of negotiation.

Chapter 3, 'Justice in Negotiations and Conflict Resolution,' by the German philosopher Rudolf Schuessler, is a contribution to giving more structure to the negotiation process. It addresses the difficulty of negotiation with people not committed to truth. In 2016, such questions become more important than ever given the situation that post-factual argumentation has been successful in winning elections. Schuessler distinguishes between 'simulation' (make-believe of what is not the case) and

'dissimulation' (create disbelief of what is the case), which are traditionally seen as normal and sometimes necessary aspects of politics on one hand[4] yet a complete untruthfulness about basic values and overall goals. Silencing, ambiguity, and sometimes telling a lie in a concrete situation might be part of political life. However, if it is impossible to discern what the strategic goals and truth are, then no successful negotiations can take place.

The other topic Schuessler discusses is justice. He shows that justice matters in negotiations because most partners in a discussion claim their position to be just. In most cases, people's justice-claims appeal to universal rules of justice and are self-biased in that people choose the theory of justice which is most profitable for them. Given the fact that there are many different theories of justice, the art of negotiation is to find a point of reconciliation between them. Schuessler combines classical philosophical positions such as Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas with game theory and the political debate between realists and idealists. By reflecting on the importance of truth and justice, Schuessler not only clarifies concepts but shows how negotiations can be more effective. Even people who do not believe in the ultimate importance of truth or justice need to respect them as realities relevant to conflict.

Chapter 4, by Zucconi, Secretary-General of Sant'Egidio Community in Rome, provides a look through the keyhole into a very special and innovative way of negotiation. His contribution is part of the more detailed investigation into the lessons learned from Track Two Diplomacy. Four innovative insights from his paper deserve special attention: (1) all parties impacted by a conflict must be addressed in the reconciliation process, but peace talks require intimate interaction among a small group of main actors, (2) advantage is gained by creating safe spaces for conflict partners to develop their approaches to peace. This allows them ownership of the process. Pressure to create peace is provided by reality, casualties in their own group, populations asking for peace, lack of resources, and a general degradation of conditions of their lives. Thus, sustainable peace may require avoiding additional pressure on the conflicting parties in negotiations, (3) mediators can help by treating all parties with respect. The community hosting the Renamo and Frelimo representatives made it possible to develop respect for the other group, and (4) written commitments provide crucial moments. Even if they are not ultimate peace agreements, written commitments that remain at the

negotiation table unless a settlement is achieved can be productive signs of goodwill and also stop some violent activities.

Chapter 5, written by Julie Bernath, Adou Djane Dit Fatogoma, and Briony Jones, deals with 'transitional justice' and presents the results of a research project funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) to understand resistance against transitional justice. After a strong expansion of transitional justice since the 1990s, today this approach is in crisis because transitional justice has been considered too top-down and imperialistic. For example, the central parts of transitional justice in the work of the International Criminal Court (ICC) accused African leaders more than European or American leaders. Unfortunately, countries like the US, Russia, China, or Israel did not ratify the statute of Rome and thus undermined the ICC that they had cooperated to bring into being, and then African countries quit the ICC. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the authors also show that opposition against a 'Truth Commission' may be the result of opposition against top-down policies of a local government. They argue that opponents should not be considered as 'spoilers.' This contribution shows the urgency to reorganize peacebuilding today. As Schuessler shows, each conception of justice must compromise and be reconciled with other concepts of justice; otherwise, it becomes egocentric and imperialistic. Scientifically speaking, the bulimia of transitional justice—which integrates everything including reconciliation under a certain understanding of justice—is the wrong conception.[5] Reconciliation can only be the englobing perspective, and transitional justice is one possible autonomous part within that approach. From that basis, and because of its very important contribution, transitional justice can and must be saved and defended against the decline that it is about to undergo.

Notes

1. This last development culminates in the concept of Track One-and-a-Half Diplomacy, advocated by some researchers linked to United States Institute of Peace (USIP) to elaborate better the links between Track One Diplomacy and Track Two Diplomacy.
2. Cf. also the summary on the website for the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy at http://imtd.org/multi-track-diplomacy (accessed on January 3, 2017).

3. A typical case is Israel who officially refuses to negotiate with the Hamas government in Gaza, leaving many questions unresolved. Making negotiations official would help both sides work for a peaceful solution.
4. The Latin quote is: *Qui nescit dissimulare nescit regnare*.
5. An englobing definition of transitional justice was given by the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General: Transitional justice is 'the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses in order to ensure accountability, serve justice, and achieve reconciliation' (2004).

References

Diamond, Louise, and John McDonald. 1991. *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Guide and Analysis*. Grinnell: Iowa Peace Institute.

Davidson, William D, and Joseph V. Montville. 1981–1982. "Foreign Policy According to Freud." *Foreign Policy* 45:145–57.

Powell, Jonathan. 2014. *Talking to Terrorists: How to End Armed Conflicts*. London: Bodley Head.

United Nations Secretary-General. 2004. *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies*. Report of the United Nations Security Council, no. S/2004/616 (August 23): 1–24. http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga07/law.pdf.

CHAPTER 3

Justice in Negotiations and Conflict Resolution

Rudolf Schuessler

Abstract It is widely recognized that justice matters for negotiation and conflict resolution. However, the pluralism of moral opinions and concepts of justice also introduces new fields of conflict. Rudolf Schuessler shows that considerations of procedural justice and meta-justice generally fail to offer a safe way out of this impasse, because they too are subject to a pluralism of approaches. It follows that justice in negotiations and conflict resolution needs itself to be negotiated. The guiding view of justice for a process of negotiation is to be established by negotiation in this process. This puts particular emphasis on the responsibility and conflict-mitigating attitudes of the negotiating parties and on norms of mutual respect that support a shared quest for mutually acceptable views on justice.

Keywords Rudolf Schuessler · Justice · Negotiation · Conflict resolution · Responsibility

R. Schuessler (✉)
Bayreuth, Germany
e-mail: rudolf.schuessler@uni-bayreuth.de

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_3

Justice matters. At least, that is the message of empirical findings on negotiations and conflict resolution in many fields of human conduct. Experimental studies in economics and psychology, and not to forget plain common sense, corroborate this as well (Albin 2001; Lange et al. 2010). Human beings resent being treated in ways they consider unjust, and agreements involving perceived injustice tend to be less stable than agreements where this is not the case. The question, however, is what to do with this insight. The recommendation to strive for justice is 'easier said than done.' Most people who advocate justice have (at least) two experiences, with the fields of negotiation and conflict resolution not being an exception. They learn that their views on justice are often not shared by those who have a stake in the problem. Justice is a notoriously pluralistic concept (Roemer 1996). Several alternative 'just' agendas or solutions can be conceived for most practical purposes, and the parties to a conflict or negotiation often differ with respect to the potentially just outcome they prefer, or the outcome they consider most just. Take, for instance, climate negotiations. Developing countries perceive it to be just to hold industrialized countries responsible for their 'historical' pre-1990 (roughly the year of the first climate negotiations) greenhouse gas emissions. Industrialized countries, on the other hand, have reservations about the validity of any demands of historical climate justice for the period before 1990. Instead, they make a case for the justness of limited benchmarking of emission reductions to existing emission levels (i.e., 'grandfathering'). Needless to say, developing-country representatives consider grandfathering to be unjust (Schuessler 2011; Bovens 2011).

The example of climate negotiations shows that calling for justice as such often fails to resolve conflicts, because the parties' divergent views on justice also tend to conflict. Moreover, where narrow-minded moralists, who are dogmatic about the purity and rightness of their own views and actions, have the say, disagreements over justice take on the appearance of religious strife. Wars of justice then become the secularized successors of religious wars. Let us assume that people who come together at the negotiating table or seek conflict resolution want to avoid this outcome. What attitude should they develop toward justice?

The Role of Theories of Justice

One option is to assume that deeper reflection will limit the pluralism of potentially just outcomes, perhaps relying on moral philosophers and theories of justice for guidance. This is what most theorists of justice aspire to. They usually claim that their intricate arguments demonstrate that a given just solution is better than any other discussed solution. Unfortunately, a multitude of such theorists exists and their conclusions and arguments differ. The pluralism of moral opinions will therefore in no way be reduced for an agent who is not yet aligned to any of the competing theories or academic gurus. Even if a theorist's arguments sound convincing to the agent, she must reckon with the possibility that other agents will be swayed by the theorist's opponents.

Admittedly, this conclusion is not universally valid. Reasonable persons will agree on a moral assessment in certain fields of ethics. For instance, most people agree that freedom, justice, and well-being are good and valuable. That is, reasonable persons share certain values. However, they usually disagree over the relative weight of those shared values, with some cherishing freedom more than justice, and others vice versa. Since most practical moral problems entail the weighing of values and reasons, an agreement on basic values does not contribute much to the solution of such problems. This reasoning can also be reversed: Action-relevant moral problems arise only if people weigh values and reasons differently; otherwise they would agree on a solution from the outset, and there would hence be no problem to contemplate.

Nevertheless, however restrictedly, the diffusion of shared concepts of justice might mitigate moral problems. Taking this step seems to be mandatory in peace-loving and conflict-resolving societies. John Rawls' influential call for a broadening of the 'overlapping consensus' between different moral paradigms is an example in point (1987). However, a pluralism of moral views and notions of justice is the natural result of a free and open public moral discourse. Outside the natural sciences and mathematics, the ordinary progression of academic discourses, which are guided by arguments alone, indicates that different reasonable persons will be won over by different arguments and consequently arrive at different conclusions.[1] This is not just a predicament of modern liberal societies, whose pluralism might be considered exaggerated by some observers. Delving into the history of moral thought, we find that the problem of a barely manageable multiplicity of moral opinions has already

been addressed by medieval thinkers (Schuessler 2014). It already troubled their neither modern nor liberal societies. The Inquisition did not succeed in suppressing the practical pluralism of moral views—this was only achieved by the far bloodier policies of modern totalitarianism. We should therefore use caution when calling for the reduction of moral pluralism in our societies. There is nothing wrong with inculcating democratic and ecological values, for example, but as soon as their relative weight with respect to other values is to be fixed authoritatively, we should begin to worry. Yet unless the relative weight of values is fixed, there will be no widespread moral agreement on solutions for practical problems.

This conclusion seems hard to swallow. To many who work in the field of negotiation analysis and conflict resolution, bringing the moral views of conflicting parties closer together is worthwhile. Actually, I do not question the reasonableness of this aim, but call for it to be correctly understood. Moral agreement on practical matters is usually not the result of ethical reflection, truth-directed reasoning, and logical argumentation. These ideals instead produce disagreement if they are pursued single-mindedly.[2] Ideal rational discourse breeds disagreement, because reasonable persons may weigh reasons differently and have no reason to refrain from doing so in ideal discourses, which are not inhibited by power differences, lack of resources, or time restrictions. Jürgen Habermas, the leading theorist of discourse ethics, got it wrong in this respect, at least in my opinion (1988). He believes that ideal rational discourse is driven by a consensus of all reasonable persons. On the contrary, consensus on practical problems and the rapprochement of moral positions is usually a result of circumstantial reasons and pressures. We agree to agree if it is in our interest, or if we grow tired of further discussions, or if we want to end a conflict for reasons of the common good. Approaches to negotiation or conflict resolution strive (and should strive) to work with such motivations. They can thereby, among other things, partially overcome disagreements on justice, but not for the reasons traditionally offered by theories of justice.

Going Procedural

The role of circumstantial factors, such as fatigue, hurting stalemate, or impatience, for coming to terms in situations of conflict indicates how much the negotiating process (or the process of conflict resolution) matters for such endeavors. Usually, the parties need to compromise, that

is, neither to attain the outcome they deem best or most fair. Since the compromise is not optimal according to the normative standards of either side, particularly when taken on its own, other standards need to be incorporated to determine whether a compromise is foul or fair. This standard will often be one of fair process, that is, a compromise will be judged by how it is brought about. If all parties feel fairly treated in the process of negotiating the compromise, they will tend to accept it as fair, because the material outcome will not fully comply with any party's standards of justice. This point helps to understand the apparently unduly exaggerated role of etiquette in diplomatic practice. At first glance, diplomatic etiquette is utterly irrelevant in comparison to the material outcome of a negotiation. At best, it pleases a few pampered civil servants, whereas the latter may seriously affect the lives of millions. Hence, rational agents should not be overly preoccupied with diplomatic etiquette. Yet perceptions of the justice of an outcome will usually differ and a compromise between rival views must be sought. Etiquette is a signal that all sides are being fairly treated in the process of finding a compromise, and as the deadlock of outcomes puts a premium on fair processes, this signal gains disproportionately in importance. Hence, it was no accident that the less powerful participants in the 'Concert of Europe' after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 received disproportionate procedural attention from the great powers of Europe of the time (Schroeder 1999; Siemann 2016). What they could call for in this temporarily (several decades, after all) successful attempt at collective security management was fair procedural respect, which they more or less got.

Principles of procedural justice would, of course, serve the outlined purpose even better than mere rules of diplomatic etiquette. However, as you might have guessed by now, moral pluralism does not stop short of procedural justice. Principles and rules of procedural justice are no less subject to moral disagreement than the material results of distributive justice. Take bargaining theory, for instance. Bargaining theory is a branch of game theory, which assumes conditions ('axioms') that limit the bargaining process between economically rational agents. These axioms can be understood as rationality conditions, but some are explicitly defended as standards of fairness (Thomson 1994).[3] Some bargaining theorists, for instance, consider it fair for all players to profit from all benefits generated in a bargaining process (one that 'enlarges the cake'). Other bargaining theorists consider it fair if only those players profit whose options are expanded. These alternative assumptions lead to different

bargaining solutions. Such alternatives generally exist for most guidelines of procedural justice, and reasonable persons can thus disagree on just procedural regulations for the solution of conflicts or for finding agreements. Established rules of etiquette are therefore often a remedy of last resort to demonstrate that all sides respect each other and want to treat each other justly. Moreover, if there are no established rules of etiquette to comply with, it is usually helpful to introduce them for the reasons outlined above.

Moral disagreement on procedural justice offers a glimpse of the depth of the disagreement problem in ethics. Disagreement on a first level of moral consideration would be less virulent if we could agree on a 'second-order ethics,' that is, an ethics of dealing with ethical disagreements. One aspect of Immanuel Kant's work offers precisely such a second-order ethics. His 'Categorical Imperative' was designed to overcome the disagreements that arose in the ordinary ethics of Kant's day with respect to happiness or virtue. Against such disagreements, Kant claimed to derive universal duties on which all reasonable beings could agree. Personally, I am in favor of solving problems of disagreement using the method of moral self-legislation, but a large number of moral philosophers, in fact, disagree.[4] Moving to a second (or 'meta') level of consideration only leads to new disagreements. We therefore face a predicament that could be described as a 'layered' or 'nested disagreement.' Disagreements on one level of moral consideration stabilize and are in turn stabilized by disagreements on further levels. This renders the problem of moral disagreement in ethics next to intractable and places particular emphasis on circumstantially driven, pragmatic remedies in practice.

Negotiating the Justice of Negotiations

So far, the upshot of my analysis is that the study of negotiations or conflict resolution cannot simply look to ethics for guidance on what *the* just outcome or just procedural regulation of a case would be. At best, theories of justice can offer a menu of just solutions from which the parties to a negotiation or conflict may choose, or on the basis of which they can develop a compromise. It follows that justice in negotiations must itself be negotiated. Negotiations are not subject to rules of justice, because these rules need to be negotiated to begin with—or the parties need to at least negotiate a shared perspective on justice,

however minimal. This seems to imply that no prior ethics of negotiations can exist, and that the many textbooks on this subject are moot. Let me comment on this issue. A plurality of notions and procedures of justice, and a requirement to negotiate a course between them, does not imply the non-existence of duties of conduct in negotiations. Similarly, the lack of a universal second-order ethics for dealing with moral disagreement does not imply that anything goes. Some restrictions may apply, or at least, we can test them for acceptability. If they remain undisputed among practitioners and addressees of negotiation analysis and conflict resolution, we may confidently use them in an ethics of negotiation or conflict resolution. If they are rejected by the parties, who display no apparent parochial self-serving bias, there is no basis for imposing them as universal moral guidelines. In sum, the old philosopher's dream of finding guidelines that are both reasonably justifiable as well as applicable need not be entirely abandoned, but should be subject to skeptical and critical testing—and needs to be considerably downscaled. That said, let us look at an example.

Norms of Veracity

Many moral philosophers assume that veracity and truthfulness can be demanded of negotiators (Menkel-Meadow and Wheeler 2004, pt. 2; Thompson 2001, chap.7). As such, veracity is not an issue of justice, but here we are primarily interested in veracity with respect to revealing one's perspective of justice. This particular kind of veracity is key to finding just compromises and therefore deserves to be discussed in the context of justice.

At a very general level, many ethicists demand that negotiators should not only refrain from outright lying, but also from disseminating misleading messages or from withholding crucial information. At first glance, such norms appear blue-eyed and overly moralistic. If political realism is considered an acceptable doctrine for international political negotiations, a willingness to share strategically important information with an opponent certainly does *not* belong to its list of virtues (Donnelly 2008). We need not invoke Machiavelli as a patron saint of political realism to underline this point. Traditionally, skillful simulation (make-believe of what is not the case) and dissimulation (create disbelief of what is the case) belong to the toolbox of any successful ruler or politician (in the original Latin: *Qui nescit dissimulare*, *nescit regnare*).[5] Note that

this does not include outright lying. Simulation and dissimulation instead work with ambiguity and withholding of information, so that an opponent is misled without ever being outrightly lied to (i.e., deceived by the conscious statement of an assumed falsehood). Christian ethics has strictly prohibited lying since the time of Augustine, but has permitted the use of other means of deception in case of necessity. Kant propagates similar practical standards, when taking the fine print of his lectures on ethics into account.[6] His unbending prohibition of lying does not include a prohibition of all ways of informational manipulation. It would otherwise be unintelligible how Kant could have become a favored philosopher of political realists ranging from Metternich to Kissinger (Siemann 2016, p. 80, 95; Ferguson 2015).

An ethics of negotiation that does not try to be more moralistic than Kant will therefore not ban all sorts of manipulative communication. It will at best prohibit outright lies. Yet even this might seem overly moralistic, because a lie (e.g., with respect to the declared intentions of a guarantee power) might help reach a peace deal in a horrendous war. Is it not better to end the slaughter of thousands of people than to remain pure at heart and refrain from giving guarantees one definitely does not intend to keep?[7] Moral philosophers will disagree on this question, most likely along the lines of consequentialist and deontological ethics. Such disagreements demonstrate that a rigid prohibition of lying cannot be part of a universally valid ethics of negotiation. It is a rule followed by moralists—or what political realists call idealists—but within the confines of reasonable moral pluralism, agents are entitled to decide for themselves how moralistic they want to be.

So much for veracity as a general norm. Yet its generality conceals the fact that we are dealing with a special case in light of the foregoing considerations on justice in negotiations. The question is whether veracity is required when we negotiate justice. The parties to a negotiation must seek agreement in a way perceived to be sufficiently just by them. In exchanging their views on justice and fairness, the parties can be more or less veracious. They can deceive opponents not only about their actual views on justice, but also about how morally acceptable they find their opponents' views.

Again, extreme cases may justify deception, at least from some reasonably defensible moral perspectives. Imagine that a democracy enters into a coalition with an evil dictator in a war against an even more evil dictator (forming an alliance with Stalin against Hitler comes to mind, except

that Stalin refuses to budge in the following case). The leaders of the democracy called on the dictator to refrain from human rights violations, referring to moral principles. What they do not reveal is that they would be willing to sacrifice these principles to achieve the coalition. Given that the dictator needs the coalition more urgently than the democratic leaders, he might give in—and that would probably justify the lie regarding the democratic leaders' moral rigidity. However, it seems that lying about moral principles and views on justice is not on par with, say, lying about one's reservation price or the strength of one's troops in a negotiation. We half expect opponents to be dishonest in the latter cases and are not truly surprised when a person, who intently looked us in the eye and quipped 'Last offer!', ends up making a better offer after sustained haggling. However, with respect to lies about moral positions, most will feel betrayed if they have been denied a benefit due to an allegedly unassailable moral principle and realize that this principle was waived in negotiations with another person. Moral honesty seems to be more important than honesty in general.

Why should this be the case? One of the better (albeit insufficient) reasons behind Kant's rigid prohibition of lying is that lying prevents cognitive progress. We cannot learn as quickly and as effectively from people who might deal us misinformation than from those who are one hundred percent veracious. This is particularly true in terms of morals, because other persons are the only source from which we can learn morally. We cannot make moral progress by studying nature.[8] Widespread lying about moral positions will therefore impede moral progress in society. It will thwart the discursive search for a better morality, which in turn might help improve society. In Kant's metaphor, it will bias our moral compass, and this is worse than spreading some factual error about the material world. Moreover, remember that justice in negotiations itself has to be negotiated. There is thus no independent route by which clever philosophers might procure moral progress and limit the effects of moral dishonesty in negotiations. What precisely moral progress signifies with respect to practical justice can only be judged on the basis of practically negotiated just results. Derailing this process is a direct onslaught against the idea of moral progress.

This is a reason to react more strongly to moral deception in negotiations than against deception per se, which is not to say, of course, that our strong emotional responses in cases of being morally duped occur for this reason. However, even those who do not care about moral

progress should be aware of the risk of strong counter-reactions against moral deception. It might well be the case that revealed moral deception destroys the trust between the parties, which is crucial for arriving at an agreement, even more so than more mundane forms of deception. However, it would require empirical studies to vindicate this assumption. In any case, it seems reasonable to reserve moral deception, if used at all, for the most challenging of hard cases. A look at the practice of hard-nosed, successful political realists confirms this recommendation. Realists from Richelieu to Metternich and Kissinger did not lie about the normative principles they held. They did not promote idealist principles, and this reduced their need to betray their own principles in case of emergency (above all in the eyes of others),[9] but they were quite candid as to the normative principles they held.

Conclusion

The present paper acknowledges that justice in negotiations and conflict resolution matters. In both fields, however, moral pluralism forestalls the straightforward guidance of universal norms as suggested by theories of justice or an ethics of negotiation and conflict resolution. Layered disagreements in ethics render it necessary to negotiate justice itself. At first glance, this seems to indicate that anything goes with respect to morality if aptly negotiated, but this conclusion would be rash. The example of veracity with reference to normative discussions in negotiations shows that a minimal ethics of negotiating justice might exist, which has so far only been insufficiently investigated.

Notes

1. In fact, there is a debate to the extent that reasonable disagreement can exist in the natural sciences and mathematics. Since I do not want to address this field here, it is excluded from our discussion for the sake of the argument.
2. On the relevance of principled disagreements in philosophy and politics, see McMahon (2009), Christensen (2009).
3. The outlined assumptions distinguish the Kalai-Smorodinsky and the egalitarian bargaining solutions.

4. The case for and against self-legislation as a core element of ethics is too complex to be pursued here. As an example of how self-legislation can be employed in applied ethics, see Schuessler (2015).
5. On simulation and dissimulation in early modern thought, see Zagorin (1990).
6. For Christianity, see Dorszynski (1948); for Kant, see Schuessler (2013).
7. The example is not merely academic because it was common for states in the eighteenth century to give assurances that were not kept in cases of emergency (see Schroeder 1999, p.11).
8. Proponents of evolutionary ethics will disagree, but evolution can at best tell us how Stone Age morality might have emerged. This hardly gives us a clue as to what is usually conceived as moral progress, namely a morality that goes beyond its Stone Age variety.
9. The paradigmatic idealist who betrayed his principles in the eyes of others, notably in the 1919 negotiations in Versailles, was Woodrow Wilson (see MacMillan, 2002).

References

Albin, Cecilia. 2001. *Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bovens, Luc. 2011. A Lockean Defense of Grandfathering Emission Rights. In *The Ethics of Global Climate Change*, ed. Denis Arnold, 124–144. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Christensen, David. 2009. Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. *Philosophy Compass* 5: 756–767.

Donnelly, Jack. 2008. The Ethics of Realism. In *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, 150–162. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dorszynski, Julius. 1948. *Catholic Teaching about the Morality of Falsehood*. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.

Ferguson, Niall. 2015. *Kissinger. The Idealist 1923–1986*. London: Allen Lane.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1988. *Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Lange, Andreas, Andreas Löschel, Carsten Vogt, and Andreas Ziegler. 2010. On the Self-Interested Use of Equity in International Climate Negotiations. *European Economic Review* 54: 359–375.

MacMillan, Margaret. 2002. *Paris 1919*. New York: Random House.

McMahon, Christopher. 2009. *Reasonable Disagreement: A Theory of Political Morality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Menkel-Meadow, Carrie, and Michael Wheeler, eds. 2004. *What's Fair: Ethics for Negotiators*. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
Rawls, John. 1987. The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus. *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 7: 1–25.
Roemer, John. 1996. *Theories of Distributive Justice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Schroeder, Paul. 1999. *The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Schuessler, Rudolf. 2011. Climate Justice: A Question of Historic Responsibility? *Journal of Global Ethics* 7: 261–278.
Schuessler, Rudolf. 2013. Kants ethisches Lügenverbot—der Sonderfall der Lüge aus Furcht. *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 120: 82–100.
Schuessler, Rudolf. 2014. Practical Ethics. *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, rev. ed., ed Robert Pasnau, 517–35. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schuessler, Rudolf. 2015. Equal Per Capita Emissions Defended. Discussion Paper. http://www.academia.edu/RudolfSchuessler/Papers.
Siemann, Wolfram. 2016. *Metternich*. Munich: C. H. Beck.
Thompson, Leigh. 2001. *The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator*. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.
Thomson, William. 1994. "Cooperative Models of Bargaining." In *Handbook of Game Theory*, ed Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart, 2:1237–84. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Zagorin, Perez. 1990. *Ways of Lying: Dissimulation, Persecution, and Conformity in Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER 4

Beyond Official Negotiations: The Experience of the Community of Sant'Egidio

Cesare Zucconi

Abstract In a world where not only economy is privatized but wars are increasing as well, alternative approaches to conflict resolution are needed that go beyond official negotiations. Cesare Zucconi's contribution draws on the experience of the peace for Mozambique negotiated by the Community of Sant'Egidio with the support of the Italian government between 1990 and 1992 as one of the first experiences of Track Two Diplomacy. Track Two Diplomacy does not replace official international relations nor interaction at an institutional level, yet it does offer what the institutions seem to be lacking today: a flexible, informal, and personalized approach. Zucconi makes the case that peace is always possible and that mediation is a promising path toward it.

Keywords Cesare Zucconi · Negotiation · Conflict resolution · Mozambique · Sant'Egidio · Track Two Diplomacy · Mediation

C. Zucconi (✉)
Sant'Egidio, Rome, Italy
e-mail: cesarezucconi@santegidio.org

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_4

Peace in a World with no Peace and Much Despair

Nowadays peace is threatened. We are all very anxious, if only for the new terrorist threat. The threat of a 'caliphate' to European countries is becoming a global challenge with its iconic and media messages of terror. After 1989, with the end of Communism, my generation expected a steady peace. Conditions were there for a long peaceful season. But in the nineties, the opportunity of the fall of Communism to build a peace order was not seized. So many national and nationalist passions have risen; many hatreds were fanned; they laid the foundations for new conflicts. Violence broke out in the name of religion. The horror of World War II was forgotten with time passing, the six-million dead Jews in the Shoah, so many civilians killed, and the use of the atomic bomb.

Nowadays, war is rehabilitated as a method to solve conflicts. We forgot history. Without history, we are imprisoned by short-term passions. Violence and terrorism are often the ways chosen to assert rights and to manifest a presence. Mafia organizations now have military power, and even though with no face, they control entire countries. In the countries of despair, states are desegregated. When statehood is missing, order and safety end. A lack of state is an additional poverty for the poor. Poverty is interconnected with a deep anger in too many countries, which is a breeding ground for new violence. Some parts of the world's population sectors, including the young and very young, live in violence. The case of child or teenager soldiers, or the Central American 'Maras,' illustrates this condition. War makes the rich poor and destroys the poor: it is the mother of all poverty, as Andrea Riccardi, founder of Sant'Egidio, says.

After All, What Can We Do?

It is an alarming scene. Many have chosen not to think about it. Yet on the contrary, it is very timely to reflect on what we can do for peace, also by bringing together the experiences of those involved in conflict prevention and resolution. Being faced with the scene I described above, what can we do? How can we affirm peace in a time of war? These are urgent questions. Pope Francis speaks of a condition of generalized war: a third world war, even though in pieces, in chapters! What can we do? The answer is not easy. We feel little relevance from decisions for war or peace made elsewhere, often in countries that are not our countries. At times we are taken by powerlessness and pessimism.

Our times seem not to be of big dreams, but rather times to keep inside our homes sheltered by our institutions or communities. Retreating within our worlds (either small or big) is quite common. We retreat in our communities becoming almost estranged in a too-big world where little can be done. That is true: there are many problems to be solved where we are, with no need of going out and searching for problems. Management requires energy. We may quarrel, discuss within communities, but this does not change history. I question myself, who wants to change history today? So many displaced persons who are coming to our continent in these months tell us that war is at hand and that it has something to do with us. Protecting oneself behind a wall in our small worlds is an illusion.

Still much has to be changed, to be healed, to be helped. Thanks to media globalization we can see everything, much sorrow even from far away. But this also increases our responsibilities! These images of sorrow are questions. But what can I do, being faced with what I see? Often nothing. It is a powerlessness that makes us pessimistic. In this way, we become used to living with no dreams or hope of changing. In the end we accept reality: even war, as an unavoidable companion of human history. At best, we try to keep away. What can be done?

The Experience of the Community of Sant'Egidio

As mentioned above, many people today have the chance and means to wage wars. Since the end of the twentieth century, states no longer possess the monopoly of violence. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York showed the world that a relatively small group of terrorists, resolute and well prepared, can challenge a superpower. The same can be said about the Islamic State (IS) issue. States today seem weaker than in the past, and this does reflect the overarching mentality of the last part of the past century: economy is privatized, why shouldn't wars be? However, it is equally true, that many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and institutional actors today can work for peace. It is an idea that was formed in the international civil society about twenty years ago. The experience of the peace for Mozambique negotiated by the Community of Sant'Egidio with the support of the Italian government between 1990 and 1992 was one of the first experiences of Track Two Diplomacy.

Track Two Diplomacy stems from the awareness that this new international scenario calls for international relations not to be solely the prerogative of a select few (official, or Track One Diplomacy): they are

a field where citizens and private organizations can contribute with their efforts and works (e.g., churches and religious leaders, academics, NGOs, journalists, businessmen, etc.). Track Two Diplomacy does not replace official international relations nor interaction at an institutional level, since it will never have access to similar resources. It does, however, offer what the institutions seem to be lacking in our times: a flexible, informal, and personalized approach. Political leaders invariably represent their constituency, and however willing they may be to take action in the internal crisis of another state, they must be sure of their constituents' support, even through failure. Institutional politics and official diplomacy are hindered by this internal rationale. Track Two Diplomacy, on the contrary, can scout ahead without being overly concerned about the impact. To commit prestige, resources, and time to actions that will develop into an uncertain outcome are perceived as inconvenient by institutions, so they rather turn their attention elsewhere.

The long story of mediation for Mozambique, fostered by the Community of Sant'Egidio for twenty-seven months, is a clear example—even a model—in this respect. At the beginning of this process, the Western nations were convinced that there would be no solution in Mozambique without the end of apartheid in South Africa. But by observing the situation on the ground and by examining the real stakes of the war, Sant'Egidio understood that there were internal causes to the conflict that made it chronic. It decided to penetrate the complex and contradictory reality of the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) and the opposing Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo). The initial goal was to understand the reasons why the two sides justified the conflict. The Afro-Marxists had found in Marxism the cement of their nationalism and the grammar of power. The rebels, called the Black Khmers in Western specialized reviews, were a mysterious movement without representatives abroad, who felt they embodied the people's discontent with the regime.

The warring parties were stuck in a 'pathology of memory,' like an ominous and overwhelming sense of rights and wrongs, especially among comrades who had fought together against the Portuguese. This is a crucial element of every crisis: the culture of war makes a lifestyle out of feelings of victimization. The first step was to rediscover the love both sides felt for their land and nation, weaving the awareness of a shared interest on both sides. This led to a higher level, that of believing in a common destiny, in a possible future. In this regard, it is necessary to

understand the psychology of the rebels, secluded for years in the bush, with no contacts with the outside world, full of an antagonistic rationale.

Sant'Egidio believed it was possible to shift the conflict from arms to politics, making men of war into politicians. This is where the human aspect comes in as absolutely essential, making it one of the strong points of Track Two Diplomacy. To reach these objectives, Sant'Egidio worked on a delicate process of mediation for twenty-seven months, confidentially and without pressure from the outside. There was of course the problem of transposing the decisions into an adequate political document. Throughout the negotiations, Sant'Egidio was in touch with the diplomatic corps of all stake-holding countries, and toward the end, the official diplomacies joined the table.

Every political peace agreement needs guarantees and arbitration. United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined this synergy as 'an original mix of institutional and non-institutional diplomacy,' an 'Italian formula.'[1] These experiences of dialogue by Sant'Egidio have multiplied in Africa. In the case of Burundi, for instance, Sant'Egidio led the 'Commission for Disarmament.' Sant'Egidio has also been active in many other countries, among them recently the Central African Republic, and Senegal as far as it concerns the issue of Casamance.[2]

A Model of Track Two Diplomacy

The first instance is the profile of the mediator. Non-institutional mediators are seen as people who do not hold any stakes in the situation they mediate. They are 'weak,' devoid of the usual means of diplomacy. Apparently this may seem a drawback, but it is not: for the parties it is a guarantee that they can express themselves without any undue pressure.

This is important. Contrary to institutional mediators, non-institutional organizations are characterized by greater freedom and by inspiring a greater degree of accountability in the parties involved in the conflict. Often institutional mediators tend to force themselves upon the parties, with a kind of 'threatening mediation' that may be useful at times, but is particularly dangerous at the beginning of a process. Track Two mediators, on the contrary, give the parties control in the peace process, which is important for the parties to acquire a sense of ownership over the process.

In some cases, the international community may decide to impose sanctions on one or both sides to press them into negotiating. It is of

absolute essence that the mediators not be perceived as part of this decision, under penalty of losing their impartiality. 'Punitive' subjects cannot mediate.

The secret of a good mediation is to involve all the parties in feeling responsible for the process without forcing them to stop defending their stands. The parties must 'own' the process, especially in order for them to implement the agreement. Peace can never be completely forced upon people who do not want to hear of it.

Non-institutional mediators are capable of being more faithful to the interlocutors: they are not interchangeable officers that may be shifted during the talks; they remain the same and may establish a relationship of trust with all sides.

Mediators must tune in with the reality of a conflict with how the people live and see it. It is not necessary to start with the fighters. In spite of the folly that is unleashed with war, many people wish for peace, especially the poor. Later, one will need to listen to the protagonists of the crisis, but never draw immediate conclusions. To be in tune does not mean to be partial; it means to try and touch the heart of a situation.

Mediating is not like playing a game of chess, moving inanimate objects on a known board with fixed rules. Mediating means to meet concrete human beings in their pains, frustrations, feelings of humiliation, and revenge.

To listen and communicate with perseverance is useful to help both sides enter a new world: a world where an agreement is possible. Even if both sides do accept to start a peace process, one should never forget that it is a risk for both sides, and skepticism rules at the beginning.

The mediators need to convince all sides that an agreement is an advantage for everyone, even if it means to yield to something. There are no easy shortcuts to this, not even the use of force. Mediators should always bear in mind that anyone who has taken up arms never did so lightheartedly. There are no 'wild' conflicts that seem impossible to understand compared to other more 'civilized' conflicts. War is always a tragedy with no coming back.

Mediators build bridges between people who ignore or despise each other, but even between themselves and the parties, they enter a situation devoid of shallow thoughts and endowed with a great deal of respect. This might seem trivial, but it is actually quite rare.

Then comes the time when precise commitments need to be written down—a stage all parties fear, because it defines their responsibilities. It

is also a 'magical' moment though: it is the beginning of a solution. The written proposal is up to the mediator, but he must never reach this stage without having devoted a great deal of time to words before. Institutional mediations often start by supplying the parties with a written text of the agreement, generally drawn from previous experiences. Today there is a fashion of a certain technicality in drawing up agreements, and they all tend to look alike. This is actually a grave mistake.

Another characteristic of non-institutional mediation is its flexibility. It means that the negotiating framework, however precise, can be bent to include whatever may help. Experts, institutions, governments, different organizations—anyone can be called in to give his or her contribution. Institutional mediations are set in a limited framework of official operations and are incredibly hard to change even if things are going wrong.

Another quality of non-institutional mediators is their control over time, and time is of essence in order to take an interlocutor seriously. Often it takes a great deal of shuttling from one side to the other. Sometimes it takes months just to organize the first meeting. Institutions do not have time, nor can they always be ready when the right moment arrives. Non-institutional realities can afford this greater flexibility. But control over time is also a matter of patience. Patience and continuity are part of the essential baggage of any diplomat.

Another element essential to success is not to seek success at all costs. Often it is like a boomerang: it exposes oneself to blackmailing by the different parties. Since their reputation is at stake, institutional mediators are under such a pressure that they can lose sight of the effectiveness of the mediation process itself. Even non-institutional mediators have reputations, but they are more free to attribute responsibility over the peace process to the parties.

One of the crucial stages of a peace process is the time of mutual recognition. At the beginning of the process, the parties do not recognize each other as interlocutors. In general, the government attributes the rebels a lesser—or irrelevant—status from a political point of view. On the contrary, the rebels use the negotiations to gain a higher status, possibly equal to the government. Institutional mediations generally tend to underestimate this crucial moment. It is necessary therefore to work for a rapprochement between the parties, and the mediators must obtain from the parties the acknowledgment of the other at the same level and on common ground.

Non-institutional mediators are apparently weak. They cannot exert pressure or sign compensation checks. But they are not suspected of having a 'hidden agenda.' Their strength is that of 'moral suasion,' which breaks new ground by the force of its contents.

A further point we need to examine is the mediators' professionalism. They need to know the keywords and diplomatic and political tools available during the negotiation. Non-institutional mediations tend to be less endowed with this quality, which is only partially replaced by their deeper understanding of the situation. However, if professionalism means the 'making of mediation into a profession,' it may be a drawback for civil-society organizations that give themselves the mandate to solve conflicts. Professional diplomats (and politicians), religious organizations *et similia*, have other occupations to attend to; freelance mediators likewise. They work on a voluntary basis. Track Two organizations that present themselves as 'mediation professionals' are undermined by the very limit of their mandate: their mediations need to be successful or else the organization or the person directing it will lose credibility. In this case the faults of institutional and non-institutional mediation pile up. Former politicians who take up conflict-resolution foundations are often prey to this underlying ambiguity.

Another important element in working for peace is the awareness that every situation is different from the other and it is not always possible to repeat a success by replicating the same actions that led to success in other circumstances. Even if the same approach is desirable and a common model can be traced, mere imitation is impossible.

One of the main difficulties of institutional mediations, besides the pressure they are subject to, is the choice of the parties that need to sit at the negotiating table, which is a very delicate issue. Wherever there is conflict, there are a number of parties that have something to say, not only the warring factions. The civil society of a country at war, third parties that have not taken up arms and traditional authorities that have stayed neutral or supported a peaceful option, can give excellent contributions. There is the danger, however, that this might open the process to exploitation. A table with too many actors of diverse importance and differing degrees of representation is exposed to the power and exploitation that the strong—the warring factions—can exert upon the weak. It is absolutely unadvisable to let too many parties sit at the table. It may seem morally just to let third parties in, but in the beginning, the parties at war should be left alone with their responsibilities.

Another point that needs to be highlighted is the selection of a suitable place for negotiations to take place. Recent practice has it that a country neighboring the one at war is selected, because everyone should be capable of solving their own problems. In the case of Africa, this means 'African solutions to African problems.' Rather, this can become an easy alibi for non-commitment. The choice of a neighboring country often goes against common sense. Bordering countries are generally involved in the crisis, or at least they do not seem completely neutral to the parties. The location should be as impartial as possible, and it should inspire an interest in peace. The mediator (whether institutional or non-institutional) should have complete control over the location of the mediation: to mediate while remaining close to the conflict means to be exposed to the pressure of the conflict itself.

Conclusions

In short, there is an approach, but there are no absolute rules. There is room for non-institutional organizations, but the presence of institutions is a key to solving conflicts. The truth is that synergy between Track One and Track Two Diplomacy is crucial. There are times when the presence and commitment of governments and institutions are of essence in making sure the agreements are observed, implemented, and assessed. A number of agreements have failed the day after they were signed! It takes patience and hard work. A peace process never ends the day the talks are over. Conflict resolution requires a 'long-term' commitment and focus—constant efforts in terms of presence and the assessment of international, governmental, and non-governmental actors—in order to attain durable peace.

Every peace process is made of several stages: an approach, the search for valid interlocutors, patience during the first contact, the establishment of trust, and selecting the location. This is the field where Track Two Diplomacy has the greatest chances of success. Then official diplomacy should step in with guarantees and arbitration. Between the two moments, talks must continue and synergies should turn into action and collaboration with all stake-holding parties.

Every peace process is of course an opportunity for countries at war to shift toward democracy. Dialogue and negotiation are a form of apprenticeship to democracy. Mutual recognition, discussion, and the acceptation of pluralism—these are the elements for building coexistence

and democracy, even for people who have fought each other for decades. Every mediation can be the seed of new forms of coexistence, the rising of a new future for entire peoples. This is the crucial role that religions can play: religions can fuel conflicts, but they can also liberate energies of peace and contribute significantly to conflict resolution.

Dear friends, this world of ours needs no hopeless people. This Europe of ours, which has lost the sense of its mission, needs to find a mission in peace. Are we the ones? Can we do it? We people of Sant'Egidio are convinced that war is not an inescapable destiny. Peace is always possible, but it depends also on each one of us.

Notes

1. This was Boutros-Ghali's message to the Seventh International Meeting for Peace of Sant'Egidio Community in Milan (1993). Boutros-Ghali is also quoted in Morozzo della Rocca (2003), p.16.
2. Some of Sant'Egidio's peace processes are reported in Morozzo della Rocca (2013).

References

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. 1993. The Seventh International Meeting for Peace of Sant'Egidio Community. Milan. September 19–22.

Morozzo della Rocca, Roberto. 2003. *Mozambique: Achieving Peace in Africa*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University.

Morozzo della Rocca, Roberto, ed. 2013. *Making Peace: The Role Played by the Community of Sant'Egidio in the International Arena*. London: New City.

CHAPTER 5

Understanding 'Resistance' to Transitional Justice

Julie Bernath, Adou Djane Dit Fatogoma, and Briony Jones

Abstract This chapter asks what can be learned if people truly engage with resistance to transitional justice processes as an object of enquiry. Embedded in critical transitional justice scholarship and critical peace studies, it conceives of transitional justice as a political process of negotiation between different actors. Resistance thus becomes a necessary element in the empirical unfolding of transitional justice processes. The chapter presents conceptual and methodological approaches and

J. Bernath (✉)
swisspeace and University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
e-mail: julie.bernath@swisspeace.ch

A. D. D. Fatogoma
Centre Suisse de Recherches Scientifiques in Côte d'Ivoire, Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire
e-mail: adou.djane@csrs.ci

B. Jones
University of Warwick, Coventry, England
e-mail: b.jones.5@warwick.ac.uk

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_5

discussions of a three-year, multi-country research project on "Resisting Transitional Justice? Alternative Understandings of Peace and Justice" of swisspeace and the University of Basel (2012–2015). It focuses on findings from the case study of Côte d'Ivoire to illustrate key insights, but also challenges, of adopting a critical research agenda on resistance to transitional justice.

Keywords Julie Bernath · Adou Djane Dit Fatogoma · Briony Jones · Resistance · Actors · Transitional justice · Peace studies · Negotiation · Côte d'Ivoire

Introduction: Transitional Justice as a Political Process of Negotiation

The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General has defined transitional justice as "the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses in order to ensure accountability, serve justice, and achieve reconciliation" (Annan 2004, p. 4). This definition illustrates the institutionalization, professionalization, and normalization of transitional justice (Rubli 2012). Today, transitional justice constitutes a specific package of internationally legitimized approaches for dealing with massive human rights violations of the past in societies engaged in multiple transitions from war to peace, and from authoritarianism to more democratic forms of government (Bell 2009).[1] While the notion of transitional justice emerged in the wake of the so-called 'third wave of democratization' through the interaction of a specific set of actors, that is, mainly human rights activists, lawyers and legal scholars, policymakers and comparative politics experts (Arthur 2009, p. 324), it has later been adopted by the peacebuilding community and is today an integral part of liberal peacebuilding (Sriram 2007).

In its analysis of the rapid consolidation of transitional justice as a field of policy, research, and practice, critical scholarship has increasingly illuminated the ways in which transitional justice constitutes a political process of negotiation between a diverse set of actors, including conflict parties, mediators, (donor) governments, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society. Any formal, state-sanctioned transitional justice process thus reflects choices and decisions taken by those actors in a position of power

to ensure that their political priorities or values are perceived as more legitimate than others, or at least that these substantially define the adoption of a transitional justice process. Scholars have increasingly shown how power relations both shape transitional justice, that is, how they define the institutional design and terms of transitional justice processes, and how power relations are being produced and redefined by these very same processes (Sriram 2012; Leebaw 2008; Sieff and Vinjamuri 1999). Recent scholarship and practice have also started to focus on questions of ownership, outreach, and participation in transitional justice processes, reflecting an increased engagement with the question of their legitimacy (Lundy and McGovern 2008; Lambourne 2012).

If we conceive of transitional justice as a political process of negotiation, which this paper does, we can then expect resistance to transitional justice as a necessary element in the empirical unfolding of transitional justice processes. This speaks to recent work on resistance in critical peace scholarship, which conceives of resistance as a component in the interaction between local and international actors in the context of liberal peacebuilding interventions (Richmond 2010). These authors also argue that resistance should not be delegitimized beforehand as dangerous 'spoilerism' (Distler and Riese 2013) and requires scholars and practitioners to "reappraise notions of actors in war-torn regions as powerless, passive beneficiaries" (MacGinty 2011, p. 84).

Resistance and the empirics of how disagreements over transitional justice arise, however, have not been well researched in transitional justice scholarship.[2] Moreover, resistance to transitional justice has traditionally been framed in transitional justice scholarship and practice as necessarily problematic and deviant to the goals of transition (Jones et al. 2013). Such a conceptual approach stems from the underlying normative belief that transitional justice processes necessarily 'do good,' and the resulting expectation is that stakeholders, including victims, will automatically adhere to it. If actors, however, oppose such processes, they become cast as 'spoilers' who have to be 'sidelined or targeted for transformation' (Jones et al. 2013). Understandings of resistance are thus reduced to a dichotomy which opposes those who resist transitional justice per se, or particular aspects of its implementation, to those who are transitional justice advocates or 'entrepreneurs.'[3]

This paper proposes to address this gap by asking what we can learn if we truly engage 'resistance to transitional justice processes' as an object of enquiry. What power relations are illuminated? What voices

are expressed? What alternatives are articulated? This paper proposes to explore these research questions by presenting insights from a three-year, three-country research project entitled "Resisting Transitional Justice? Alternative Visions of Peace and Justice." This research project, funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), was carried out by a team at swisspeace, an Associate Institute of the University of Basel, from 2012 until 2015. While it examined resistance to transitional justice in the case studies of Côte d'Ivoire, Cambodia, and Burundi, this paper highlights findings from Côte d'Ivoire to illustrate key insights but also challenges of adopting a critical research agenda on resistance to transitional justice.

This paper is split into four sections. The first section presents the conceptual and methodological approach to resistance to transitional justice developed in our research project. The second section gives an overview of the context of transitional justice in Côte d'Ivoire. The third section discusses the findings on resistances to transitional justice in the case study of Côte d'Ivoire. The fourth section presents some overall reflections on the relevance of this project for some key questions in transitional justice research and practice.

Researching Resistance to Transitional Justice

At first, mobilizing the concept of resistance in the study of transitional justice seems to be a vexing exercise, as resistance studies and transitional justice scholarship draw from opposite moral economies in their approaches to resistance (Bernath and Rubli 2016). On the one hand, the interdisciplinary field of research in social sciences which focuses on resistance as the main object of enquiry traditionally locates resistance with powerless and 'subaltern' actors engaged in progressive and emancipatory struggles against inequality (Knight 2012, p. 326; Fletcher 2001, p. 44). Moving away from the analysis of open, organized group action such as revolutions, these studies have increasingly focused on subtle and everyday forms of resistance as introduced by anthropologist James Scott (1985). On the other hand, transitional justice practice and scholarship associates resistance with specific actors: those who have something to lose in the political transition and are powerful enough to visibly block transitional justice processes. Resistance is mainly identified with the former political elite or the 'old-regime loyalists' previously involved in massive human rights violations, as well as the direct perpetrators of violence who enjoy access to power and resources in the new government (Subotic

2014, p. 135). Acts and actors of resistance are not perceived to be legitimate; rather, they result from strategies for self-preservation and avoidance of accountability mechanisms.

Conceptually, 'resistance' seems to imply different sets of acts and actors as well as distributions of power and resources, depending on the underlying normative positions and disciplinary perspectives. Rather than perceiving this as an insurmountable paradox, we have come to understand these diverging approaches to resistance as stemming from the subjectivity and inter-relational aspect of resistance itself. In our research project, we draw mainly from recent geographies and anthropologies of resistance that show how resistance is inherently linked to processes of social labeling of certain acts as resistance and is therefore always context-specific and produced in the interactions between different actors rather than being static and absolute. These reflections have led us to focus on asking 'what counts as resistance' to transitional justice rather than trying to find out what might 'objectively' constitute as resistance in these contexts. Narrowing our focus on perceptions of intentions to resist implies an actor-oriented approach that attempts to uncover what different actors themselves would define as resistance, that is, whether they self-identify as resisting transitional justice or ascribe such a resistance to other actors. We thereby avoid the methodological pitfall of 'seeing resistance everywhere'; however, asking what counts as resistance also has its own challenges.

One challenge encountered during our research relates to the different uses of language, which goes beyond the multilingual setting of our multiple case studies. Many respondents do not use the term 'resistance' themselves, or they do so in different ways. Thus as researchers, we retain the burden of final interpretation of resistance to transitional justice. Based on the literature discussed above, we have developed a working definition of resistance, or an identification framework, which we have looked for in the interviewees' words. We define resistance as a purposeful act intended by the actor to work against, prevent, or disrupt the intended or implemented formal transitional justice process (Jones et al. 2013). It can be organized or disorganized, an act of an individual or group, an act of the powerful or powerless, and is a subjective concept perceived differently from many vantage points. The key aspect is that it is purposeful (i.e., there is intentionality, and not all acts of contestation and negotiation will necessarily be resistance).

Another challenge relates to the normative dimension of research on resistance, which we cannot ultimately escape despite not pre-defining resistance and attempting to analyze perceptions of resistance instead. This necessarily entails reflecting upon the legitimacy of the perceptions of resistance that we are analyzing and how it relates to normative concepts of justice and legitimate distributions of power. Nonetheless, these questions can be relegated to a second step, which allows us to first engage with interlocutors or forms of agency rather than readily dismissing them from the beginning. This allows us to engage with dissonant narratives on transitional justice and the politics of international intervention in such contexts while still requiring reflexivity and transparency on our positionality as researchers.

Following these reflections on the operationalization of our research question, we proceeded to the mapping of actors, processes, and points of contention as an initial step. Qualitative fieldwork was then conducted in Côte d'Ivoire, Cambodia, and Burundi. A key component of the research project has also been the collaboration with researchers from these three case studies.[4]

Case Study: Transitional Justice in Côte d'Ivoire—The Trajectory of a Political Conflict

The French colony of Côte d'Ivoire was formally proclaimed on March 10, 1893. This proclamation was followed by the policy of brutal pacification of indigenous populations, most intense until 1930, which comprised "a set of coercive measures that are forced labor, the poll tax to be paid in money, the introduction of a code of rights of citizenship that relegates indigenous people in the state of matter without law, arbitrary penal system, etc." (Fauré 1990, p. 120). It is in the context of this system that indigenous emancipation movements were born, the most important of which was the African Agricultural Union established on July 10, 1944, to 'resist' the brutality and inequality of colonial administration. That union transformed into the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire African Democratic Rally (PDCI-RDA) in 1946, a political party led by Félix Houphouët-Boigny who was a leading figure in the anti-colonial struggle, leading ultimately to Côte d'Ivoire's independence in 1960.

After gaining independence, the political landscape was in fact characterized by a reproduction of the colonial system. This resulted in a strategy of restraint and control over freedom of expression throughout

the thirty years of one-party rule until 1990. The PDCI-RDA either squeezed out or absorbed its rivals. This period was characterized by the absence of public liberties, the absence of a multiparty system and institutionalized opposition, the absence of competitive elections, the monopoly of the State on the press and the media, control of the unions by the central authorities, and control of management structures through the annexes of the single-party organizations, students, youth, and women's movements (Fauré 1990; Appiah 2008). As with the anti-colonial struggle, this environment also gave rise to informal mechanisms of resistance against the post-independence one-party system that lasted until 1990.

However, the return to multiparty politics in 1993 and the opening of associational space gave birth to a political landscape that retained and even enhanced the reflexes of the one-party political system. Civil-society structures developed, which re-created those that had been in place during the one-party rule, closely aligned with the PDCI-RDA. In addition, civil society coalesced around the political opposition, representing in both cases a continued close alignment between political parties and civil society in Côte d'Ivoire, in a very tense environment.

Côte d'Ivoire has experienced decades of violent political conflict with flash points such as the military coup in 1999, the armed rebellion from 2002 to 2010 that divided the country into two zones, and the post-election crisis of 2010–2011 with more than 3000 victims and massive human rights violations. This situation has led the country into a transitional justice process, which brings together international, regional, national, and local institutions, including the deployment of a UN operation since 2003. Significantly, the transitional justice process focuses on the acts of violence committed following the post-election crisis in 2010–2011, when Laurent Gbagbo refused to step down as president after Alassane Ouattara was declared the winner and supported by the African Union, Economic Community of West African States, and the UN.

Resistances to Transitional Justice in Côte d'Ivoire: A Transitional Justice Process Caught in the Nets of Political Violence

Political competition in Côte d'Ivoire has existed in a very noticeable environment of violence and counter-violence since the return of the multiparty system in 1990. Claudine Vidal highlights the fact that "the violence which now pervades daily life in Côte d'Ivoire does not date from 2002, nor even from 1999. The brutalization of political power relations commenced, or more precisely recommenced, at the beginning of the 1990s" (2003, p. 45). This situation was accentuated in the immediate post-conflict period from 2011 to 2014, and the current transitional justice process is being implemented in a tense political and military context. The result is that transitional justice policy-making and debates have unfolded through the prism of the continued political violence in Côte d'Ivoire, and must be understood with this context in mind.

Simultaneously, several bodies were set up or reactivated after Ouattara's investiture as president on May 21, 2011. Regarding the judicial dimension of the process, the Special Inquiry and Investigation Unit on the post-electoral crisis was set up, the Rome Statute was ratified, the International Criminal Court began its proceedings, and the national courts were activated—in particular the Military Tribunal and the courts of Assize. Regarding the non-judicial process of transitional justice, many institutions were established, including the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Ministry of Solidarity, Family, Women and Children and its war-victims department, and the National Program for Social Cohesion. With regard to the right to the guarantee of non-recurrence, institutional reforms were announced, notably that of the judicial system, as well as Security Sector Reform and the reinstatement of the National Security Council. These bodies were set up almost simultaneously after April 11, 2011, at the end of the post-electoral crisis.

The government and its international partners were confronted with militia violence in the implementation and functioning of these official transitional justice mechanisms. This form of violence should be situated within the general context of political violence that has reigned in the country for several years. These acts of militia violence do not primarily target transitional justice institutions, but rather happen in parallel to the transitional justice process. They illustrate how the ongoing political violence is designed to target the political transition itself (i.e., the

current regime and state, which forms the very basis of any transitional justice process).

In addition to such militia violence, resistance in this case also concerns the ways of doing things, of thinking, of taking actions, which disturb the transitional process in Côte d'Ivoire. Specifically, it involves in this context of political violence the boycott of the transitional process, the strategies of exclusions and self-exclusions from it, the withdrawal from the process, and the use of the transitional mechanisms for self-serving political ends. However, by understanding the continuum of political violence as one of the contexts in which such resistance takes place, we can analyze these acts not simply as the work of 'spoilers' but through the lens of the repressive apparatus of the state. The violent political context generates the conditions for acts of resistance which in turn can tell us something about the changing relationship between the state and citizens. Indeed, one might say that transitional justice is paying the price for the way in which the political system works in Côte d'Ivoire, independently of the current stakeholders.

Reflections on Initial Findings

With reference to the specific case study of Côte d'Ivoire, we can see that forms of resistance to the transitional justice process can be understood through the continuum of political violence and the broader political projects of those who resist. In our interviews with self-identified resisters of transitional justice, they understand themselves not merely as seeking to 'spoil' the process as means of self-preservation but as advancing specific political projects. Indeed, groups such as the organized diaspora or civil-society organizations active in Côte d'Ivoire would pose questions and outline concrete policies which are not, in fact, very distant from those being articulated by actors perceived to be more 'moderate' in their positionality: questions such as whether the process has been transparent; whether the military role played by former colonial power of France is indicative of a form of neo-colonialism; and whether the transitional justice process is biased against supporters of former President Gbagbo.

Resistance in this case study, and indeed more generally in contexts of transitional justice, must be read in context and not dismissed only as, or indeed even primarily as, the act of spoilers. Resistances to transitional justice will have their own history. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, we outlined briefly here the connections between anti-colonial struggle

and contemporary forms of political struggle and opposition, but other histories will be pertinent for other cases. To usefully mobilize a concept such as 'resistance' as scholars working on transitional justice, we therefore must have a substantive understanding of context and a continuing reflection on what is illuminated and what is hidden. We can go some way toward achieving this if we ensure that we employ an ongoing reflexivity in terms of speaker positionality and burdens of interpretation.

This short paper began by identifying a gap in the literature on transitional justice, which to date has not dealt substantially with the concept of 'resistance,' despite its relevance for many of the discussions regarding the politics and scope of transitional justice processes. The authors of this paper hope to have contributed to addressing this intellectual need by outlining some of the findings on Côte d'Ivoire from an in-depth study of resistance to transitional justice involving the case studies of Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi, and Cambodia. There is certainly more work to be done, but it is argued here that engaging with resistance to transitional justice as an object of enquiry rather than as a 'problem' of implementation can illuminate the nuances of the contexts in which transitional justice advocates pursue a specific vision of 'justice.'

Notes

1. Transitional justice processes have, however, also been mobilized in democratic contexts (Winter 2014; Hansen 2014).
2. Exceptions include Thomson (2011) and Sriram (2012).
3. The phrase 'transitional justice entrepreneur' is borrowed from Madlingozi (2010).
4. The main output of this research project, a monograph on resistance and transitional justice, includes case-study chapters by the three researchers of this research project, as well as researchers from the three case studies (Jones and Bernath 2017).

References

Annan, Kofi. 2004. *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies*. Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, no. S/2004/616 (August 23): 1–24. http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga07/law.pdf. Accessed on 25 Nov 2016.

Appiah, Adou. 2008. Promotion du développement et de la démocratie: les freins de l'épanouissement de la société civile en Côte d'Ivoire. In *Démocratie, Droit de l'Homme, Bonne gouvernance et Développement*, ed. Maurice Oulaté and Houlaï Bernard Tiabas, 15–46. City: Editions Universitaires de Cote d'Ivoire.

Arthur, Paige. 2009. How 'Transitions' Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice. *Human Rights Quarterly* 31: 321–367.

Bell, Christine. 2009. Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the 'Field' or 'Non-Field.' *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 3 (1): 5–27.

Bernath, Julie, and Sandra Rubli. 2016. Adopting a Resistance Lens: An Exploration of Power and Legitimacy in Transitional Justice. *Conflict and Society* 2 (1): 87–103.

Distler, Werner, and Sarah Riese. 2013. The Other Side of the Coin: Intervention and Resistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. *Zeitschrift Für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung* 2: 177–208.

Fauré, Yves-André. 1990. Sur la démocratisation en Côte-d'Ivoire: passé et présent. *Année Africaine*, 115–60.

Fletcher, Robert. 2001. What are We Fighting For? Rethinking Resistance in a Pewenche Community in Chile. *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 28 (3): 37–66.

Hansen, Thomas Obel. 2014. The Vertical and Horizontal Expansion of Transitional Justice: Explanations and Implications for a Contested Field. *In Transitional Justice Theories*, ed. Suzanne Buckley-Zistel, Teresa Koloma Beck, Christian Braun, and Friederike Mieth, 105–24. New York: Routledge.

Jones, Briony, Julie Bernath, and Sandra Rubli. 2013. Reflections on a Research Agenda for Exploring Resistance to Transitional Justice. Swisspeace working paper no. 3. Bern, Switzerland: swisspeace.

Jones, Briony and Julie Bernath. 2017. (co-eds.) *Resistance and Transitional Justice*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

Knight, Alan. 2012. Rethinking Histories of Resistance in Brazil and Mexico. In *New Approaches to Resistance in Brazil and Mexico*, ed. John Gledhill and Patience A. Schell, 325–353. Durham: Duke University Press.

Lambourne, Wendy. 2012. Outreach, Inreach and Civil Society Participation in Transitional Justice. In *Critical Perspectives in Transitional Justice*, ed. Nicola Palmer, Phil Clark, and Danielle Granville, 235–261. Cambridge: Intersentia.

Leebaw, Bronwyn A. 2008. The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice. *Human Rights Quarterly* 30: 95–118.

Lundy, Patricia, and Mark McGovern. 2008. Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up. *Journal of Law and Society* 35 (2): 265–292.

MacGinty, Roger. 2011. *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Madlingozi, Tshepo. 2010. On Transitional Justice Entrepreneurs and the Production of Victims. *Journal of Human Rights Practice* 2: 208–228.

Richmond, Oliver. 2010. Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace. *Millenium: Journal of International Studies* 38 (3): 665–92.

Rubli, Sandra. 2012. *Transitional Justice: Justice by Bureaucratic Means*? Swisspeace working paper no. 4. Bern, Switzerland: swisspeace.

Scott, James. 1985. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Sieff, Michelle, and Leslie Vinjamuri. 1999. Reconciling Order and Justice? New Institutional Solutions in Post-Conflict States. *Journal of International Affairs* 52 (2): 757–779.

Sriram, Chandra. 2007. Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transitional Justice. *Global Society* 21 (4): 579–591.

Sriram, Chandra. 2012. Post-Conflict Justice and Hybridity in Peacebuilding: Resistance or Cooptation? In *Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism*, ed. Oliver P. Richmond and Audra Mitchell, 58–72. Hampshire, Eng.: Palgrave Macmillan.

Subotić, Jelena. 2014. "Bargaining Justice. A Theory of Transitional Justice Compliance." In *Transitional Justice Theories*, edited by Suzanne Buckley-Zistel, Teresa Koloma Beck, Christian Braun, and Friederike Mieth, 128–43. New York: Routledge.

Thomson, Susan. 2011. Whispering Truth to Power: The Everyday Resistance of Rwandan Peasants to Post-Genocide Reconciliation. *African Affairs* 110 (440): 439–456.

Vidal, Claudine. 2003. La brutalisation du champ politique ivoirien, 1990–2003. *Revue Africaine De Sociologie* 7 (2): 45–57.

Winter, Stephen. 2014. *Transitional Justice in Established Democracies: A Political Theory*. Hampshire, Eng.: Palgrave Macmillan.

PART II

Alternative Approaches—Gender

CHAPTER 6

Introduction to Gender

Elisabet le Roux

Abstract In October 2000, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, which officially recognized and reaffirmed the important roles of women across the entire spectrum of peace processes. Yet, 25 years having passed since Resolution 1325 was passed, women are still significantly underrepresented and unrecognized in efforts to resolve conflicts and ensure lasting peace. The three chapters in this section reflect on the role of women, urging for greater recognition of women's roles and their agendas in peace processes.

Carolina Rehrmann's contribution, "Made for Goodness? Women, Ethnic Conflict, and Reconciliation," draws upon examples from Cyprus to showcase how adept women are at navigating highly sensitive and volatile (post) conflict settings, thereby challenging traditional patriarchal structures and nationalist affiliations to facilitate peace and reconciliation. Elisabet le Roux's chapter, "The Role of Women in Peace Processes: Challenging the Status Quo," draws on examples from Liberia, Burundi,

E. le Roux (✉)
Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa
e-mail: eleroux@sun.ac.za

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_6

Sudan, and Sierra Leone to explore the diverse ways women are involved in informal peace processes while being marginalized in formal ones, arguing for a fundamental reimagining of peace processes. Katherine Marshall's chapter "Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation: Where are the Women?" delves into the reasons and mechanisms behind the frequent absence of women in various aspects of war and peace, emphasizing how the broader conflict transformation field can benefit from appreciating the complex roles that women play.

Keywords Gender · UNSC Resolution 1325 · Women's participation · Peace processes

In October 2000, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. This was a landmark resolution, officially recognizing and reaffirming the important roles of women across the entire spectrum of peace processes, including prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian response, and post-conflict reconstruction. In the resolution, the UNSC.

> [r]eaffirm[ed] the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stress(ed) the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution (UNSC 1325 2000, p. 1).

The resolution called on all actors to increase and ensure women's full participation and involvement in peace processes. Through the resolution, the UNSC.

> [c]all[ed] on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia: (a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; (b) Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements; (c) Measures that

> ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary (UNSC 1325 2000, p. 3).

A quarter of a century after Resolution 1325 was passed, the three chapters in this section reflect on the role of women in peace processes. It is clear that, despite 25 years having passed since Resolution 1325 first urged member states to recognize, support, and enable women's involvement in peace processes, women are still significantly underrepresented and unrecognized in efforts to resolve conflicts and ensure lasting peace. This remains the case despite the various creative and influential ways in which they have played a crucial role in peace processes. All three chapters advocate for greater recognition of women's roles and their agendas in peace processes.

Carolina Rehrmann, in her contribution "Made for Goodness? Women, Ethnic Conflict, and Reconciliation," draws upon examples from Cyprus, an island deeply affected by ethnic conflict and its aftermath, to explore the roles of women in peacebuilding. Criticizing the inherent masculinist bias in traditional approaches to conflict resolution, she argues that women are particularly well-suited for peacebuilding endeavors. These attributes stem from the lessons they have gleaned from enduring structural violence, restriction, and exclusion due to their gender. Such experiences imbue women with a heightened sensitivity toward the consequences of violence and enable them to transcend communal/national demarcations. Furthermore, the gendered role expectations placed upon women may enhance the credibility and acceptance of their involvement in peacebuilding. Through Rehrmann's case studies of women's activism, she showcases their adeptness at navigating highly sensitive and volatile (post) conflict settings. In doing so, they challenge traditional patriarchal structures and nationalist affiliations, thereby facilitating peace and reconciliation.

In her chapter "The Role of Women in Peace Processes: Challenging the Status Quo," Elisabet le Roux draws on examples from Liberia and Burundi to explore the diverse ways women are involved in informal peace processes while being marginalized in formal ones. The chapter argues that a fundamental reimagining of peace processes is imperative given the invaluable contributions women offer. First, reconciliation and gender justice must become a priority in peace processes, with a serious commitment to advancing women's rights and gender equality.

Second, women-centered agendas should be given space to influence the focus and goals of peace negotiations, recognizing the informal/unofficial roles that women play that are conducive to peace. Third, various factors interact with gender to influence women's participation in peace processes, underscoring the importance of reflecting on which women's rights and priorities are represented in these processes.

Katherine Marshall's chapter "Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation: Where are the Women?" begins by highlighting the historical dominance of men in the visual portrayal and formal leadership roles of both war and peace. Marshall delves into the reasons and mechanisms behind the frequent absence of women in various aspects of war and peace. The exclusion of women is linked to entrenched social norms that relegate them to subordinate positions vis-à-vis men, hindering a comprehensive understanding of their roles in peacebuilding. Marshall discusses the distinctiveness of women's engagement in peacebuilding, unpacking the (positive and negative) implications of their roles being overlooked. The chapter highlights the challenges and obstacles faced by women in peacebuilding, emphasizing how the broader conflict transformation field can benefit from appreciating the complex roles that women play in ensuring peaceful and prosperous societies.

References

United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 2000. *Resolution 1325. UN Doc S/Res/1325.* https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n00/720/18/pdf/n0072018.pdf?token=nsDacu1x3cGy5YQV9a&fe=true Accessed 22 Apr 2024.

CHAPTER 7

Made for Goodness? Women, Ethnic Conflict, and Reconciliation

Carolina Rehrmann

Abstract Drawing on basic concepts of gender studies, Carolina Rehrmann traces the potential of women and women's associations for conflict transformation and reconciliation. She starts with a critical review of the masculinist bias in traditional approaches to conflict resolution that disregards gender's potential to explain and resolve conflict. Seeing male and female roles in a dialectic reference to one another and tracing their impact on all levels of social and political life is (1) crucial for understanding conflict risk and conflict structures, and (2) illuminates the potential of women's engagement for transethnic and cross-ethnic dialogue, trauma reprocessing, and reconciliation. Rehrmann presents case studies of women's activism in (post) conflict settings—Cyprus in particular—illustrating success in challenging traditional patriarchal structures, nationalist affiliations, and 'natural' gender roles.

C. Rehrmann (✉)
University of Jena, Jena, Germany
e-mail: carolina.rehrmann@uni-jena.de

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_7

Keywords Carolina Rehrmann · Women · Women's activism · Ethnic conflict · Conflict transformation · Reconciliation · Cyprus · Gender roles

Women have long been seen as naturally empathetic, nurturing, and harmonious—stereotypes that shaped their roles in society. It was gender studies that first dismantled these myths, showing that such traits are not innate but the result of socialization into specific gender roles. Today, this perspective is gaining wider acceptance. Yet, ironically, women's disproportionate role in peace-building continues to be linked to the same emotional qualities rooted in outdated, traditional views of their nature.

Women's organizations have thrived in post-conflict settings where men's groups are often absent. Across regions, they have played pivotal roles in addressing gender-based violence, processing trauma, and fostering trans-ethnic or trans-national relations between former enemies. Notable examples include Women in Black in the Balkans, women-led initiatives in Palestine-Israel, or mothers' groups advocating for the missing and dead. These efforts stand out not only for their impact but for their ability to engage where male-dominated groups have failed. Why is this? Women's marginalization within male-dominated structures has paradoxically equipped them with unique strengths. Their experiences of exclusion and structural violence foster a deeper sensitivity to the consequences of conflict and the need to transcend divisions. Additionally, societal expectations often allow women to act in ways that garner credibility and trust, especially in contexts of peace-building and reconciliation. These qualities, shaped by the challenges they face, position women as powerful agents of transformation in post-conflict societies.

I dare make three claims as to why women seem to be better positioned then men to foster transformation in post-conflict societies. First, their roles within male-dominated structures often place them at critical fault lines of power and exclusion. So: It is not merely despite but indeed because of their experiences of structural violence, marginalization, and restriction that women develop the resilience and insight needed to challenge entrenched systems of conflict and inequality. Second, these experiences of subordination sharpen women's ability to understand and address the profound consequences of violence. This sensitivity enables them to navigate beyond communal or national divides, fostering connections across fractured societies. Third, societal expectations tied to traditional

gender roles often grant women greater credibility and trust in peace-building efforts. Their perceived detachment from the more aggressive, politicized arenas of conflict allows them to engage in reconciliation initiatives with a legitimacy that male actors often lack. These dynamics, shaped by adversity, empower women to lead the way in fostering rapprochement and long-lasting peace.

To explore both the mechanisms of women's subordination and their potential as agents of reconciliation, this analysis begins with a feminist critique of traditional conflict resolution approaches. It highlights the role of gender as a powerful catalyst in both ethnic conflict and reconciliation. The focus will be on women's contributions within the civil-society sphere, emphasizing the need for comprehensive, bottom-up approaches to peace-building. Drawing on examples from various conflict regions, with a particular emphasis on Cyprus, this discussion will illustrate how gendered perspectives can illuminate pathways to lasting reconciliation.

To understand the impact of gender, it must be made visible. As gender-sensitive approaches argue, traditionalist essentialism still heavily influences both social and scientific perceptions of gender roles. Ironically, we see this today in the masculinist hardliners—hawks leading governments across the West, Russia, or Israel (where there is plausibility of a genocide unfolding in front of the world's eyes)—whose current actions exemplify how power structures rooted in domination, mutual antagonism, and the politics of "othering" are not just sustained but actively deepened by their policies and rhetoric. In other words: The central actors in world politics create and perpetuate the very structures they think in. This is not to say that there are no women leaders who support and reinforce aggressive, militaristic approaches to world politics. However, aggression, domination, and threats—especially, as I want to discuss in the following, within ethno-national frameworks—are deeply rooted in masculinist ideal images; images that dominate collective national memories, with male heroic, militant figures at their core. Women who enter the world stage often implicitly or explicitly adapt to this paradigm, aligning themselves with masculinist values to gain authority and legitimacy. Figures like Margaret Thatcher, Hillary Clinton or Christine Lagarde may be cases in point. In particular, International Relations (IR) has been criticized for its focus on high politics, rationality, coercive power, and physical violence—concepts that reflect and reinforce masculine roles and male-dominated political realities. The critique gains further weight given the longstanding reluctance to address concepts like

socio-psychological dynamics, identities, and emotions as core elements of conflict structures (Sheff 1999, p. 335).

This general bias has often led to the popular and scientific misinterpretation of gender studies as being merely studies by women about women. Consequently, they are frequently dismissed as irrelevant to understanding and resolving conflicts, sidelined from serious consideration in mainstream conflict analysis (significant exceptions include Buckley-Zistel and Stanley 2012, and the *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*). Further, gender-sensitive approaches show how fields like IR or economics have systematically overlooked women's issues, as well as those of other marginalized identities. Concepts such as e.g. human security often ignore gender-based violence (GBV), while economic analyses fail to address how marginalization disproportionately affects women and intersectional minorities. By reframing these discussions, gender studies highlight the structural inequalities and blank points embedded in these disciplines and their real-world consequences. In doing so, they have succeeded in reframing concepts to adequately address women and to make visible the multiple dependencies and discriminations of women in social and political life and determine strategies for their economic, political, and social empowerment (True 2010).

However, initiatives risk becoming mere harm reduction if they fail to address the fundamental structures that sustain inequality. Constructivist approaches are essential here, as they reveal how gender shapes and reinforces socio-political structures, maintaining systems of power and exclusion (Youngs 2008). In other words, these approaches delve into the 'black box' of societies, uncovering how traditional gender paradigms influence everything from family dynamics to attitudes toward trauma, forgiveness, and reconciliation. By doing so, they challenge the conventional boundaries of conflict analysis, advocating instead for an interdisciplinary approach that addresses these deeper, interconnected factors (Jenkins and Reardon 2007).

When we enter the sphere of ethnic and ethno-nationalist conflict, the gendered dynamics become especially stark. Revealing the gendered nature of such conflicts means uncovering the connections between aggressive chauvinism, demands for conformity (for both men and women), the promotion of monolithic narratives, and intergroup polarization. In these contexts, women often embody the nation's vulnerability and honor, while masculine ideals anchor the dominant narratives of danger, heroism, and struggle (Yuval-Davis 1997). Both roles come with

narrow prescriptions of behavior and social sanctions for non-compliance. As J. Ann Tickner aptly states, "When we think about the definition of a patriot, we generally think of a man, often a soldier who defends his homeland, most especially his women and children, from dangerous outsiders" (1992, p. 3). The strategic use of accusations of being 'unpatriotic' often serves as a powerful tool in ethnic conflicts, employed to enforce conformity or delegitimize dissent and critique.

Gender theory, interconnected with critical racism, or post-colonial studies, dismantles power structures by exposing the constructed nature of social roles. This perspective is essential in analyzing ethnocentric conflicts, where group identities are closely tied to gender roles and their socio-emotional impacts.

Numerous examples, from Delacroix's Liberty Leading the People to Mother Albania, portray women as exalted symbols of the nation amidst male-centered, violent liberation struggles. These representations of women as embodiments of the collective explain why, particularly in the context of exclusive and primordial narratives, sexualized war crimes such as mass rape are often strategically employed and interpreted as acts of collective humiliation.

Cynthia Cockburn (2007), in her work on the former Yugoslavia, and Simona Sharoni (1995), in her analysis of Israel and Palestine, underscore the centrality of traditional gender roles in shaping primordial perceptions of ethnic rivalr with women's fertility and men's roles as protectors of the community emerge as key pillars of national identity, profoundly influencing the political narratives and structures built around them (Cockburn 2007; Sharoni 1995).

Challenging this static perception, Aleksandra S. Milicevic illustrates how the creation and eventual disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia were accompanied by significant shifts in women's roles. During the socialist period, women benefitted from relative gender equality, participating more broadly in public and professional life. However, with the nation's fragmentation, they were increasingly relegated to traditional roles as breeders and caretakers, tasked with sustaining the reborn image of the nation (2006, p. 268–72). It seems safe to say that gender roles were not simply a central element of ethno-national outburst in the Bosnian war of 1992–1995, but very much a sine qua non-condition.

Similarly, in Cyprus, women have come to symbolize the nation's territorial mutilation and humiliation at the hands of the enemy. They

serve as a stark counter-image to male-dominated war narratives, reinforcing official narratives of self-victimization. A telling example of this is a poem from a Greek-Cypriot history textbook, explicitly designed to evoke nationalist sentiment:

> Her soul is genuine and full of grace!
> In the most of utmost humiliation
> Her heart grieves,
> Since borealis has blown away her dreams
> And the Northern Neighbor
> Has brought sludge and blood
> And locked the door of her house
> Her soul is genuine and full of grace
> Resting in silent pain...
> She commemorates Madonna's grief
> At the moment of her child
> (...)
> Planting a tree of patience
> Untiringly awaiting the halo and
> Lightening of Wonder (Papadopoulos 2001, p. 39).[1]

A striking example is the Greek-Cypriot mothers of sons still missing since the violent division of the island in 1974. These women would gather at the interior border, holding photographs of their sons in silent accusation. While their actions attracted significant media attention, they have also been criticized as a strategic exploitation of their grief to reinforce a biased narrative of victimization. Their enduring pain, often described as "frozen," has conveniently served power-political interests to perpetuate the conflict. Similarly, the case of Solomos Solomou offers another poignant example of how dominant masculinist narratives shape public memory. In 1996, driven by nationalist fervor, Solomou crossed the internal Cypriot border to tear down the Turkish flag and was subsequently shot. His image remains ubiquitous in Greek-Cypriot collective memory, symbolizing the sacrifices tied to these entrenched narratives. Together, these examples illustrate how institutional memory in Cyprus uses traditional gender images to uphold and perpetuate established narratives, shielding them from both external critique and internal dissent.

Much of feminist and women-oriented literature—from policy papers to gender analyses—has focused on addressing women's subordination.

However, this focus has also sparked internal critique, arguing that emphasizing women's empowerment and highlighting their struggles should not lead to their essentialization as inherently weak or passive.

So, where does women's strength lie? In ethno-nationalist contexts, it is often tied to the very structures and challenges that produce their subordination. Research suggests that women, along with other marginalized groups, tend to form emotional bonds more easily, transcend communal boundaries more readily, and construct transnational identities that challenge the status quo (Boaz Yablon, 2009; Korac, 2006). Without essentializing or romanticizing gender roles, it is clear that traits traditionally associated with women—often rooted in their prescribed roles—can become decisive advantages. Women's potential in these contexts reflects a "virtue out of necessity," enabling them to lead transformative shifts in social and gender paradigms. This capacity is grounded in three interrelated dimensions: emotional, factual, and cognitive.

First, women are often socialized to be more empathetic, harmonious, and self-reflective than their male counterparts, granting them a broader scope for action. This is particularly relevant in (post-)conflict contexts, where their ability to acknowledge emotions and engage in dialogue extends beyond family and social circles—even to potential adversaries.

Second, in traditional settings, women's closer ties to the social sphere, as opposed to politics or the military, often leave them less entangled in issues of blame and political opposition. This detachment strengthens their capacity to rebuild and heal fractured social ties.

Third, organizations such as Women in Black (WiB) and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) demonstrate that women's focus on shared challenges, from daily struggles to political goals, fosters a unique ability to think and act transnationally. By embracing multiple, syncretic, and above all shared identities, women create pathways for reconciliation that transcend national and ethnic boundaries.

The aspects mentioned take on even greater significance in moments of crisis. The history of feminism and women's struggles in crisis-prone regions shows that such upheavals often serve as catalysts for women's movements. In these exceptional moments, women are frequently able to step into roles traditionally reserved for men, challenging entrenched gender norms and hierarchies over the long term. Moreover, there is an

emotional dimension to crises as opportunities for sustainable social transformation. Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker underscore the critical role of emotions in either perpetuating or resolving conflict:

> Healing often becomes more about retribution and revenge, rather than a long-term project begetting peace, collaboration and emotional catharsis. The emotions triggered by trauma thus tend to perpetuate existing antagonisms, further entrenching the disingenuous perceptions of identity that may have created violence in the first place (2008, p. 385).

It is easy to see how idealized gender stereotypes—such as the aggressive impulse associated with men and the reflective, healing qualities ascribed to women—shape responses to violence. They illuminate the risk of escalating cycles of violence fueled by fear, resentment, and humiliation (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2008, p. 386). However, the authors also emphasize emotions crucial for reconciliation: "Rather than presenting reconciliation as simply the management of fear, anger, and resentment, one must appreciate how feelings such as empathy, compassion, or even wonder may be part of experiencing trauma as well" (p. 386). It is again women's peace engagement in diverse conflict regions that demonstrates how these emotions foster dialogue, understanding, and the re-humanization of the "other.".

Cockburn's analyses of women's encounters in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and former Yugoslavia show how women negotiate 'the space between' their often uncomfortable and contradictory narratives, identities, and affiliations within and beyond their communities. She refers to the process of 'rooting and shifting' from one's comfort zone to finding common ground in transethnic questions, while highly sensitive issues are still unresolved (2007, p. 8–10). Here, women as cause or consequence of their experiences, roles, and peace engagements exhibit ambiguity tolerance—a prerequisite for change.

That appears as particularly difficult in hot and asymmetric contexts of perceived mutually exclusive solidarities. As one Palestinian woman states, "I can't be so feminist when I see the checkpoints.... I see it from a national perspective. We are suffering here, men and women both. How can I say those Israeli women soldier's are my sisters?" (Cockburn 2007, p. 121). In defying ethnic, geographical, and symbolic boundaries and dominant policies, women's groups tackle these challenges by creating space for mutual knowledge and empathy, and acting disloyal to gendered

images of war. Cockburn resumes her broad field experience with the words:

> Of course, these women were not negotiating sovereignty, drafting treaties or doing diplomacy. They were not among the important people, mainly men, who were simultaneously, elsewhere, sitting around negotiating tables making peace (or more accurately failing to make peace) for their various nations. But these were undeniably cross-national projects, well connected to an international feminist anti-war movement, developing detailed experience of handling ethno-political conflict and defying war machines (1999, p. 7).

This dynamic is equally relevant to the Cyprus conflict, where reconciliation efforts are almost entirely confined to the civil-society sphere. Here, many women engage with silenced narratives of pain that underpin the intractability of the conflict. As in other regions, these women often act without state support and, in many cases, in direct opposition to it. Maria Hadjipavlou and Sevgül Uludağ, co-founders of the bi-communal network Hands Across the Divide, exemplify this approach. Their initiative brings together women from both sides of the divide, addressing shared challenges and fostering dialogue. However, their efforts have faced significant obstacles, including political harassment, threats, and accusations of being 'unpatriotic.' Despite this resistance, their work has gained substantial support and provides profound insights into the self-perpetuating structures of the conflict—insights that traditional political analyses often overlook. Hadjipavlou and Uludağ's struggles highlight the barriers to cross-border cooperation, the frustration with the unresolved status quo, the hidden stories of pain, and the absence of transitional justice. These realities mirror the entrenched dynamics of official politics, static rhetoric, and institutional practices of mutual non-recognition and blame. As Hadjipavlou observes, the regular encounters facilitated by their network foster a "collective 'other' to the male warrior," creating a counter-narrative to the dominant, masculinist frameworks of the conflict. (2010, p. 43).

Here, journalist and peace activist Sevgül Uludağ stands out as a remarkable figure. As a Turkish Cypriot woman and activist, she has courageously spoken out against the political hierarchies and oppressive structures of the regime in the northern part of the island, under Turkish occupation.[2] Within and beyond the bi-communal association 'Together

we can,' she is engaged in revealing the face of the Cypriot missing by collecting untold stories from all communities of the island and publishing them in newspapers on both sides of the dividing line. In a context of mutually exclusive narratives, with no retributive justice and no acknowledgment for the victims of the other side, she digs into the omnipresent past, reaching out to people who have been and continue to live with the silent knowledge of atrocities as victims, witnesses, and perpetrators.

In her publications, at bi-communal events, and youth camps, Uludağ, along with other women and men, reach out to civil society to recollect, safeguard, and disseminate these invisible stories of pain, executions, rapes, expulsions, and agony of the victims' relatives, as well as hidden stories of those who helped and saved each other in times of conflict. Due to her credibility and reputation based on her three-decades-long voluntary engagement and her open critique of the political sphere, many Cypriots from both sides entrust Uludağ with stories they would not tell to the official government investigators and the United Nations (UN) representatives of the Committee on Missing Persons.[3]

Hadjipavlou's and Uludağ's activities, in this respect (as do other women's activities in different regions of ethnonational conflicts) represent the power of engagement beyond and opposed to the official sphere, in touching and setting in motion what is suppressed and left out by male-dominated official discourses and practices. In this sense, it is safe to say: They are made for goodness. One can only hope for the moment when the Cypriot system is ripe for women like them to conquer the political sphere just like Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Leymah Gbowee in Liberia. As a Turkish proverb goes: Patience is bitter, but it bears sweet fruit.

Notes

1. English translations are by C. Rehrmann.
2. Stated in an interview on March 6, 2016.
3. Uludağ's collected stories can be read in her daily blog at http://sevgululudag.blogspot.de/. Some of them have also been published in Uludağ, (2005).

References

Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. http://www.berghof-foundation.org/publications/handbook/berghof-handbook-for-conflict-transformation/. Accessed on 29 Nov 2016.

Boaz Yablon, Yaacov. 2009. Gender Differences in Peace Education Programmes. *Gender and Education* 21 (6): 689–701.

Buckley-Zistel, Susanne, and Ruth Stanley, eds. 2012. *Gender in Transitional Justice. Governance and Limited Statehood*. London: Palgrave McMillan.

Cockburn, Cynthia. 1999. *The Space between Us: Negotiating Gender and National Identities in Conflict*. London: Zed Books.

Cockburn, Cynthia. 2007. *From Where We Stand: War, Women's Activism and Feminist Analysis*. London: Zed Books.

Hadjipavlou, Maria. 2010. *Women and Change in Cyprus: Feminisms and Gender in Conflict*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Hutchison, Emma, and Roland Bleiker. 2008. Emotional Reconciliation: Reconstituting Identity and Community after Trauma. *European Journal of Social Theory* 11 (3): 385–403.

Jenkins, Tony, and Betty A. Reardon. 2007. Gender and Peace: Towards a Gender-Inclusive, Holistic Perspective. In *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies*, ed. Charles Webel and Johan Galtung, 209–229. London: Routledge.

Korac, Maja. 2006. Gender, Conflict and Peace-building: Lessons from the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia. *Women's Studies International Forum* 29: 510–520.

Leiner, Martin, and Susan Flämig. 2012. Reconciliation in the Middle of Dispute: Introduction to the Series. In *Latin America between Conflict and Reconciliation*, ed. Martin Leiner and Susan Flämig, 7–19. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Milicevic, Aleksandra S. 2006. Joining the War: Masculinity, Nationalism and War Participation in the Balkan War of Secession, 1991–1995. *Nationalities Papers* 34 (3): 265–287.

Papadopoulos, Antonis. 2001. *Den Xechno kai Agonizomai*. Leukosia: Ypourgeio Paidias kai Politismou.

Sharoni, Simona. 1995. Gendered Identities in Conflict: The Israeli-Palestinian Case and Beyond. *Women's Studies Quarterly* 23 (3/4): 117–135.

Sheff, Thomas J. 1999. Collective Emotions in Warfare. In *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*, 2d ed., ed. Lester Kurtz, 319–329. San Diego: Academic Press.

Tickner, J. Ann. 1992. *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security*. New York: Columbia University Press.

True, Jacqui. 2010. The Political Economy of Violence against Women: A Feminist International Relations Perspective. *The Australian Feminist Law Journal* 32 (1): 39–59.

Uludağ, Sevgül. 2005. *Cyprus: The Untold Stories. A Reader*. Peleus no. 31. Mannheim: Bibliopolis.
Youngs, Gillian. 2008. From Practice to Theory: Feminist International Relations and 'Gender Mainstreaming.' *International Politics* 45 (6): 688–702.
Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1997. *Gender and Nation*. London: Sage.

CHAPTER 8

Challenging the Status Quo: The Role of Women in Peace Processes

Elisabet le Roux

Abstract Around the globe, women play diverse roles in peace processes. Despite growing acknowledgment of their contributions, formal inclusion remains lacking. Hence, this chapter advocates for challenging the status quo. Drawing from experiences in Liberia and Burundi, it examines women's roles and the barriers they face. It identifies three key areas demanding a shift. Firstly, prioritizing reconciliation and gender justice within peace processes is imperative. Secondly, women-focused agendas must shape and drive peace negotiations. Lastly, recognizing the intersectionality of women's identities is pivotal for effective peacebuilding.

Keywords Peace processes · Women · Gender justice · Women-centered agendas · Intersectionality · Liberia · Burundi

E. le Roux (✉)
Stellenbosch, South Africa
e-mail: eleroux@sun.ac.za

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_8

Introduction

> (I)t doesn't matter what it will take us, the women of Liberia say they want peace, and now (Quote in *The News* newspaper, 13 April 2003, cited by Massaquoi 2007, p. 78).

Women engaged in peace processes challenge the status quo in various ways. Merely advocating for peace, particularly in longstanding conflicts, constitutes a significant challenge. Their formal and informal roles in fostering peace confront entrenched norms, prompting leaders, combatants, and communities to reconsider their stances. Moreover, by participating in peace processes, women question the gendered hierarchy that prescribes male leadership and female submission. Hence, women's involvement in peace processes is ironically an act of disruption, challenging societal norms and expectations.

As research has shown, this disruption is much needed and significant. For example, countries with limited involvement of women in public life are less likely to participate in peace negotiations (Nagel 2021). Parties involved in peace processes are more likely to reach an agreement if women's groups have a strong influence on the process (Bigio and Vogelstein 2018). Additionally, peace agreements signed in the presence of women are more detailed, contain more provisions, and have higher implementation rates than those reached in their absence (Aduda and Liesch 2022).

In this chapter, "peace processes" refer to a range of activities related to peace, including peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace education (Adjei 2019, p. 136). A pivotal moment occurred in 2000 with the adoption of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325, which formally acknowledged the crucial roles women play in peace processes. This resolution, alongside subsequent UNSC resolutions recognizing women's contributions to peace processes and advocating for their inclusion, collectively make up the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda (Adjei 2019, p. 133).

However, despite increased recognition, women continue to face challenges in being formally included in peace processes. In the past 25 years, only 3% of peace process mediators, witnesses, and signatories have been women (Meagher et al. 2023, p. 13). Women's involvement in peace

processes remains predominantly informal and unofficial. This is unfortunate as the world continues to experience numerous conflicts, with over 45 armed conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, more than 35 in Africa, 21 in Asia, seven in Europe, and six in Latin America (Geneva Academy n.d.). Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Colombia have been grappling with armed conflict and failed peace agreements for decades.

Therefore, this chapter argues that it is crucial to further challenge the status quo. It draws upon examples from peace processes in Liberia and Burundi to discuss and illustrate the nature of women's involvement in peace processes and the barriers they encounter. In Liberia, civil war erupted in 1989. Although the first phase of the war ended in 1997, renewed conflict broke out in 2000 and was ultimately resolved through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra in August 2003 (Hegre et al. 2009, pp. 607–608). In Burundi, a civil war characterized by ethnopolitical and genocidal violence began in 1993 and officially ended with the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in August 2000. However, additional peace agreements and a new constitution were required to fully end the conflict (McCulloch and Vandeginste 2019, p. 2). Renewed outbreaks of violence persist, such as in 2015 when President Pierre Nkurunziza's decision to seek a third term, against constitutional provisions allowing only two presidential mandates, led to renewed conflict (Féron 2020, p. 2).

After discussing the nature of and barriers to women's involvement in peace processes, the chapter proceeds to argue that a fundamental reimagining of peace processes is needed in light of what women can offer. Three key areas are discussed that require a further challenge to the status quo: reconciliation and gender justice, women-centered agendas in peace processes, and women's intersectional identities.

Women's Involvement in Peace Processes

Women's involvement in peace processes spans the entire cycle of war and peace. This includes advocating for peace during ongoing conflicts and serving as watchdogs after conflicts to prevent a resurgence of violence. The following paragraphs unpack the nature of women's involvement in peace processes, using examples from Liberia and Burundi. The focus is to provide a brief overview of the typical forms of involvement and the consequential contributions of women.

First, women advocate for peace by raising awareness in their communities and among leaders about the importance and possibility of ending conflicts and establishing peace. Although they may undertake formal roles, such as UN peacekeepers or police officers, their contributions often occur in informal and unofficial ways. Advocating for peace can be seen as a radical endeavor, especially in settings with long-term armed conflicts where individuals have grown disillusioned and come to accept conflict as an inevitable part of life.

In Liberia, women advocated for peace through various means, including street protests, marches, prayer rallies, and demonstrations calling for an end to the war. They reminded communities of the importance and possibility of peace and pleaded with combatants, including their own intimate partners and key leaders, to stop fighting. For example, in 2003, the Women in Peace Network (WIPNET) launched the Mass Action for Peace Campaign. They organized sit-ins and demonstrations across Monrovia, with a daily prayer gathering at the end of a runway. Their presence and momentum pressured President Charles Taylor into meeting with them, during which they called for an immediate cease-fire (Massaquoi 2007, p. 78).

Second, women organize collectively for peace, which significantly enhances their impact. Examining women's involvement in peace processes globally, the role of women's organizations is evident. In Africa, the number of women's organizations has significantly increased since the 1990s, and they greatly benefit from connections with international NGOs (Debusscher and Martin de Almagro 2016, pp. 2, 4). This is also true for women's organizations focused on establishing peace, especially following the adoption of Resolution 1325. These organizations work collectively. For instance, the Mano River Union Women Peace Network, established in 2000, represents a network of women's organizations working for peace in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea (Saiget 2016, p. 5).

Notably, these women's peace organizations practically demonstrate peaceful collaborative engagement with "the other." In many countries embroiled in protracted armed conflict, women have formed peace alliances and organizations that include women from different sides of the conflict. For example, in Burundi, organizations like the Women Network for Peace and Non-Violence and the Women's Association for Peace were formed, including both Hutu and Tutsi women. These organizations not

only advocated for peace but also practically illustrated that peaceful coexistence and cooperation are possible. They helped others understand how peaceful coexistence can be achieved, such as by hosting workshops on nonviolent conflict resolution (Agbalajobi 2009, p. 13). Especially in civil wars and ethnic conflicts, where the enemy "other" is a neighbor, people need such practical examples and guidance on how to make peace and move beyond conflict.

Third, women often promote and facilitate conversation and collaboration between fighting factions. This is where women's informal and unofficial methods of engagement and lobbying have been instrumental in ensuring that opposition groups engage with each other and collaborate for peace. Women peace activists directly and individually engage with leaders from the different factions, motivating and convincing them to participate in peace processes. For instance, women peace activists from Liberia received international recognition for ensuring that the Accra Peace Agreement was signed. The chief mediator called these women his allies, explaining how they moved between the different male delegates, coaxing and motivating them to participate in the negotiation process (Saiget 2016, p. 10). These women also applied more direct pressure. When the parties in peace negotiations showed no sign of reaching agreements, and with fighting still continuing in Liberia, the female delegates (only there as official observers) blocked the men's exit from the conference room and refused them food and water.

> [The women] barricaded the conference room and with linked arms, refused to let anyone leave until a binding agreement had been made. Standing strong against warlords, freedom fighters, politicians, and religious leaders, the women physically pushed these men back through doors and windows as they tried to make their way out of the conference room and back to their luxury hotels (Ouellet 2013, p. 14).

Fourth, women use peace processes as an opportunity to promote women's rights and freedoms. The disruption caused by armed conflict and the resulting restructuring offers a chance to rethink and transform dominant gender norms and roles. By participating in peace processes, whether formally or informally, women peace activists demonstrate the ability of women to take on leadership roles and participate in decision-making at local and national levels, thereby challenging prevailing gender norms. Additionally, women peace activists advocate for specific policies

and provisions to be included in formal peace agreements to promote women's rights and freedoms.

For example, during the peace negotiations in Arusha in 2000, seven Burundian women delegates held closed-door sessions with the international mediator to discuss gender issues (Saiget 2016, p. 8). These women also advocated for the inclusion of a women's charter in the new constitution and the elimination of discriminatory laws against women, both of which were accepted and incorporated into the final Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (Agbalajobi 2009, p. 14). Similarly, in Liberia, the Accra Peace Agreement included several gender-related policies, such as the inclusion of women in the Governance Reform Commission and the National Elections Commission, the participation of women's organizations in the National Transitional Legislative Assembly, and the requirement for national and gender balance in all appointments within the transitional government of Liberia (Debusscher and Martin de Almagro 2016, p. 8).

Finally, women play a crucial role in post-conflict settings by ensuring the implementation of peace agreements, raising local awareness about the content of these agreements, and facilitating peacebuilding at the community level. In Liberia, women's organizations continued to play a significant role in post-conflict recovery, including leading mass campaigns to promote voter registration and women's participation in the first elections after the war (Debusscher and Martin de Almagro 2016, p. 2). Women peace activists also established Peace Huts, which were based on the traditional practices of the Liberian Palava Huts, an indigenous system of justice used to resolve disputes. These Peace Huts provided a structured way to promote peacebuilding and gender equality in the post-conflict era at the community level (Lawson and Flomo 2020, p. 1870). In Burundi, women's organizations have played a crucial role in preventing the recurrence of conflict. They engage in awareness-raising, training, mediation, and peacebuilding activities with the goal of preventing renewed conflict. For example, the women's organization Dushirehamwe has trained thousands of Burundian women in conflict prevention, mediation, and peacebuilding through Train-the-Trainer programs (Féron 2020, p. 3).

Barriers to Women's Involvement in Peace Processes—And How Women Overcome Them

There are significant barriers to women's participation in peace processes, with one major obstacle being the systematic exclusion of women from formal peace processes. Over the past 25 years, only 3% of peace process mediators, witnesses, and signatories have been women. Additionally, there have been only two women serving as chief negotiators in major peace processes, and only one woman who has signed a final peace accord as a chief negotiator (Meagher et al. 2023, p. 13). This underrepresentation can be attributed to the fact that women hold fewer key positions in politics and security structures, leading to the perception that their involvement is unnecessary or irrelevant to peace talks (Aduda and Liesch 2022, p. 3).

The exclusion of women from formal peace processes is rooted in patriarchal societal attitudes that hinder women's participation in various aspects. Gendered norms, biases, and assumptions limit the spaces in which women can assert their authority and contribute to societal conversations, ultimately restricting their power and influence. These patriarchal attitudes also reinforce the notion that peace negotiations are predominantly male-dominated spaces. Consequently, women are not only excluded from formal peace talks but also face stigmatization, discrimination, smear campaigns, and even violent threats when they assume public and leadership roles in peace processes, defying gender norms and expectations (Abrahamyan et al. 2018, p. 55). Additionally, external actors involved in peace processes can exacerbate gender inequalities and women's exclusion by engaging exclusively with male leaders or by showing ignorance or insensitivity toward local traditional systems and structures that might include women.

The impact of armed conflict further inhibits women from participating in peace processes. They face significant risks to their safety and security and often have to assume additional economic and social responsibilities due to the consequences of the conflict, such as the loss of their husbands. Many women also bear the physical and emotional scars of the conflict and continue to endure threats and sexual harassment even in post-conflict settings. These circumstances leave many women without the necessary physical, mental, and economic resources to mobilize for peace and demand representation in peace processes.

Women's organizations also face significant challenges, often lacking capacity-building opportunities and suffering from unequal resources, which prevent them from effectively lobbying for women's rights and ensuring their inclusion in peace processes (Shulika 2016, p. 25). This is why women must be creative to ensure their involvement in peace processes, as illustrated in the preceding section's discussion of women's involvement in peace processes. Women are accustomed to being sidelined and are skilled at finding workarounds. For instance, Whitman (2006, p. 32) argues that women's status as second-class citizens empowers them to find innovative ways to cope with problems. Therefore, women have had to be creative in ensuring their participation in peace processes.

One effective method for overcoming marginalization and exclusion is the use of international partnerships and resolutions to gain increased access to and influence in peace processes. Women peace activists have successfully used the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda and UNSC resolutions to demand their inclusion and participation in peace negotiations. The WPS agenda serves as a strategic tool for women peace activists, offering them a platform to engage with officials and policymakers (Abrahamyan et al. 2018, p. 54; Martin de Almagro 2017, p. 7). Furthermore, some women peace activists have collaborated with international actors to advocate for and facilitate women's participation in peace processes, particularly at the national level. For example, UNIFEM (the UN Development Fund for Women, which in 2011 merged with a number of other smaller entities to become UN Women) supported women in Liberia (during the Accra peace negotiations) and Burundi (during the Arusha peace negotiations), organizing exclusive conferences for women delegates and observers. These conferences produced significant declarations and played a crucial role in ensuring that women's recommendations were incorporated into their respective countries' final peace accords (Saiget 2016, p. 8).

Given the prevalent tendency to marginalize and exclude women from peace processes at both local and national levels, women have resorted to various ad-hoc and informal means of participation. These include stay-home actions, sex bans, multi-day prayer meetings, marches, picketing, networking through personal contacts and affiliations, and leveraging international media. It is crucial not to underestimate the significance of these informal activities for peace. Saiget (2016) argues against viewing formal and informal practices as mutually exclusive; instead, women's

involvement in informal and unofficial peace processes should be seen as a parallel form of diplomacy influencing the dynamics of peace negotiations.

Emphasizing solely women's involvement in formal peace processes reinforces a Western bias that prioritizes the use of formal and external bodies and structures to end conflicts. Therefore, informal and/or indigenous approaches, such as mediation, truth-saying, joint problem-solving, and rituals, should be recognized for their important role in conflict resolution and peace promotion (Issifu 2016, pp. 145–146).

While acknowledging the importance of women's involvement in informal and unofficial peace processes, promoting their participation in formal and official peace processes is equally crucial. We need a complete reimagining of peace processes, considering what women bring to the table: not just their unique approaches and skills but also their priorities and agendas. While women's participation in peace processes has always pushed boundaries, I argue that further challenges are necessary. In the following discussion, I will focus on three key areas of peace processes that need to be questioned and transformed to ensure women's full participation and representation.

Reconciliation and Gender Justice

Armed conflict can both challenge and facilitate gender equality within society. On one hand, conflict amplifies existing gender inequalities, compromising community structures, access to healthcare, and human rights, leading to worse conditions for women (Patel et al. 2020, p. 2). On the other hand, armed conflict also disrupts the gendered status quo, providing an opportunity to challenge gendered roles and norms that limit women's freedoms and agency (Meagher et al. 2023, p. 13). For example, some women engage in conflict as active combatants or peacekeepers, while many assume traditionally male roles within the community due to the absence of men, such as running businesses, building houses, and heading households (Sideris 2000). However, when conflict ends, there is often a patriarchal backlash, with forceful efforts to re-establish traditional gender roles that limit women's rights and position them as subordinate to men (Meger 2010). In many cases, the women's rights gained during armed conflict are lost immediately in its aftermath (Ochieng 2019, p. 7). For instance, during conflict, women establish businesses to support themselves and their families, assuming the traditionally male roles of providers and decision-makers, often in fields like

construction or animal husbandry. However, when their husbands return home, these women are forced to hand over their businesses, losing their financial independence and decision-making ability.

Peace processes, therefore, represent a crossroads for women's rights and freedoms within society. They offer a choice: to revert to pre-conflict gender-unequal power structures that prioritize and valorize men at the expense of women, or to rethink and transform these structures to recognize women's equality. This intentional engagement with gendered power structures is not only crucial for improving the status of women but also essential for ensuring long-term peace. Three dimensions of power play a significant role in militarization and war: economic power, ethnic/national power, and gender power. Cockburn (2011, p. 42) argues that gender power is often overlooked in peace processes, perpetuating the ongoing cycle of conflict worldwide.

> You see that the disposition in societies such as those we live in, characterized by a patriarchal gender regime, is towards an association of masculinity with authority, coercion and violence. It is a masculinity (and a complementary femininity) that not only serves militarism very well indeed, but seeks and needs militarization and war for its fulfilment. Of course, the violence of war is in turn productive… It produces particular gender identities… But these war-honed gender relations, 'after war' (which may always equally be 'before war'), again tend to feed back perennially into the spiralling continuum of armed conflict, for ever predisposing a society to violence, forever disturbing the peace (Cockburn 2011, p. 44).

This is why some argue that challenging patriarchy and transforming society into a more gender-equal one is necessary to ensure peace (Jenkins and Reardon, 2009, p. 209). Peace processes need to prioritize the advancement of women's rights and gender equality. For societies to achieve sustainable peace, transformative change is required. This change should result in a different understanding and experience of gender and relationships between men and women. While war has numerous traumatic and devastating consequences, it also presents an opportunity for transformation. However, realizing this opportunity requires concerted effort: "Post-conflict peacebuilding processes present major opportunities for advancing women's rights and gender equality. But a gender perspective needs to be more effectively operationalised in post-conflict institutions and peacebuilding processes..." (True, 2013, p. 1).

Women-Centered Agendas in Peace Processes

The number of women delegates present at peace negotiations is often used as a basis for arguing whether women were included or not. However, mere representation is insufficient; women-centered agendas must be granted space and influence in shaping the focus and aim of peace negotiations. Women's perspectives should significantly impact key decisions during peace negotiations, including how disarmament processes will incorporate and support female combatants, how post-conflict justice processes will address cases of conflict-related sexual violence, and how initiatives for gender equality and women's empowerment will be integrated into the new, post-conflict landscape. These are nuances that are often ignored and overlooked in formal peace negotiations, where the focus remains primarily on men and their agendas. Peace negotiations are often highly gendered spaces, with the discussions and decisions—alongside issues deemed unworthy of discussion—reflecting male biases. For example, women's economic rights and participation continue to be neglected. The economic repression of women—before, during, and after armed conflict—affects their physical security and access to justice, and economic reparations either perpetuate existing gender inequalities or undermine them (True, 2013, p. 4). Yet post-conflict economic recovery plans rarely adequately consider the unique economic vulnerability of women and how it impacts them more broadly. This, in turn, affects their ability to participate in and contribute to peace. As noted by True (2013, p. 4):

> If key economic and social rights such as those to land and housing, to transact in one's own legal name, to equality in marriage, and to freedom of mobility are not secured early enough after conflict, then many women who are already poor and marginalised will be denied opportunities for both economic and political participation in peace and reconstruction.

Yet, when reflecting on the importance of women's agendas impacting peace negotiations, it is crucial to avoid essentialist views of women. Just as not all women are naturally peaceful, not all women will promote women-centered agendas when involved in peace negotiations. Women need to be informed and motivated to do so. As Whitman (2006, p. 39) argues: "Having women at the peace table is important, but having women who actively promote women's issues is even more important."

For some women, their own internalization of patriarchy inhibits them from challenging its limiting structures. Other women, included as a minority (compared to men) within peace negotiations and decision-making positions, feel unable to challenge the system. Thus, these women end up supporting peace negotiations that reproduce authoritarian, patriarchal, militarized post-conflict societies (Hendricks 2017, p. 94). Simply including women in peace talks is not enough. It is essential to select women who are not only informed but also capable and willing to speak out, ensuring that post-conflict society does not merely re-establish pre-conflict patriarchal dominance.

Finally, there needs to be a rethinking of what activities are recognized as conducive to peace. Instead of dismissing women's contributions to peace processes as "informal" or "unofficial" and therefore of lesser value and impact, more reflection is needed on why certain activities are prioritized and deemed more important to peace processes. Rather than only focusing on including women in formal peace processes, we should reconsider what is recognized as contributing to peace. Many activities in which women engage—such as peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace education—are innovative and creative, and their impact and importance should be acknowledged.

> There must be more innovative thinking of alternative gender sensitive ways of creating peace at all levels (local, national, regional, continental and global) and to cease being limited by the forms of yesteryear that are no longer able to address the multi-faceted complex nature of our current conflicts (Hendricks 2017, p. 93).

Women's Intersectional Identities

Reflections on women's roles in peace processes are dominated by two differing epistemological views. Essentialist perspectives argue that women should be included in peace processes due to their inherently peaceful nature, attributed to their biology and reproductive roles. According to essentialists, incorporating women and their peace-promoting attitudes will enhance the effectiveness of peace processes (Atteya 2021, p. 44). However, the notion that women are naturally peaceful has been strongly contested, with evidence showing women's participation as active combatants in armed conflicts. Essentialist arguments for women's inclusion in peace processes can stigmatize women

who are or were combatants. Furthermore, basing women's inclusion on their roles as mothers disempowers them (Charlesworth 2008, pp. 349–357). Women cannot be taken seriously as equal political actors with valuable insights if their inclusion is justified solely by their ability to bear children.

Constructionist perspectives view gender roles as neither natural nor fixed and argue that women need to be included in peace processes because they are affected by armed conflict differently than men. Their inclusion is necessary for peace processes to address their unique experiences and needs (Adjei 2019, p. 145). However, while constructionist perspectives do not rely on biological arguments for women's inclusion, they may still be too limiting, as not all women's experiences and needs are the same. Intersectionality highlights that women's identities and experiences are shaped not only by their gender but also by other identity categories (e.g., race, class) and wider circumstances (e.g., education, occupation). These factors intersect in complex ways, producing diverse forms of vulnerabilities and opportunities.

> Researchers have often used a narrow definition of gender – men versus women – to explain unequal social relations that exclude sections of the society from the peace process, while ignoring the important role other social identity markers play to exclude women from the process (Adjei 2019, p. 134).

Recognizing women's intersectional identities has significant implications for peace processes. It prompts the question: which women are being included in these processes, both formal and informal? Intersectionality highlights that various factors interact with gender to influence women's participation in peace processes. Therefore, it is crucial to reflect on which women's rights and priorities are being represented. Martin de Almagro (2017) explores this issue in Liberia and Burundi, revealing a gap between women peace activists from the highest social classes (leading national organizations and linked to a transnational activist elite) and those leading grassroots women's organizations. These gaps hinder efforts to empower women and promote gender equality.

For instance, in Liberia, the Affirmative Action Bill, which reserved seats in the House of Representatives for women, youth, and people with disabilities, took seven years to pass. This delay was partly due to insufficient support from many women's organizations that viewed the process

as being driven by elites. Similarly, in Burundi, there was resistance to advocating for women's right to inherit the land. These examples illustrate that "(t)he effort to include women as participants will do little to address the experiences of a diversity of women until the ramifications of racial, class and sexuality stratification among women are acknowledged" (Martin de Almagro 2017, p. 19).

Conclusion

The roles of women in peace processes need to be recognized and lauded. Women peace activists, through their efforts to establish and maintain peace, challenge the status quo in many ways. They are creative and brave in carving out space for their voices and need to be heard and addressed, thereby contributing to the development of a society free from armed conflict. However, reflecting on the current state of the WPS agenda, along with practical examples of women's involvement in peace processes globally, it is clear that further challenges to the status quo are still necessary.

Rather than merely advocating for women's inclusion in peace processes, the goal must be to transform these processes. More effort is needed to ensure that peace processes genuinely represent and incorporate women's priorities, agendas, and activities. Specifically, peace processes need to take the importance of gender equality and gender justice more seriously, provide greater opportunities for women's agendas and activities to influence outcomes, and pay close attention to and address the diverse experiences and needs of different women.

References

Abrahamyan, Milenna, Parvana Mammadova, and Sophio Tskhvariashvili. 2018. Women Challenging Gender Norms and Patriarchal Values in Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation Across the South Caucasus. *Journal of Conflict Transformation, Caucasus Edition* 3 (1): 46–71.

Adjei, Maxwell. 2019. Women's Participation in Peace Processes: A Review of Literature. *Journal of Peace Education* 16 (2): 133–154.

Aduda, Levke, and Johanna Liesch. 2022. Women at the Table: Identifying Factors Through Which Women Have the Opportunity to Influence Peace Agreement Design. *Journal of Global Security Studies* 7 (1): 1–21.

Agbalajobi, Damilola T. 2009. The Role of African Women in Peace Building and Conflict Resolution: The Case of Burundi. *African Journal for the Psychological Study of Social Issues* 12: 1–2.

Atteya, Noran. 2021. *Women, Religion, and Peacebuilding in Africa: A Case Analysis of Sudan*. Doctoral diss.: University of Pretoria.

Bigio, Jamille, and Rachel B. Vogelstein. 2018. *Increasing Female Participation in Peacekeeping Operations*. Online. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/report/increasing-female-participation-peacekeeping-operations. Accessed 4 Oct 2023.

Charlesworth, Hilary. 2008. Are Women Peaceful? Reflections on the Role of Women in Peace-Building. *Feminist Legal Studies* 16 (3): 347–361.

Cockburn, Cynthia. 2011. Gender Relations as Causal in Militarization and War: A Feminist Standpoint. In *Making Gender, Making War: Violence, Military and Peacekeeping Practices*, ed. A. Kronsell and E. Svedberg, 29–46. London: Routledge.

Debusscher, Petra, and Maria Martin de Almagro. 2016. Post-Conflict Women's Movements in Turmoil: The Challenges of Success in Liberia in the 2005-Aftermath. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 54 (2): 293–316.

Féron, Élise. 2020. Reinventing Conflict Prevention? Women and the Prevention of the Reemergence of Conflict in Burundi. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 37 (3): 239–252.

Geneva Academy, n.d. *Today's Armed Conflicts*. https://geneva-academy.ch/galleries/today-s-armed-conflicts. Accessed 4 Oct 2023.

Hegre, Håvard., Gudrun Østby, and Clionadh Raleigh. 2009. Poverty and Civil War Events: A Disaggregated Study of Liberia. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53 (4): 598–623.

Hendricks, Cheryl. 2017. Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture. *Africa Development* XLII (3): 73–98.

Issifu, Abdul K. 2016. Local Peace Committees in Africa: The Unseen Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding. *Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies* 9 (1): 141–158.

Jenkins, Tony, and Betty Reardon. 2009. Gender and Peace: Toward a Gender Inclusive, Holistic Perspective. In *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies*, ed. C. Webel and J. Galtung, 209–231. London: Routledge.

Lawson, Erica S., and Valiba K. Flomo. 2020. Motherwork and Gender Justice in Peace Huts: A Feminist View from Liberia. *Third World Quarterly* 41 (11): 1863–1880.

Martin de Almagro, Maria. 2017. Producing Participants: Gender, Race, Class, and Women, Peace and Security. *Global Society*, 1–21.

Massaquoi, William N. 2007. *Women and Post-Conflict Development: A Case Study on Liberia*. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

McCulloch, Allison, and S. Vandeginste. 2019. Veto Power and Power-Sharing: Insights from Burundi (2000–2018). *Democratization* 26 (7): 1176–1193.

Meagher, Kristen, Mouna Khaity, Sali Hafez, Mariana Rodo, Nassim El Achi, and Preeti Patel. 2023. Strengthening Health Systems and Peacebuilding Through Women's Leadership: A Qualitative Study. *Global Health* 19 (21): 1–18.

Meger, Sara. 2010. Rape of the Congo: Understanding Sexual Violence in the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 28 (2): 119–135.

Nagel, Robert U. 2021. Gendered Preferences: How Women's Inclusion in Society Shapes Negotiation Occurrence in Intrastate Conflicts. *Journal of Peace Research* 58 (3): 433–448.

Ochieng, Merab. 2019. Role of Women in Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Transformation Africa: A Catholic Church Perspective. *International Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences* 1 (2): 1–12.

Ouellet, Julie X. 2013. Women and Religion in Liberia's Peace and Reconciliation. *Critical Intersections in Education: An OISE/UT Students' Journal* 1 (1): 12–20.

Patel, Preeti, Kristen Meagher, Nassim El Achi, Abdulkarim Ekzayez, Richard Sullivan, and Gemma Bowsher. 2020. 'Having More Women Humanitarian Leaders Will Help Transform the Humanitarian System': Challenges and Opportunities for Women Leaders in Conflict and Humanitarian Health. *Conflict and Health* 14 (84): 1–15.

Saiget, Marie. 2016. Women's Participation in African Peace Negotiations: Cooperating with the UN Agencies in Burundi and Liberia. *Peacebuilding* 4 (1): 28–40.

Shulika, Lukong S. 2016. Women and Peace Building: From Historical to Contemporary African Perspectives. *Ubuntu: Journal of Conflict and Social Transformation* 5 (1): 7–31.

Sideris, Tina. 2000. Rape in War and Peace: Some Thoughts on Social Context and Gender Roles. *Agenda* 43: 41–45.

True, Jacqui. 2013. *Women, Peace and Security in Post-Conflict and Peacebuilding Contexts*. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, Policy Brief. https://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/true_noref_unscr1325_feb_2013_final.pdf. Accessed 4 Oct 2023.

United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 2000. *Resolution 1325. UN Doc S/Res/1325*. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n00/720/18/pdf/n0072018.pdf?token=nsDacu1x3cGy5YQV9a&fe=true Accessed 22 Apr 2024.

Whitman, Shelly. 2006. Women and Peace-Building in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: An Assessment of their Role in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 6 (1): 29–48.

CHAPTER 9

Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation: Where Are the Women?

Katherine Marshall

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Adopted Resolution (S/RES/1325) On Women, Peace, and Security On 31 October 2000. The Resolution Reaffirms the Important Role of Women in Preventing and Resolving Conflicts, Peace Negotiations, Peacebuilding, Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Response, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction. It Stresses the Importance of Their Equal Participation and Full Involvement in All Efforts for Maintaining and Promoting Peace and Security. Resolution 1325 Urges All Actors to Increase the Participation of Women and Incorporate Gender Perspectives in All United Nations Peace and Security Efforts. It Also Calls On All Parties to Conflicts to Take Special Measures to Protect Women and Girls From Gender-Based Violence, Particularly Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Abuse, in Situations of Armed Conflict. The Resolution Provides Several Important Operational Mandates With Implications for Member States and Entities of the United Nations System (UNSC 2003, UN 2003).

K. Marshall (✉)
Georgetown University, Washington, USA
e-mail: Km398@georgetown.edu

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_9

Abstract The noticeable absence of women in formal peacemaking settings reflects both prejudices and institutional structures that are changing, albeit too slowly. There are positive examples of women's roles both in negotiations and, notably, in the wide gamut of "peacebuilding" activities, which include identifying the causes of conflict and preventing violence, as well as the crucial work of reconciliation and moving toward harmonious societies. Key issues involve the lack of recognition of women's innovative work across diverse sectors and effective strategies to overcome barriers to both understanding and action. By recognizing the multifaceted roles of women and integrating this understanding and appreciation into the broader conflict transformation field, we can enhance our understanding of the underlying causes of conflict and strengthen efforts toward peaceful and prosperous societies.

Keywords Peacebuilding · Conflict resolution · Women · UN resolution 1325

The Challenge

Throughout history, men have largely dominated the realms of optics and formal leadership, in both times of war and peace. They commanded on battlefields, led ministries of war, and participated in negotiations. Women, when present, were often perceived as helpless victims. There were exceptions to this narrative, such as Joan of Arc, Amazon warriors, or spies cloaked in the innocence or witlessness associated with "the weaker sex." Traditionally, though, war has been a men's business, including the processes that brought war to an end. All that is changing, propelled both by the monumental shifts in the respective and relative roles of women and men in societies and changes in the nature of violent conflicts, conflict resolution, and what is now termed "peacebuilding" (Hunt 2007, Kreft 2017). The United Nations Resolution 1325, adopted in the year 2000, called for, and even demanded, the active role of women. It symbolized a growing awareness or consensus that women's lack of visibility in matters related to war and peace was an anomaly and needed to change. Over 107 countries have adopted a national action plan to promote Resolution 1325. However, progress toward genuine inclusion has been painfully slow, and there is still far to go before the qualities and insights attributed

to women's participation, along with their social and political equality, are fully realized in practice (Newby and O'Malley 2017; GIWPS 2016, 2020).

This chapter explores the challenges and shifts in thinking and practice that are transforming different aspects of peacebuilding, with a focus on women's roles. What constitutes the problem? Why do patterns of excluding women persist? Why does it matter that women have often been absent from many aspects of war and peace? And even when women are involved, why is their input so often obscured or invisible? The complex problem of defining women's inputs emerges time and again as an intellectual, ethical, and practical matter: is there something distinctively "female" to define, and if not, what are the implications? Women's invisibility is a common pattern: the significant work they undertake often goes unnoticed (Hayward and Marshall, 2015; Hunt 2007). This phenomenon is widespread, particularly affecting women with religious institutional ties. With the changing nature of conflict and peacebuilding, challenging questions regarding boundaries arise, involving women. Where does the field of peacebuilding start and end? How do questions of prevention link to governance, economic policymaking, and the management of the increasing diversity characteristic of contemporary societies? The chapter's final section looks ahead to contemporary boundaries, obstacles, trends, and opportunities.

The assertions and analyses presented here are based on my extensive operational experience across the "nexus" of international development, humanitarian action, and peacebuilding. The once clearly defined institutional boundaries among these fields are now being challenged and increasingly breached. It has become problematic to categorize situations in one field or another, both in the academy and in operational work. The complex emergencies that are increasing in number across various regions involve conflicts of diverse forms, rarely conforming to the traditional pattern of opposing national armies (Omer et al., 2019). These conflicts are intertwined with a multitude of governance issues, economic policies, vulnerabilities, social tensions, and basic human needs. Rising awareness of the pervasive actual and potential impact of climate change affects approaches and realities across the board. The so-called "five P's" that distill the complex Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—Peace, Prosperity, Planet, People, and Partnerships—are all involved in conflict prevention and transformation. Furthermore, the vital and distinct roles of women are an integral facet of the whole and each individual part.

Why Do Women Matter in Peacebuilding?

Why are women frequently excluded from decision-making and leadership roles in areas linked to war and peace? What are the reasons behind this exclusion and why does this matter?

Women's historic and, too often, present exclusion from various fields is closely connected to social norms that have often relegated them to secondary roles defined by cultural assumptions. Assumptions of subordinate status and dependence are particularly relevant in the traditionally "masculine" domain of war and peace, where qualities and virtues associated with masculinity have historically dominated. Women were not expected to be warriors and were seldom welcomed in the diplomatic arenas that largely shaped decisions regarding war and peace. While significant shifts have occurred, with women now occupying numerous military and diplomatic positions, remnants of past expectations persist.

The words at the heart of UN Resolution 1325 (as mentioned in the epigraph for this chapter) begin to address the fundamental question of why women's exclusion matters and how their inclusion can lead to tangible improvements. Where women were seen as relevant for war and peace, it has often been as victims. Indeed, women disproportionately endure the hardships of war and conflict, bearing the burden of sustaining life amidst destruction and displacement. Feeding and caring for families in situations where food, water, fuel, housing, and medical care vanish is frequently left to women. An ancient evil, increasingly recognized and discussed as part of conflicts, is the deliberate use of rape and kidnapping as weapons of war. Here also women's roles as victims are central to perceptions of the parts they play.

While women undoubtedly endure significant pain and carry heavy burdens during conflicts, the emphasis on portraying them solely as victims often confines them to passive roles. This narrow focus limits our understanding of their diverse roles and hampers their involvement in conflict resolution and healing processes. This includes addressing the underlying causes of conflicts and fostering reconciliation, spanning from local community initiatives to transnational efforts.

And How Might Women's Engagement Be Seen as Distinctive?

"Essentializing women" is a temptation and a trap. It can be satisfying to argue that women, as half of humanity and endowed with a full range of talents, interests, and wisdom, are essential participants simply on grounds of equity and justice. However, more complex questions arise when exploring how unique experiences and other assets might come into play, and even more so when operationalizing assumptions about women's distinctive assets. Given the wide diversity of women across the world, making generalizations can be perilous.

My own experience supports arguments for some distinctive qualities and tendencies. The most significant ones are linked to experiences that often arise from socialization. Women's roles within families and communities are often shaped by gendered expectations that both limit their scope and open up opportunities. Dekha Ibrahim in Kenya built on her community roles to shape dynamic approaches to conflict resolution that, in turn, led to broad appreciations of what peacebuilding involved. Women's interest in the welfare of children and communities tends to shape their agendas and priorities when they are faced with choices. The fact that many women bring gifts of reconciliation and an appreciation for underlying tensions that drive violent outbreaks and conflicts is well-documented (obviously, some men have similar qualities). Having a mix of people, including men and women, "at the table" enriches agendas and the quality of discussions.

The more violent conflict and peace are understood as integral parts of societies, the clearer it becomes that conflict resolution and building durable peace must include a wide range of topics and sectors, and thus involve a diverse group of stakeholders. The traditional understanding of "stages of conflict," which suggests a sequence of conflict eruption, violence or war, negotiations leading to a ceasefire, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), and a transition back to normal life and, if applicable, development, is oversimplified or even false. Today's complex emergencies involve different phases, often with disparate situations within a relatively small territory, and may include reversions and skipped steps. The stereotype of transitions from peace to war and back, involving men dominating the war phases, simply does not apply.

In sum, for a host of reasons, the contemporary expectation of women's integral engagement in peacebuilding is rooted in notions of

equality and equity that challenge the traditional role expectations that previously excluded them. Even more significant is the growing appreciation for women's engagement in traditional contexts of war and peace, which calls into question long-standing narratives. Women could be and quite often were far more active participants than conventional narratives suggest, for better or for worse. Fundamental changes in both realities and narratives about conflict and peacebuilding also highlight the wide range of roles that women play and the importance of engaging them. However, the force of traditional expectations of women's inferior social roles, romanticized notions of domestic virtues, and different capacities persist stubbornly in many areas. Despite the rhetoric, there are formidable obstacles that stand in the way of women's full engagement and recognition, and these need to be appreciated and addressed.

And What is Peacebuilding?

Peacebuilding has become a well-used term in the field and beyond. Fundamentally, it reflects an appreciation, as well as a caution, that the work for peace must go beyond "peacemaking" and "peacekeeping" to encompass a broader and ongoing process aimed at fostering a strong, sustainable, and positive societal dynamic. Therefore, peacebuilding cannot be separated from considerations of societal well-being, development aspirations, and, increasingly, the protection of the planet. Delving deeper, a comprehensive understanding of peacebuilding requires acknowledging that peace is not a tangible achievement or a moment that is "created," but an ongoing and enduring process of managing and reconciling interests within societies that are becoming increasingly diverse and dynamic. Scholar and activist Johan Galtung (1976) is credited with popularizing the contemporary usage of the term and expressed it as follows: "The mechanisms that peace is based on should be built into the structure and be present as a reservoir for the system itself to draw upon… More specifically, structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur." See also scholar Scott Appleby's nuanced appreciation for different dimensions of conflict and peace, focused on the "ambivalent sacred" (2000).

An exchange I had about a specific experience concerning an international peace award highlights pitfalls and opportunities that specifically relate to women's roles or their absence from obdurate understandings

of how they engage. The challenge in this instance was to address the dearth of female nominees for the peace award. While speaking to women in an effort to identify nominees, many pointed to female colleagues who were doing complex, creative, and vital work at different levels. These efforts ranged from grassroots community development in tense environments to nationwide initiatives. However, these women did not see their colleagues' work as directly related to peace or worthy of recognition in that context. Their descriptions of practical peacebuilding extended to reforms of educational systems, extending healthcare to excluded minorities, providing microcredit to support women's entrepreneurship, and enhancing local governance. Yet, inherently narrow, if often unarticulated, understandings of what constitutes peace work failed to recognize, even among women, the breadth of actions that peacebuilding entails and implies.

Taking this broader lens, there is indeed a remarkable array of women's actions that often go unrecognized as peacebuilding efforts, despite their clear contributions. Musawah, a remarkable organization born in Malaysia and Indonesia, works to advance the welfare of Muslim women primarily through action based on law and legal systems. Organizations like Talitha Kum and Girls not Brides work to address specific issues such as human trafficking and forced marriage, both of which are effects and causes of conflict and injustice. There are countless other examples of women's engagement and leadership in fields that fall squarely within the definition of peacebuilding.

In sum, there is a pressing need to broaden our understanding of peacebuilding beyond the confines of conventional, segmented approaches typically found in traditional diplomacy and conflict resolution. This expanded definition is particularly crucial in recognizing and involving women from various perspectives in a wider array of processes recognized as integral to peace.

Exploring the Phenomenon of Invisibility

The systematic exclusion of women from traditional war and peace processes means that action and analysis have tended to be dominated by men. Even when women are involved, their contributions are often unappreciated or ignored. Cultural bias further obscures perspectives and contributions from situations and cultures where "Western" scholarship has not deeply penetrated. However, there is a growing appreciation

for women's roles, thanks to societal changes and the activism that led to the United Nations' passage of Resolution 1325. Remarkable women, such as former Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Leymah Gbowee, Maria Ressa, Graça Machel, Nadia Murad, and Malala Yousafzai, have been honored, for instance, with the Nobel Peace Prize. Scilla Elworthy (2010), over a long period of time, has addressed a wide range of issues, from nuclear disarmament to community-level peacebuilding. Women also lead national institutions, with examples including Madeleine Albright and Hillary Clinton at the US Department of State, and Sadako Ogata at the UN Refugee Organization, who advocated strongly for the concept of human security. There are countless other examples of exceptional and courageous leadership by women in areas related to peacebuilding.

Many women who exercise leadership, however, are far less recognized and appreciated, and this matters. They are effectively invisible, with their work and approaches largely unnoticed and overlooked. This can be because these women work, often not by choice, in unconventional ways and through unconventional channels. They are often prevented by tradition or rules from holding official positions. Yet many achieve remarkable results with limited resources, despite the obstacles they face.

Two arguments are put forward regarding women's invisibility. For some, it has its advantages, including for the women themselves. The cloak of invisibility may enable and facilitate unconventional approaches, different channels, and unusual networks. Some argue that unofficial status can help overcome rigid institutional practices and norms. Some "invisible actors" go unnoticed and are thus able to make unique connections, approaching conversations and interactions in ways that open up new avenues to explore, as well as hearts and minds. Examples of the positive use of invisibility include the largely unseen work of women in Aceh, Indonesia, and the efforts of many Catholic sisters working for peace in conflict zones. Most of this work is poorly documented, for obvious reasons. Some women prefer their informal invisible roles precisely because it shields them from conventional norms and barriers.

The main argument, however, is that working in the shadows comes with multiple disadvantages. These women may go unrecognized, be forced to prove themselves, and lack resources and networks. They face uphill battles to do what they consider necessary. While working at the community level may align with expectations and encounter fewer barriers, when it comes to national spaces, their work and approaches are

likely to be dismissed. Invisibility, therefore, needs to be seen primarily as a disadvantage, and a pattern and phenomenon that needs to be addressed and overcome.

Religiously Linked Women—Cultural Boundaries

A particular group of women, many of whom actively and specifically work to advance the cause of peace, face distinctive problems that accentuate the patterns of invisibility: women with a religious affiliation. The problems are linked both to persistent obstacles to women's leadership within some religious hierarchies and to cultural factors that may inhibit women from securing resources or recognition. Many Roman Catholic sisters fall into this trap, though there are also examples of determined and effective women (in Colombia, for example) who defy both hierarchy and cultural obstacles to reach across boundaries, explore, and develop new approaches to resolving conflicts and moving toward peace. An additional factor at work involves tensions in some situations that tend to distance lay women activists from religious communities and approaches, including religiously inspired women. These tensions are driven by both assumptions and realities that some religious actors either question or oppose women's involvement in activism, particularly in peacebuilding efforts. Addressing this challenge requires navigating a complex landscape of diverse situations, emphasizing the need for contextual analysis and engagement (Appleby 2000).

Women in Action. Where Might Distinctive Challenges and Obstacles Lie?

The headline of a March 2023 UNSC press release conveys concerns about mixed progress toward implementing Resolution 1325: "Progress in Security Council's Women, Peace, Security Agenda Lacking, as Sexual Violence, Insufficient Protection, Absence in Peace Processes Continues. As Agenda Nears Twenty-Fifth Anniversary, Gains on Gender Equality Shrinking Worldwide, Women Still Suffering from Brutal Armed Conflicts, and 'Gender Apartheid.'" The harsh examples of women's oppression in Afghanistan and reports of continuing experience of rape as a weapon of war stand out as uncomfortable realities and challenges to hopes for progress. The report notes that more than 90 speakers emphasized challenges faced by women, from Syria to Mali, Yemen, Ukraine,

South Sudan, and beyond. Yes, progress can be seen, with a "growing number of States tackling the nexus of gender and security in national action plans." But "two years shy of the resolution's twenty-fifth anniversary, progress in protecting women and embedding their voices in the decision-making processes that shape their lives remains woefully insufficient." Sima Bahous, Executive Director of UN-Women, in March 2023 pointed to "historic firsts for gender equality," but "we neither significantly changed the composition of peace tables, nor the impunity enjoyed by those who commit atrocities against women and girls." Many situations have seen civic space for women activists shrink dramatically, if not close altogether, and misogyny in many forms has spread. The global picture, in short, is sobering.

The challenges for peacebuilding are shaped by specific contexts and circumstances, affecting the roles that both institutions and individuals can play, women or men. False premises and distorted analyses often accompany efforts to link or limit either men or women to specific paths. The spirit behind national action plans to implement UN Resolution 1325 reflects a growing awareness across various sectors of society of the nuances and complexities inherent in change and transformation, necessitating a case-by-case approach. However, slow progress toward increasing progress on key indicators, both statistical and anecdotal, suggests that significant barriers still exist. Not all are equally persuaded that women indeed belong "at the table" in significant numbers and with effective leadership mandates. The obstacles to strengthening this broad engagement are of utmost importance.

Looking Ahead

Various paths can and need to be pursued to address obstacles and create opportunities for greater and more effective participation by women across the wide spectrum of peacebuilding dimensions. Official recognition of the existing gap and the imperative to rectify the underlying root issues is a crucial initial step. Similarly, acknowledging women's contributions through case studies and efforts to honor their bravery and achievements is essential. Several programs are specifically dedicated to identifying and celebrating women's roles, ensuring that honors and awards are directed toward them, even if they do not fit conventional criteria or roles. And tailored training programs can enhance both awareness and skills (Buxton 2012; Jafari 2023).

The impact of inspiring individuals is of great importance, especially for younger generations who need role models to motivate them and guide them toward paths they can aspire to. Other approaches to enhancing women's roles in peacebuilding work include supporting meaningful operational networks that span from community-level action to national and transnational processes. Considerable attention is currently being directed toward building effective networks that connect and support women engaged in peacebuilding efforts. However, building these networks is easier said than done, and the task presents particular challenges for those working in intensive, fast evolving, and often dangerous situations.

Networks must be well-curated, with ongoing efforts to ensure that they address the specific needs of participants and remain adaptable to changing circumstances. Training and fellowship programs are pivotal, and programs that focus specifically on peacebuilding with women at the center hold special significance (Buxton 2012). Moreover, there are important and creative efforts underway that include toolkits and other efforts to offer practical support to women operating in conflict-ridden environments, where tensions are high, or where an uneasy peace demands attention to unreconciled grievances and dangerous inequalities. Capacity building and leadership development represent logical areas for action and can take many different forms (Jafari 2023).

Two broad challenges for peacebuilding could benefit from a more deliberate focus on the challenges of engaging and including women: the various peacemaking and mediating processes at work, and the broader nexus of peace, development, humanitarian response, and climate action.

A contemporary categorization for addressing conflicts examines various "tracks." Track One refers to official negotiations, often led by governments, and intergovernmental organizations, with diplomats at the forefront. Track Two refers to unofficial, often civil society-led peace processes. "Track One-and-a-Half" lies between these two categories (such as the efforts of the lay Catholic Community of Sant'Egidio in South Sudan). Track Three refers to the important work of conflict resolution and peacebuilding at the community, or grassroots level. Women must be engaged across all these levels. Presently, they often lack the visibility and prominence they deserve, whether in recognized formal processes or in behind-the-scenes, gradual efforts. Increased scholarly and media focus on women's diverse roles in formal and informal peacebuilding could amplify both their visibility and impact.

The fields of conflict resolution and peacebuilding adopt distinctive institutional forms, yet there is a growing awareness of porous boundaries among different approaches and disciplines. Links between peacebuilding, humanitarian action, and disaster response present urgent coordination demands. The development community, now more attentive to fragility, can no longer sideline humanitarian action and conflict resolution as beyond their scope of work and competence. The crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic underscored the interdependence of these communities and the need for heightened focus on prevention and preparedness. Climate change, particularly its associated disasters, further shapes institutional approaches. While these nexus issues undergo significant strategic and institutional transformations, the centrality of women's roles in these processes deserves more emphasis. As peacebuilding becomes increasingly integral to strategic engagements tied to human development and well-being, the active and equal engagement of women, about women, and with women takes on even greater significance.

References

Appleby, R Scott. 2000. *The Ambivalence of the Sacred. Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*. Lanham.

Buxton, Julia. 2012. Tailoring Training in Gender, Peace, Conflict and Development. *Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development* 19. http://www.brad.ac.uk/ssis/peace-conflict-and-development/.

Elworthy, Scilla. 2010. *A Discussion with Scilla Elworthy, Director, Oxford Research Group*. Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs: Georgetown University. https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion-with-scilla-elworthy-director-oxford-research-group.

Galtung, Johan. 1976. *Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research*, vol. II. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers.

Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security (GIWPS). 2016. *Adolescent Girls' Access to Education in Conflict-Affected Settings Closing the Gap*. https://giwps.georgetown.edu/resource/closing-the-gap/.

Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security (GIWPS). 2020. *Beijing +25 Accelerating Progress for Women and Girls*. https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Beijing25AcceleratingProgressForWomenAndGirls.pdf.

Hayward, Susan, and Katherine Marshall, eds. 2015. *Women, Religion and Peacebuilding: Illuminating the Unseen*. United States Institute of Peace.

Hunt, Swanee. 2007. Let Women Rule. *Foreign Affairs* 86 (3): 109–120.

Jafari, Sheherazade. 2023. *Religion and Gender. Action Guide*. United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Religion-and-Gender-Action-Guide.pdf.

Kreft, Anne-Kathrin. 2017. The gender mainstreaming gap: Security Council resolution 1325 and UN peacekeeping mandates. *International Peacekeeping* 24 (1): 132–158. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2016.1195267.

Newby, Vanessa F., and Alanna O'Malley. 2017. Introduction: WPS 20 Years On: Where Are the Women Now? *Global Studies Quarterly* 1 (3): ksab017. https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksab017.

Omer, Atalia, R Scott Appleby, and David Little. 2019. *The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding*. Oxford University Press.

United Nations (UN). 2023. Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. 9267th Meeting (AM & PM), SC/15221. *Progress in Security Council's Women, Peace, Security Agenda Lacking, as Sexual Violence, Insufficient Protection, Absence in Peace Processes Continues*. https://press.un.org/en2023/sc15221.doc.htm

United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 2000. *UN Resolution 1325*. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n00/720/18/pdf/n0072018.pdf?token=OmHGibzogchWQaeYNY&fe=true

United States Institute of Peace. (cx). *What is UNSCR 1325? An Explanation of the Landmark Resolution on Women, Peace and Security*. https://www.usip.org/gender_peacebuilding/about_UNSCR_1325.

PART III

Alternative Approaches—Religion

CHAPTER 10

Introduction to Religion

David P. Gushee

Abstract This chapter explores three alternative and unconventional approaches to conflict transformation, as presented in the essays by Azza Karam, Richard Friedli, and the author. Karam argues for the necessity of integrating religion into peacebuilding efforts, emphasizing the significant role religious communities play in both conflict and reconciliation. She highlights the untapped potential of multi-religious collaboration, despite the challenges posed by interfaith divisions. Friedli examines the dual nature of religion as both a unifying and divisive force, proposing strategies to mobilize its constructive potential for reconciliation, such as reinterpreting religious narratives and fostering collective healing. The chapter also discusses Glen Stassen's "just peacemaking" theory, which outlines ten essential practices for preventing war, drawing from both interdisciplinary research and Christian ethical principles. Together, these essays offer distinct yet complementary perspectives on addressing conflict, underscoring the importance of religion, ethical engagement, and proactive peacemaking strategies in global peace efforts.

D. P. Gushee (✉)
Mercer University, Macon, USA
e-mail: GUSHEE_DP@mercer.edu

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_10

Keywords Religion · Conflict transformation · Peacebuilding · Interfaith collaboration · Religious extremism · Reconciliation · Social identity · Just peacemaking · War prevention · Nonviolent action · Human rights · Democracy · International diplomacy · Collective memory · Ethical engagement

The three essays in Part III are primarily linked by their alternative, unconventional approaches to conflict transformation, although each offers a distinct perspective.

In Chapter 13, Azza Karam argues that if one seeks peace or other dimensions of the common good, "religion must be factored in." She notes that "religions are the dictators of so much behaviour and thought." According to Karam, as much as 80% of the world's population claims a religious affiliation, citing Pew polling data. It is evident that religious communities provide substantial practical services toward the common good worldwide, leveraging their considerable wealth accumulated over centuries. Unfortunately, religion can also be a source of violence and insecurity, or at least an exacerbating factor, as seen in religious extremism.

Despite the prevalence, resources, and issues associated with religious convictions and communities, religion remains a relatively neglected factor in governmental and NGO efforts to address peace and the common good. Karam emphasizes a point that is often understood but less frequently practiced: any government or NGO that wants to understand the world, let alone address its gravest problems, must take religion seriously.

Karam's most original contribution in her chapter is her focus on multi-religious collaboration in addressing human problems, including violence and war. Such collaboration is in short supply at every level—local, national, regional, and global—relative to both potential and need. Karam highlights how siloed religious groups often are, even within the same small local communities. She identifies various reasons why long-term multi-religious collaboration can be difficult, such as the constant "transitions and transformations even within one religious community, let alone many of them trying to cooperate." Nonetheless, her challenge remains: multi-religious cooperation for peace and the common good is imperative.

In Chapter 11, Richard Friedli describes the religious dimensions of intergroup conflict and explores the religious resources available for reconciliation. Two key definitions in his essay are worth highlighting here:

> I understand the term 'religion' to imply *socially enacted desire for the ultimate, embodied in practices that have non-negotiable significances.*

Thus, religion is about "the meaning of existence, an orientation towards action, and the formation of a social identity." One can hardly imagine a more powerful force in human existence, yet its power has an intrinsic ambivalence:

> The social reality of religion is a resource of constructive as well as destructive energies . . . religious traditions can either bring members of a community together in a coherent 'we' or separate them from perceived 'others.'

Religion can be a force both for legitimizing intercommunal violence and for healing it. Toward the end of his essay, Friedli suggests ways to mobilize the latent constructive or healing power of religion. These include reconstructing or reinterpreting foundational religious and cultural narratives, developing rituals and processes of reconciliation, and providing resources for transforming collective and individual memories of violence. Friedli uses examples related to the veiling of Muslim women and the Rwandan genocide to illustrate his claims.

In Chapter 12, I explore the ethical contribution of the late Christian ethicist Glen Stassen's "just peacemaking" theory:

> [Stassen] argued that humanity was in recent decades discovering, developing, and implementing war-preventive practices, which are absolutely essential given the destructive power of modern weaponry. These practices are becoming increasingly visible in interdisciplinary scholarly literature as well as in grassroots activist and protest efforts and in international diplomacy. . . . As a Christian ethicist, Stassen further argued that many of these practices paralleled specific teachings of Jesus.

The just peacemaking theory distills ten essential peacemaking practices, including: supporting nonviolent direct action; taking independent

peacemaking initiatives; using cooperative conflict resolution; acknowledging responsibility for past conflict and injustice; promoting democracy, human rights, and religious liberty; fostering just and sustainable economic development; leveraging emergent cooperative forces in the international system; strengthening the United Nations (UN) and international organizations; reducing offensive weapons and weapons trade; and encouraging grassroots peacemaking groups.

My essay describes each of these ten peacemaking practices in detail, provides examples of their successful application in specific conflict situations, and critically examines the limitations and dangers of each approach.

Together, the three chapters by Karam, Friedli, and myself offer diverse and illuminating alternative approaches to conflict transformation, drawing on different disciplines, contexts, and historical eras.

CHAPTER 11

Religious Dimensions in Conflict Transformation: A Tentative Approach Toward a Reconciliation Methodology

Richard Friedli

Abstract Every political context manifests an overlapping reality with religion as a key component. Islamic or Christian traditions are involved therein, as well as Hindu and Buddhist communities. In view of realistic reconciliation dynamics, a pre-condition is the analysis of the theoretical and practical dimensions of religion-based violent phenomena: manifest and latent, personal and structural, economic and cultural. In doing so, three major dimensions need consideration: fundamental narratives, socially accepted norms, and collective memories. These factors are often used to legitimize destructive and/or segregation practices. Yet embedded in these same deep-culture configurations is the potential for reconciliation. Richard Friedli illustrates two case studies of conflicts where both destructive—even genocidal—and constructive religious dynamics

R. Friedli (✉)
Fribourg, Switzerland
e-mail: richard.friedli@unifr.ch

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_11

are involved: (1) the Islamic veil, and (2) the *ubuntu* philosophy in Rwanda.

Keywords Richard Friedli · Religion · Conflict transformation · Reconciliation · Islamic veil · *ubuntu* · Rwanda

Some years ago—specifically since the events of 9/11 and the attack on the Twin Towers in New York in 2001—confrontation began between Western armies and militias with close ties to radicalized Islamic groups. These global conflicts can no longer be analyzed, interpreted, or managed without taking their 'religion' component into account. This does not signify a move towards an approach inspired by the now infamous 'clash of civilizations' theory developed by the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington twenty years ago. It is even less acceptable to designate the relationship between the West and Islam as a frontier stained by bloodshed. However, according to anthropologist Arjun Appadurai, a 'religious' understanding of the prevailing social and political realities can facilitate the drawing of a 'geography of anger' that encompasses the victims of *militia Christi* (Christian fundamentalism) in Latin America, the apartheid theologies of South Africa, the Buddhist nationalist movements in Myanmar and Sri Lanka, Hindu actions by the Army of Shiva in India, jihadist militias of the Islamic State, the Hezbollah (the Party of Allah) in Lebanon, and Mai–Mai groups or The Lord Resistance Army in Central Africa (2006).

The 'Religion' Dimension

Highlighting these kinds of correlations in the frame of a comparative sociology of religions is one thing; however, fully grasping the implications of the 'religion' factor at an operational level is another story (Werkner 2016). In order to do this, it is necessary to make a practical choice between the various theories and definitions proposed over the years by the science of religion. Among the dozens of approaches to the religion component in a given society—sociological, phenomenological, theological, ethical, psycho-analytical, cognitive, and atheist—I propose in this paper the functionalist approach from the constructivist tradition

and the sociology of knowledge (Frazer and Friedli 2015, pp. 9, 11–15, 31).

I understand the term 'religion' to imply *socially enacted desire for the ultimate, embodied in practices that have non-negotiable significances*. In my opinion, with this multi-dimensional tool—the meaning of existence, an orientation towards action, and the formation of a social identity—it is possible to concretely envisage the transformation of conflicts.

In fact, such a definition for the factor of religion brings two of its conflicting components to light: on the one side, the ambivalence of its message; on the other side, its potential for interpersonal and socio-political polarization. So, the social reality of religion is a resource of constructive as well as destructive energies. I understand the phrase 'ambivalence of religion' to imply that religious traditions can either bring members of a community together in a coherent 'we' or separate them from perceived 'others.'

Therefore, religion functions at a social-political level either as a social tie 'to connect' or as a source of separation 'to divide,' as a source of collective stability or as an instigator of prophetic change. In this way, although religions can guarantee social stability (attestation), they can also be used to promote a prophetic critique of political reality (contestation). These kinds of derivations are in accordance with the polarization between the fundamental message and the fundamentalist affirmation of a religious tradition.

This ebb and flow between the calm affirmation of a religious message and its belligerent radicalization is often connected with the prevailing economic or demographic environment. Nationalistic memories and the actions of charismatic leaders or collective psychologies that demonize the 'others' and reduce them to the level of animals are also possible triggers for the outbreak of conflict. As a consequence, the transformation of conflicts can be—or rather must be—based on the analysis of these kinds of external factors (Basedau 2016, pp. 237–54).

To sum up, my position is this: In the first urgent step, the conflict situation must be controlled, mitigated, and terminated by concentrated interventions of state, police, or even military forces. The result of such 'hard' logic can be labeled as a 'negative peace state'; but to contribute to a stabilized personal, social, and public environment, a complementary endeavor needs to be done in cultural changes. That's the logic of 'soft' sciences. Therein religion has a key function.

Typology of 'Violence'

In a similar way to what we saw with the definition of religion, it is of central importance in any efforts aimed at transforming conflicts that the parties in the conflict come to a preliminary agreement on what they mean by the term 'violence.' With regard to the common operational definition of religion, a precondition for any emotional de-escalation of aggressive or murderous opposition between individuals or groups is having the possibility to refer tactically to a jointly agreed understanding of what constitutes violence during the respective negotiation period.

Like when defining religion, there are many theoretical approaches that can be adopted to identify violence—for example, the theory that establishes a link between frustration and aggression, or the theory that refers to basic human needs, or the theoretical approach that focuses on the impact that the recollection of humiliation can have in the history of an individual or the collective memory (Baberowski 2015). The analysis of violence that I will use in this paper is based on the explanatory tools introduced by Johan Galtung around fifty years ago in the discipline of peace studies (1975, pp. 7–31; cf. 1996; Galtung and MacQueen 2008).

The following is a brief overview of Galtung's definitional approach to violence, which at first glance appears to be relatively abstract: *All actions are considered 'violent' if they diminish the prevailing living conditions of a person or a group when compared with what should be concretely possible in a given historical context* (1975, pp. 9–13). In the first instance, this gap is only perceived in the form of 'direct/personal' violence in which the perpetrators of violence and their victims can be identified. However, 'structural' violence is the latent, underlying trigger that the visible actors of violence have interiorized. Moreover, in order to justify their violent actions, these perpetrators refer to some foundational narratives that are channeled through 'cultural' violence.

Galtung uses the French phrase *culture profonde* and the German term *Tiefenkultur* (deep culture) to refer to this legitimizing justification of violent actions by respective traditions. In academic debate, this foundational interpretation of violent reality is presented as moralizing and even spellbinding—a reference that gives everybody a bad conscience, but which does nothing to resolve the prevailing social practices or violent policies (Baberowski 2015, pp. 110–32). When seen in this way, the reference to deep culture is considered to function like some kind of

essentialized 'fetish' (Bouthoul 1974, p. 101). In response to this suspicion, it is my proposal that the legitimatizing reference to cultural violence be better operationalized by understanding the term as a latent interface comprising: (a) the foundational narratives, (b) the given societal normative plausibilities, and (c) the collective or individual memory of the given perpetrators of violence.

By way of a summary, Fig. 11.1 gives a schematic representation of the intertwined nature of the mechanisms of direct/personal, structural, and cultural violence. This typology facilitates an operational methodology for the transformation of conflicts. Clearly, the diagram reduces the complexity of situations to their 'violent energy' component and a few simplistic explanatory references. However, the only objective of using the diagram is to increase the perceptibility of the peace research methodology proposed in my approach.



Fig. 11.1 A Fundamentalistic Perception

As with any schematic representation, however, reducing violent social situations down to three inputs alone is clearly not an exhaustive reference to the many specific cultural and religious dimensions of each given conflict context. In addition to the three aspects of direct/personal, structural, and cultural violence, influences that might contribute to the outbreak of violence include—to mention just a few of the various possible additional elements—mass media pressure, climatic influences, or psychological factors related to opinion leaders and the psychology of the masses.

To illustrate the way the methodological approach proposed functions, I will refer to two examples out of the many possible Buddhist, Hindu, Christian, Islamic, and African references mentioned in the opening paragraph: (1) the issue of the obligation to wear an Islamic veil in public places, which is often interpreted by Western observers as violence against women, and (2) the context of the genocide in Rwanda.

Again, the aim here is not to present the full spectrum of issues inherent in these two problem areas, but rather to illustrate—both at the meso and macro levels—how elements of the deep culture can be brought to bear in the negotiation, reconciliation, and socio-political processes related to the social conflict surrounding the Islamic veil and the genocidal tragedy in Rwanda.

The Islamic Veil as a Non-Negotiable Norm

The ethical legitimization given for the obligatory wearing of a veil in public comes from the Quran, which emphasizes a dress code that was in common use in rural Arab settings in the seventh century C.E.

> And tell the believing women to lower their gaze and guard their chastity, and to display of their beauty and ornaments only that which is apparent and to draw their veils over their bosoms, and not display their ornaments except to their husbands, or their fathers, or the fathers of their husbands, or their sons, or the sons of their husbands, or their brothers, or the sons of their brothers, or the sons of their sisters, or Muslim women, or their slaves, or male servants with no sexual desire, or small boys who know nothing about the private parts of women. And let them not stamp their feet so as to reveal what they hide of their adornment. And turn unto Allah together, O believers, that you may be successful (Surah An-Nur 24:31).

This recommendation from the time of the Arabic origins of the revelation of the Quran is transferred—exacted as it is by the Salafist milieu and presented as an obligation that is still valid—in the Western reality of the twenty-first century. The actual reasonableness of this dress code is therefore ratified by the reference to the traditional customs and honor codes of the Arabic context of the Salafi companions of Mohammad. Any potential modern-day objections are then interpreted—for example, by the jihadist Boko Haram of north-eastern Nigeria—as a disastrous 'Haram' legacy of British colonization, which must be ruthlessly addressed as a 'sin' and serious 'infidelity.'

The Genocide in Rwanda as a Glorified Event

An analysis of the genocide against the Batutsi inhabitants of Rwanda in 1994, using the Galtung methodology, reminds us that in order to justify the extermination of this aristocratic group—which had exploited the Bahutu peasants under the feudal *Ubuhake* serf system—an unconditional call was made to the Ten Commandments of Bahutu of 1990 (Friedli 2013, pp. 227–29). Seemingly, the ethnic stratification of the social system was socially codified and politically ratified during the Belgian colonial period. In order to give religious legitimization to their ethnic hatred and genocidal crimes, the perpetrators of violence on the side of the Bahutus referred sometimes to the 'Hamite' theory, that is the biblical story of the condemnation by Noah of his son Ham. In fact, this story, which presents the 'table of nations' (Gen. 9:18–28), is used to legitimize *a contrario* the exploitation and genocidal extermination by the black Hamites of the noble and light-skinned Japhetites. It is a kind of reversed mythological revenge. In fact, along the biblical text reassumed by the 'apartheid' theology, Noah blessed Japheth for having covered up their drunken father's nudity but cursed Ham who had made fun of his condition. And now during the genocide of 1994, the exploited Bahutu persons become the exploiters of the Batutsi.

Transformation of Conflicts

This triangular analysis of violence—namely, giving consideration to the direct/personal, structural, and cultural aspects—also facilitates the outlining of the interpersonal, structural, and cultural dynamics of reconciliation. These tools, found within the frame of the sociology of cultures

and religions, are clearly not the only operational factors. Indeed, the sociological and anthropological traditions referred to in this paper tend to be qualified as soft sciences (Galtung and MacQueen 2008, pp. 89–107). In an interdisciplinary and well-articulated context, they are nevertheless useful if they are combined with hard sciences like agriculture, medicine, imposed state family planning, as well as the legal and court system. From my experience on the ground, social and religious sciences that qualify as soft often become concrete hard tools in favor of social changes in order to guarantee the sustainability of interventions within reconciliation projects.

Figure 11.2 presents the deep-culture factor in the frame of the conditions that are necessary for structural reconciliation, and consequently for processes of interpersonal reconciliation.

The methodology proposed in support of the transformation of conflicts is based on a dynamic according to which the opponents—social adversaries, ethnic enemies, or militarized fighters—reach a point where they no longer consider each other as enemies that need to be



Fig. 11.2 An Open Space Perception

annihilated, but rather as adversaries with whom they must enter into negotiations (Lederach 2005; Lederach and Lederach 2010; cf. Friedli 2012). These mediation processes, often labeled as 'soft,' are nevertheless complex (compare Fig. 11.1 with Fig. 11.2). They are, above all, interdependent with economic, political, and demographic factors. On the threshing floor of conflicts, they are often, as already mentioned, perceived as the only real hard factors. It is with these considerations in mind that we refer once again to the issues of the Islamic veil on the one hand and the Rwanda genocide on the other, while acknowledging that the related processes of material, social, and spiritual reconstruction can take years—the reconstruction of souls and wounded, destabilized identities in particular.

The Islamic Veil as a Personal Option

In Islamic contexts that rigidly impose the wearing of the veil and severely punish any attempts to refuse to conform to this traditional obligation, the study and evaluation of the three components of the deep-culture interface becomes a necessary process. This step involves first identifying the foundational message and the verses used in the Quran to transmit it (Mernissi 1992; cf. Ramadan 2008, pp. 115–98, 267–301). However, well before the concrete exegesis of the few passages in the Quran that refer to the dress culture of women around the prophet Mohammad, it is necessary to reach an understanding of the historical context that inspired them, and the normative transcultural value of the Quranic revelation and Islamic practices undertaken by the Salafi companions of Mohammad.

Furthermore, in order to frame this kind of perspective, consideration must also be given to the prevailing normative, historical Arabic customs and related Islamic contexts—not to mention the need to grasp the related collective and regional memory. In fact, Europe's colonial past and memories of the Christian crusades continue to deeply poison any attempts at dialogue. Indeed, at best there is an exchange of two polite monologues—not a real dialogue (Lindbeck 2009, pp. 16–31, 66–70; cf. Bitter 2003, pp. 292–302; Friedli 2013, pp. 226–27). More often than not, these dialogues are nothing more than a juxtaposition of monologues, in other words, 'duologues.'

Unless, that is, the whole issue of the veil is seen in the light of deeper layers of the Quranic tradition and Islamic spirituality. Here, we can refer—within this Islamic framework that needs to be updated beyond

the established forms of structural violence—to different tractions in the biography of the prophet Mohammad himself and especially to the important roles played by his first wife Khadidja and his young wife Aicha as his trustful references for advice and counseling.

Furthermore, another approach that would be open to reasonable accommodations, while remaining within deep Islamic culture, is the qualification of *rahman* and *rahim* (compassion) invoked through God at the *bismillah* (start) of each daily prayer. As suggested by the Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi some years ago, this gesture of prayerful solidarity is, in Islam *Rahma*, another aspect of spiritual diapraxis (1992, pp. 115–120; cf. Rasmussen 2011; Bitter 2011; Frazer and Friedli 2015, pp. 22–23, 27). However, as the sociology of prejudice shows, it takes a long time to build the confidence needed to renegotiate the codes of the prevailing social structure because this is something that goes far beyond rational argumentation. In fact, we are referring precisely to an aspect of deep culture that has to be reconfigured in accordance with the needs of a new historical context (Nussbaum 2011).

The Reconciliation Process in Rwanda for a Rebuilt Community

Similar prejudice-based deadlocks are often seen in post-genocide approaches in the context of Rwanda (Hatzfeld 2000; 2015, cf. Friedli 2013, pp. 227–32). Radically opposed narratives that justify and interpret the murderous, criminal, and genocidal events that occurred between April and July 1994 collide with one another in discussions between families, among humanitarian organizations, and in the heart of the churches. Twenty years after the events, there are still numerous perspectives on why the widespread massacres occurred: the 'Hamite' hypothesis, Belgian colonial style, the role of Catholic missionaries, global geopolitics, hesitations within the United Nations (UN) system between the Western and communist blocks, the drop in the price of coffee, the urban–rural divide, the demographic explosion, to mention just a few of the theories discussed (Friedli 2013, pp. 227–28). Therefore, in this post-genocide context, there are still many monologues, suspicions, and mutual accusations.

Nevertheless, in this second example which I introduced to illustrate the 'Religious Dimensions in Conflict Transformation' approach, it is again at the level of the values within the Rwandan deep culture that

the reconstruction of social structures and responsible cohabitation will have to take place. I am thinking here of the key black-African value of *ubuntu* that Bishop Desmond Tutu gave prominence to during the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission initiative (1993–1995). In fact, the term *ubuntu* refers to encompassioned solidarity and reciprocal kindness between *abantu* (human beings).

It is with good reason that the Rwandan Government, in its project to encourage a process of widespread interethnic reconciliation, established the grassroots gacaca courts (1996–2012), combining modern transitional justice methodology with elements taken from the traditional Rwandan gacaca method of conflict resolution by renegotiating the harmony between neighbors (Friedli 2016). In fact, there was extensive national and international coverage—oftentimes critical—of the establishment, implementation, and outcomes of this unique experience of civil reconciliation, but in my opinion, the traditional gacaca system remains an exemplary initiative for refocusing and reconfiguring—after the horrors of a genocide—the drivers of reconciliation within Rwandan deep culture (Rutayisire 2012; Clark 2010; Friedli 2013, pp. 228–32; Weingardt 2014, pp. 42–48).

The Way Forward for Future Transformation of Conflicts

The overview of the cultural and religious processes that need to be uncovered and are instrumental at the level of deep culture is still preliminary in nature. Further enquiries into the methodology (of the shift from Fig. 11.1 to 11.2) and corresponding processes—social-political, interethnic, religious, migratory, military, and terrorist—are needed to transform contexts of structural and interpersonal violence into sustainable reconciliation dynamics.

I would put the following issues on any future agenda related to methodologies in conflict transformation:

Rituals of Reconciliation

A careful elaboration of socio-political 'rites of passage' that are capable of rounding off the phase of conflict transformation and rooting the process of cohabitation between reconciled parties is not yet well developed. In fact, conflicts profoundly disturb and disorganize the daily routines of

people, groups, and even entire populations (Friedli 2012). Earlier we referred to two situations that could benefit from rites of passage at the social level: the end of the controversies over the Islamic veil in the Western context; and, at the level of community policies, the radical reorganization of the community in Rwanda following the events related to the genocide. When referring to rituals, the intention is not to advocate for any kind of emotional ceremony for forgiveness, but rather to provide a channel through which the events of the past can be consciously accepted and the risks inherent in a new and reconciled future anticipated.

In both contexts, the communities still find themselves in the transition phase towards civil reconciliation that the anthropologist Victor Turner has designated with the term 'liminality'—on the threshold of transition towards the resumption of a 'normal' existential routine (1969). As with transitions at the personal and societal level that are marked with rites of passage from the moment of birth right up to the death of a person or family, it is necessary to create, at the macro-sociological level, rites of social healing and community responsibility, which allow members of a society to close the door on their violent past and renew their sense of mutual trust so that they can lay the foundations of a renewed future together (Bleeker 2012; Friedli 2016). This opens up the whole research field of Faith-Based Diplomacy (Cox 2015), examples of which include the inter-religious rites of reconciliation in the conflict context of Kashmir (Cox 2015, pp. 146–263; cf. Frazer and Friedli 2015, pp. 19–21) or the interethnic celebrations aimed at facilitating the re-integration of child soldiers within their families and communities in Liberia (Lederach and Lederach 2010, pp. 28–40).

Intercultural Comparative Ethics

In the field of social and political intercultural ethics, more operationalized approaches would be useful in order to facilitate responsible choices on the part of social actors in the public sphere (Appadurai 2013). In addition to the formulation of 'ideal' approaches at the level of the ethics of conscience, criteria are needed for the elaboration of models and procedures related to ethical choice in relation to emergency situations and humanitarian catastrophes (Weingardt 2014).

This kind of 'transcultural' ethics would take into consideration a situation-specific moral approach, in which the unconditional respect for the individual person as well as for the social community is emphasized,

the binding nature of the state of law as well as the need for compassion, the legitimacy of monotheistic traditions as well as polytheistic approaches to the Divine, the call to religion as well as the atheistic perspective. The ethical challenge of respecting Western, African, Asian, and Latin-American ethical traditions is a key task that remains to be accomplished (Friedli 1974). It would necessitate the drawing up not only of criteria for ethics of conscience and for ethics of responsibility, but also the parameters for lucid compromises, and for ethics of emergency as Dietrich Bonhoeffer was in search for (cf. Schliesser 2008, pp. 175–205). The vision for such intercultural ethics, or even transcultural ethics, can perhaps be indicated by such values as 'deep democracy,' 'every human being as stranger in the world,' or 'human security.'

References

Appadurai, Arjun. 2006. *Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Appadurai, Arjun. 2013. *The Future as Cultural Fact: Essays on the Global Condition*. London: Verso Press.

Baberowski, Jörg. 2015. *Räume der Gewalt*. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag.

Basedau, Matthias. 2016. "Ideen, Identitäten und Institutionen: Explikation eines multidimensionalen Religionsbegriffs in der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung." In *Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung* no. 1, ed. Ines-Jacqueline Werkner, 235–65. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Bitter, Jean-Nicolas. 2003. *Les dieux embusqués: Une approche pragmatique de la dimension religieuse des conflits*. Genève: Librairie Droz.

Bitter, Jean-Nicolas. 2011. Diapraxis in Different Contexts: A Brief Discussion with Rasmussen. *Politorbis* 52 (2): 65–68.

Bleeker, Mô. 2012. Vers une anthropologie de la réconciliation. In *Frieden als Beruf - Beiträge aus der Religions- und Friedensforschung: Festschrift für Richard Friedli*. Culturel Religionswissenschaftliche Studien no. 3, ed. Petra Bleisch Bouzar and Andrea Rota, 81–97. Zürich: Pano Verlag.

Bouthoul, Gaston. 1974. *La paix*. Que sais-je? no. 1600. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Clark, Phil. 2010. *The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers*. Cambridge Studies in Law and Society, ed. Chris Arup et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, Brian. 2015. *Faith-Based Diplomacy: The Work of the Prophets*. Bloomington: Xlibris.

Frazer, Owen, and Richard Friedli. 2015. *Approaching Religion in Conflict Transformation: Concepts, Cases and Practical Implications*. Center for Security Studies Mediation Resources, ed. Simon J. A. Mason. Zürich: CSS ETH Zurich.

Friedli, Richard. 1974. *Fremdheit als Heimat: Auf der Suche nach einem Kriterium für den Dialog zwischen den Religionen*. Oekumenische Beihefte no. 8. Freiburg Schweiz: Universitätsverlag.

Friedli, Richard. 2012. Versöhnung ohne Kapitulation: Ein Werkstattbericht über Transitional Justice und Versöhnungsrituale. In *Friedensfähigkeit und Friedensvisionen in Religionen und Kulturen*, ed. Mariano Delgado, Adrian Holderegger, and Guido Vergauwen, 345–359. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

Friedli, Richard. 2013. Conflict Transformation with Religious Dimensions: Three Case Studies of Transcultural Mediation. In *Agents of Transculturation: Border-Crossers, Mediators, Go-Betweens*. Cultural Encounters and the Discourses of Scholarship no. 6, ed. Sebastian Jobs and Gesa Mackenthun, 219–42. Münster: Waxmann.

Friedli, Richard. 2016. Religion und ihre Rolle bei Konflikten und in der Konfliktbewältigung. *Arbeitsblatt 2016, Herausgeberin: Gesellschaft für ethische Fragen* (April) 51:25–34. http://gef.ch/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Arbeitsblatt_2016_def-GzD.pdf.

Galtung, Johan. 1975. *Strukturelle Gewalt. Beiträge zur Friedens- und Konfliktforschung*. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch.

Galtung, Johan. 1996. *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. London: Sage.

Galtung, Johan, and Graeme MacQueen. 2008. *Globalizing God: Religion, Spirituality and Peace*. Online: Transcend University Press. https://www.transcend.org/.

Hatzfeld, Jean. 2000. *Dans le nu de la vie. Récits des marais rwandais*. Paris: Seuil.

Hatzfeld, Jean. 2015. *Un papa de sang*. Paris: Gallimard.

Lederach, John Paul. 2005. *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace*. New York: Oxford Press.

Lederach, John Paul, and Angela Jill Lederach. 2010. *When Blood and Bones Cry Out: Journeys through the Soundscape of Healing and Reconciliation*. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Lindbeck, George. 2009. *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press.

Mernissi, Fatima. 1992. *La peur-modernité: Conflit Islam-démocratie*. Paris: Albin Michel.

Nussbaum, Martha C. 2011. *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Ramadan, Tariq. 2008. *L'islam, La réforme radical: Ethique et libération*. Paris: Presse du Châtelet.

Rasmussen, Lissi. 2011. Diapraxis: Towards Joint Ownership and Co-citizenship. *Politorbis* 52 (2): 59–64.

Rutayisire, Paul. 2012. *Historique du processus Gacaca au Rwanda*. Rwanda: Kigali.

Schliesser, Christine. 2008. *Everyone Who Acts Responsibly Becomes Guilty: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Concept of Accepting Guilt*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press.

Turner, Victor W. 1969. *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Weingardt, Markus A. 2014. *Was Frieden schafft. Religiöse Friedensarbeit - Akteure, Beispiele, Methoden*. Gütersloh, Ger.: Gütersloher Verlagshaus.

Werkner, Ines-Jacqueline., ed. 2016. *Religion in der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung: Interdisziplinäre Zugänge zu einem multidimensionalen Begrif. Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung no. 1.* Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

CHAPTER 12

A Critical Realist Engagement with Glen Stassen's 'Just Peacemaking' Approach

David P. Gushee

Abstract David P. Gushee critically examines 'just peacemaking theory' as pioneered by the late Glen Stassen, a Christian ethicist from Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, California. After an exploration of the personal and intellectual origins of Stassen's just peacemaking theory, Gushee describes and critiques each of the theory's ten practices, which involve non-violent direct action, independent initiatives, acknowledgment of responsibility, and cooperative conflict resolution. According to Stassen, many of these practices parallel specific teachings of Jesus. Despite the weaknesses and limitations of Stassen's theory of just peacemaking or practice, Gushee concludes that it has a substantial contribution to contemporary global peacemaking efforts.

Keywords David Gushee · Glen Stassen · Just peacemaking theory · Non-violent action · Responsibility · Conflict resolution · Peacemaking

D. P. Gushee (✉)
Mercer, USA
e-mail: gushee_dp@mercer.edu

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_12

Glen Harold Stassen pioneered 'just peacemaking' in the 1980s.

> Just peacemaking proposes that the central norm of the ethics of peace and war should be the building of just civil and international peace through the implementation of ten specific practices of proven effectiveness.

Eventually Stassen produced three books by the same title (*Just Peacemaking*), named his center at Fuller Seminary the Just Peacemaking Institute, and offered countless speeches and essays on just peacemaking all around the world (Stassen 1992, 1998, 2008). It became a central paradigm in the discussion of peace and war in our jointly authored work, *Kingdom Ethics* (Stassen and Gushee 2003). This essay offers a bit of background to Stassen's version of just peacemaking, elucidates the ten practices of just peacemaking, and includes my own critical engagement.

Just Peacemaking and Its Intellectual Underpinnings

Just Peacemaking was not exactly a 'theory.' Stassen did not prefer the term. He instead argued that humanity was in recent decades discovering, developing, and implementing war-preventive practices, which are absolutely essential given the destructive power of modern weaponry. These practices are becoming increasingly visible in interdisciplinary scholarly literature as well as in grassroots activist and protest efforts and in international diplomacy. Stassen delighted in offering examples of such effectiveness—validation in the real world was very important for his ethics, and he believed such validation was readily available for just peacemaking.

As a Christian ethicist, Stassen further argued that many of these practices paralleled specific teachings of Jesus. For example, Jesus taught in Matthew 5 to drop what we are doing and take the initiative to make peace with an enemy, rather than either retaliating or simply accepting a broken relationship. Stassen therefore named one of the just peacemaking practices 'independent initiatives'—one side takes a surprising step to ease tensions, build confidence, and facilitate reconciliation with an enemy. Stassen was not surprised that Jesus' teachings paralleled successful human peacemaking practices, because he read Jesus as the ultimate realist about human nature and human relations. This understanding of Jesus made a huge contribution to Stassen's original version of just peacemaking,

though the approach has been embraced by others who do not share his faith.

Stassen never said that just peacemaking had trumped pacifism or just war theory, as if they could now just go away. He did say that just peacemaking reflected the deepest aspirations of both pacifism and just war theory. It fulfilled pacifism's fond hope for a world without violence by providing practical means to make peace. It fulfilled just war theory's last resort criterion by providing concrete steps each side must take before war can be viewed plausibly as a last resort. In this sense, just peacemaking revived and made more relevant the insights of both just war theory and pacifism.

Stassen never offered public support for any war. Whenever a conflict situation arose he always attempted a just peacemaking analysis, which yielded some kind of proposal to resolve said conflict short of war. He left it to others to conclude that, alas, in this case, war might be necessary or justifiable.

This approach tended to inflect Stassen's presentation of the ten just peacemaking practices. His tendency was to state flatly that these ten practices prevent war, then to give examples of such prevention. He never gave examples of times when the ten practices had failed to prevent war. This can be seen as a fault. Perhaps I can correct it a bit here.

An Annotated Critical Rendering of the Ten Just Peacemaking Practices

What follows is my rendering of Stassen's standard articulation of the ten just peacemaking practices, then a few critical comments.

1. Support Nonviolent Direct Action.

Stassen: Nonviolent direct action as practiced effectively by Mohandas Gandhi in India and Martin Luther King Jr. in the United States (US) has spread around the world. Practitioners helped end dictatorship in the Philippines, bring about nonviolent anti-Communist revolutions in Poland, East Germany, and Central Europe, and spur democratic change in Latin America, South Africa, and many other regions.

Nonviolent direct action occurs when citizens confront injustice through peaceful public protests and other resistance strategies including

boycotts and strategic noncooperation. Effective nonviolent direct action campaigns often force recalcitrant governments (and sometimes other powers, like corporate entities) to enter into dialogue with those victimized by injustice and eventually to change unjust policies. They do so without a resort to force that might tempt the state or the faction holding a majority of firepower to gun down dissenters.

Comment: Nonviolent direct action does not always prevail. Consider Tiananmen Square in 1989, or the lengthy protests in Hong Kong, or various efforts in Vladimir Putin's Russia. Even when their goals are not achieved, though, by remaining nonviolent, these movements rob governments of any legitimate reason to use violence against their own protesting citizens. Governments sometimes do kill nonviolent resisters. But these martyrs, as in Selma in 1965, contribute by their very bloodshed to just peacemaking by highlighting this grotesque new governmental injustice and further delegitimizing unjust regimes, at least in the long run. They give surviving resisters the moral high ground that can be used to make gains for justice and peace.

2. Take Independent Initiatives to Reduce Threat.

Stassen: Independent initiatives are unilateral measures taken by one side of a conflict situation, designed to decrease the threat and distrust that undermine support for negotiated solutions. They (1) are visible and verifiable actions, not mere promises, (2) are accompanied by an announcement that their purpose is to decrease threat and distrust, and to invite reciprocation, (3) do not leave the initiator weak but strong because the initiator is perceived by onlookers as holding the moral and strategic high ground, (4) do not wait for the slow process of negotiations, (5) have a timing announced in advance that is carried out regardless of the other side's bluster or response, and (6) come in a series: if the other side fails to reciprocate, small initiatives continue in order to keep inviting reciprocation.

For example, the strategy of independent initiatives freed Austria from Soviet domination in the 1950s; produced the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty of 1963 after Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy halted atmospheric testing unilaterally; achieved dramatic reductions in nuclear weapons via the series of initiatives by Soviet President Gorbachev and the US Congress, and then President George H. W. Bush; and led to

breakthroughs by adversaries in Northern Ireland, eventually leading to the end of decades of guerrilla war there.

Comment: Independent initiatives are effective when both sides are, at some level, willing to make peace. They function as a first step. Of course, there are situations in which one side is not willing to make peace, and in which an independent initiative is received as a sign of weakness, with any gains simply pocketed by the other side. Unwillingness to make peace can be driven by various factors, including ideology, anger, or fear. Adolf Hitler is the proverbial but legitimate example of a leader who had no interest in peace. In practical politics, government leaders often hesitate to take an independent initiative because their political enemies will accuse them of being 'weak' or making the country look weak, however unfair such claims might be.

3. Use Cooperative Conflict Resolution.

Stassen: The idea of cooperative conflict resolution is that the sides together cooperate to resolve a conflict in a manner at least reasonably satisfactory to the parties involved. The realism is that if either party is dissatisfied, then both parties suffer because the conflict will fester.

Stassen saw cooperative conflict resolution in President Jimmy Carter's achieving a lasting peace in the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel (1979). It has borne good fruit in numerous other disputes both domestic and international. Stassen was impressed, for example, by the use of cooperative conflict resolution in legal settings, such as in resolving domestic and marital disputes.

Cooperative conflict resolution trains adversaries to see each other as human beings with dignity and legitimate needs rather than as sub-humans whose every negotiating demand is illegitimate just because of how evil they are. The goal is to find win–win solutions and to end the scorched-earth tactics so often characteristic of those in heated conflict with each other. A key test of the seriousness of governments' (or anyone's) claims to be seeking peace is whether they initiate negotiations or refuse them, and whether they develop imaginative solutions that show they understand their adversary's humanity, perspectives, and legitimate needs.

Comment: Cooperative conflict resolution is a dramatic advance in understanding how to address human conflicts. But of course, not every

adversary is open to cooperative conflict resolution. These strategies often do win breakthroughs but only in cases in which both sides at the same time decide they prefer peace to more fighting. There is a dimension to human nature in which adversaries actually seem to revel in hatred and unresolved conflict.

4. Acknowledge Responsibility for Conflict and Injustice; Seek Repentance and Forgiveness.

Stassen: This practice seeks to end fruitless finger-pointing in situations of conflict by initiating honest acknowledgment of *one's own side's responsibility* for what has gone wrong. Certainly, Dietrich Bonhoeffer did this in Nazi Germany in some of his late writings; though he was murdered by the regime, he helped inspire surviving leaders and churches to eventually confess the sin of support for or complicity with Hitler. Since then, many governments have lanced the boil of festering historical injustices by acknowledging responsibility, and directly asking forgiveness, of an adversary or former adversary for prior wrongs done. It can be an immensely powerful and transformative practice.

Comment: It is amazing how often the relations between individuals or nations are held hostage to the inability of one or both sides to acknowledge responsibility for their contribution to their joint problems, let alone to repent and ask for forgiveness. Proud failure to ever acknowledge wrongdoing, accompanied by constant blaming of others for their wrong, has stymied peacemaking in many venues. Reasons for failure to acknowledge responsibility are manifold, but often include nationalist constituencies that punish politicians who ever reach the vicinity of an acknowledgment of responsibility for wrongdoing. The opposition's false claim that US President Barack Obama spent his entire presidency 'apologizing for America' is a great example.

5. Promote Democracy, Human Rights, and Religious Liberty.

Stassen: Spreading human rights, religious liberty, and democracy contributes to building peace. People whose rights are respected, whose freedoms are protected, and who have a voice in self-government, do not need to rebel using force—this applies both across nations and within them. Work by churches and human rights groups to press for

human rights has helped convert authoritarian and dictatorial regimes in Latin America, such as in El Salvador, to democracies or democracies-in-process, and the trend continues elsewhere. Spreading peace is done by networks of persons advancing human rights and creating the conditions for a sustainable just peace.

Comment: This is not to say that the best way to advance democracy is at the point of a gun. Democracies, under the rule of law, honoring minority rights, and protecting human liberties, must be nurtured and must develop a democratic ethos over time. When rights-honoring democracy takes root it is a huge advance for just peacemaking and a less violent world—but of course it does not always take root. Consider the billions of dollars and thousands of lives the US has invested in encouraging democracy and human rights (after violating democracy and human rights) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, the devolution of US governance since World War II raises interesting questions about the erosion of democracy in formerly (and formally) democratic lands. Many American observers are convinced that the US is less democratic and less a defender of human rights than ever before. It should also be noted that, unlike the first four practices, this one is a long-term rather than short-term or one-time strategy.

6. Foster Just and Sustainable Economic Development.

Stassen: Hungry people—or people at the bottom of wealthy societies whose wealth they have no share of—easily become desperate and violent, and, when they rebel, their need is at least temporarily exacerbated.[1] A just peace requires at least relatively equitable global and domestic economies in which extreme inequalities in wealth, power, and participation are progressively overcome.

Comment: There is no question that shared prosperity and other aspects of just and sustainable economic development contribute to a more peaceful world. Civil conflict, in particular, is deeply connected to grotesque economic injustices. International conflict has certainly been triggered by economic motives, including mercantilist competition among nations. Greater economic justice and greater success in meeting everyone's human needs are important aspects of developing a more peaceful world. But it is hard to describe these goals as making for an immediately implementable just peacemaking practice. The ten

just peacemaking practices do not all function at the same level. Some are immediate and concrete steps while others are longer term and less concrete.

7. Work with Emerging Cooperative Forces in the International System.

Stassen: Networks of international communication, travel and migration, church missions, and business are stitching nations together into an international society in which former or potential enemies are brought into continuous constructive interaction. It stands to reason that the more nations are involved in these webs of interaction, the less likely they are to make war. This is partly because there is too much to lose for all involved, and partly because there is a web of human connections that create loyalties transcending state boundaries. War between the US and China seems unthinkable, in part for this reason.

Comment: There is much truth to these claims. But it is also clear that international terrorist networks draw upon the same forces of globalization to transit ideas, money, weapons, strategies, and people into and out of various conflict zones or target areas. Further, we learned in studying the 9/11 terrorists that many of them had become radicalized as minority Muslims in contemporary secular Europe. Stassen rightly identified the increasingly cosmopolitan, global, and interconnected world in which we all now live and its possibilities for wiring us together in community. But he did not name the possibility that this would not always be a constructive force in international relations. Globalization without genuine integration, recognition, and 'feeling at home' may exacerbate rather than alleviate intergroup conflicts.

8. Strengthen the United Nations and International Organizations.

Stassen: Acting alone, states cannot solve most of their economic, environmental, and security problems. The problems are international. Therefore, the practice of supporting cooperative action via the United Nations (UN) and all relevant global and regional organizations is crucial. These organizations, at their best, resolve conflicts, monitor and enforce truces, and replace violent conflict with the beginnings of cooperation.

They also reinforce international legal norms and reduce the role of raw power in international relations.

Comment: True enough: but it is not coincidental that in recent decades the US, the most powerful nation on earth by most measures, has often refused to cooperate with international institutions that might check its power. Stassen knew this and protested it vigorously. International institutions are part of statecraft but are affected by power dynamics in international life. Stassen believed in the original design of the UN as an institution of collective security sharply constraining unilateral action on the part of governments. This has not worked out very well in practice, as the relative power of various states has often determined their relationship with international institutions or compliance with their occasional mandates. The UN needs systemic reform. A place to begin is with the structure and functioning of the Security Council.

9. Reduce Offensive Weapons and Weapons Trade.

Stassen: Nations and peoples that can hardly afford to feed themselves never seem to be short of highly destructive weaponry. The weapons trade is a multi-billion-dollar industry awash in blood, as Pope Francis reminded Americans during his 2015 visit (Harrison 2015). Even so-called 'conventional' weapons have become so destructive that war is usually horrific and in the end not worth the price.

The issue of offensive versus defensive weapons became especially important during the nuclear weapons buildup of the Cold War. Strategists often debated which various types of weapons would be classified as offensive versus defensive. One goal was to create disincentives for the major nations to load up on offensive weapons and thus be tempted to wipe out the other side with a surprise nuclear strike. Reducing offensive weapons and shifting toward defensive force structures strengthened security in this regard.

The ex-Yugoslavia wars of Serbia against Bosnia, and Croatia and Kosovo, in the 1990s, are the counter-examples that prove the rule: Serbians controlled the former Yugoslavian army and its weapons. They had the offensive weapons to make war without expecting a destructive counterattack, until (after genocidal assaults, with UN representatives standing by) world revulsion finally ended their onslaughts, North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened, and peace agreements were finally reached.

As nations turn toward democracy and human rights, their governments no longer need large militaries to keep them in power. They can reduce military spending and devote their economies to meeting basic human needs.

Comment: The profit motive drives much of the weapons trade, and no one has yet found a magic wand that can wave it away. It is one thing to ask for a reduction in the weapons trade but quite another to address its economic motivations. In addition, threatened regimes (and tribes, and individuals) often arm themselves in fear of their enemies. Sometimes the best that can be done in such situations is to assure a rough balance of both fear and of weaponry, so that everyone concludes it is in everyone's best interests to leave well enough alone. Such balances of power and fear are, themselves, deeply vulnerable to being upset.

10. Encourage Grassroots Peacemaking Groups and Voluntary Associations.

Stassen: Everybody needs somebody looking over their shoulders to keep them in check. In the political and international arenas, governments need citizen groups to do this for them, and these groups themselves need training in just peacemaking and its practices.

The impressive array of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working on human rights, civil society, and peacemaking around the world exist precisely to help both governments and their citizens create a more just and peaceful world. The growing worldwide people's movement of peacemaker groups constitutes a historical force that empowers just peacemaking. A transnational network of groups can transcend captivity to narrow national or ideological perspectives. They can help to initiate, foster, and support transforming initiatives that take risks to break out of cycles that perpetuate violence and injustice.

Comment: But grassroots groups start off at an enormous disadvantage in relation to regimes making war. We activists working as Evangelicals for Human Rights (EHR) discovered this in working on the torture problem in the US after 9/11. Government secrecy meant citizen groups were always a few steps behind the government, which made every possible effort to block our access to the information needed to hold our

own government accountable to constitutional principles. (Eventually, we did make a difference, however. We contributed to pressure on the Bush Administration which helped expose and force modification of its policies after 2006). Grassroots groups are important not only when they succeed but when they fail. They can nurture the qualities that sustain courage when just peacemaking is unpopular, that create hope when despair and cynicism are tempting, and that foster grace and forgiveness when just peacemaking fails.

Conclusion

Just peacemaking is a critically important contribution to thinking about war and peace. No presentation of (Christian or other) ethics on this subject is adequate without consideration of just peacemaking. My effort at respectful dialogue with just peacemaking theory/practice intends to move this strand of thought in the direction of greater realism about those people, movements, and regimes (sometimes our own) bent on war, closed to peacemaking, enraged by grievance, fueled by ideology, coldly willing to kill civilians, calculating about its selective deployment of the 'international community' and its norms, alienated by globalization, driven by economic interests, or otherwise unwilling to make a just peace. Just peacemaking strategies will not always work in our violent world. The decision as to whether to support military engagement will eventually fall upon many of the world's leaders and people. Just peacemaking theory is best served by realism about the tragic reality that in many cases its counsels and practices will be ignored—even as we commend these practices using every available means.

Note

1. Consider the 2015 Global Hunger Index (GHI) with its conclusion that violent conflicts are the single biggest force behind hunger.

References

Harrison, Virginia. 2015. Pope Blasts Arms Trade as 'Industry of Death.' *CNN Money*. http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/12/news/pope-francis-arms-industry-of-death/index.html. Accessed on 9 May 2016.

Stassen, Glen H. 1992. *Just Peacemaking: Transforming Initiatives for Justice and Peace*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox.
Stassen, Glen H. 1998. *Just Peacemaking: Ten Practices for Abolishing War*. Cleveland: Pilgrim Press.
Stassen, Glen H. 2008. *Just Peacemaking: The New Paradigm for the Ethics of Peace and War*. Cleveland: Pilgrim Press.
Stassen, Glen H., and David P. Gushee. 2003. *Kingdom Ethics: Following Jesus in Contemporary Context*. Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press.

CHAPTER 13

The Multilateral Imperative: Seeking the Common Good

Azza Karam

Dr. Azza Karam is President and CEO of Lead Integrity, served as a Professor of Religion and Development at the Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam (the Netherlands), and as a member of the United Nations Secretary General's High Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism. She Is a Secretary General Emerita of Religions for Peace, and Former Founder and Coordinator of the United Nations Interagency Task Force On Religion and Sustainable Development and Its Multi-Faith Advisory Council.

Abstract This chapter underlines that religions matter to the possibility—and imperative—of realizing the global common good. The case is made by sharing some facts about how religions—institutions, faith-inspired NGOs, and religious leaders—contribute to welfare as parts of all communities, as critical service providers, and as influencers of socio-cultural, political, and financial behavior. Lessons learned from actual work done with and within the UN, and diverse realms of religions, are

A. Karam (✉)
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
e-mail: azza.karam@gmail.com; Akaram@Lead-Integrity.com

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_13

shared. The argument is made for how current engagements with religion have not, in fact, served the common good, as unfolding events in the world clearly reveal. The chapter concludes by making the case for more critical research on current multi-religious efforts; and a call for more discernment and civic collaborations, which are multi-religious and multi-stakeholder in nature, for the sake of accountability for the common good.

Keywords Religious · Multi-religious · Accountability · Common good · Multilateral · Peace · Security

The Dream

> *There was a time, when I blamed my companion if his religion did not resemble mine. Now, however, my heart accepts every form . . . Love alone is my religion* (Ibn Al Arabi, an Arab, Andalusian, Muslim scholar, mystic, poet, and philosopher, 1165–1240).

The Premise

Individually, religions, through their respective institutions (e.g., mosques, synagogues, temples, etc.), their diverse faith leaders, and their affiliated NGOs, have been serving the common good since the beginning of history. I have systematically argued that there are several very good reasons why religions matter to international development, foreign policy, and the constantly increasing humanitarian needs. If peace and security are to be understood as the manner in which people behave toward one another, what they believe in, and how they think, then religions, as the dictators of so much behavior and thought, must be factored in as a critical variable of public policy.

A 2012 Pew Research Poll revealed that just over 80 percent of individuals worldwide identify with a specific religious affiliation. This means that the secular lenses through which many Western governments perceive the world—often sidelining religion—are inadequate or even obstructive. Religious institutions, leaders, and faith communities serve as vital social and cultural gatekeepers in all societies. Any shifts in behaviors and

attitudes, including social and cultural norms, require religious leaders and institutions speaking from their respective pulpits, and advocating for specific behaviors. Only then can necessary changes, such as promoting safety and health practices during a pandemic, be effectively disseminated on a broad and systematic scale.

If peace is to be understood not merely as the absence of war, but as the assurance of everyone's access to dignity, then we must embrace a holistic understanding of "peace" as a common good. This encompasses the realities of development and human rights as well. Albert Einstein once said, "[G]enius is making complex ideas simple, not making simple ideas complex."

The ability to secure practical material needs and build spiritual resilience in a time when our world is facing multiple planetary crises, along with a crisis of political and institutional legitimacy, where literally millions suffer through armed conflicts, gang violence, and forced displacement worldwide, exacerbating food insecurity and inequalities, compounded by insufficient access to basic and quality health care, and an environmental red alert—all of these factors compel us to look beyond the interests of a specific group of people or region. Whether they are majorities or minorities, regardless of gender, age, geographical provenance, race, nationality, or religion, a global crisis of insecurity plagues our planet.

So what does religion have to do with it?

Some Facts

Religious institutions—encompassing *all* faiths, not solely Christian ones—stand as the largest, oldest, and most extensive providers of social services—acting as the original development actors. Since time immemorial, these institutions have addressed people's needs in health, education, nutrition, sanitation, environmental conservation, psycho-social support, and palliative care, among many other basic matters.

While precise data may vary, Christian health organizations alone are estimated to provide at least a quarter of the world's primary health care in regions like Africa, Latin America, and Asia, and notably in the United States of America (USA). The figure is known to rise dramatically in conflict-ridden contexts. Moreover, religious NGOs often take the lead as first responders in humanitarian crises—at least four out of

the top ten global humanitarian NGOs are religiously inspired, if not religiously based. Religious sites frequently serve as the first "go-to" spaces in both natural and man-made humanitarian crises, particularly, though not exclusively, in armed conflicts.

Sustainable human development, which includes nurturing a sustainable environment, lies at the heart of our future as one planet, a matter that has imposed itself on the agendas of many political parties and the discourses of most politicians. It behooves us, therefore, to be aware that religious leaders, along with certain movements and entire religious infrastructures, serve as partners in shaping policies, and actions, and often act as "spiritual advisors" to many politicians. Religious inspiration runs deep in the fabric of the social consciousness of most political actors, in societies that are themselves still rooted in cultures defined and informed by religion. To assume a clear divide between secular politicians and religious leaders is to ignore the interlinked realities that have existed for centuries.

If security is to be realized through human engagement, then it is important to recognize religious entities as among the largest and most resourceful bodies in the world. Their vast networks of volunteers, human resources, and formidable fund-raising capacities, or financial resources, surpass many secular NGOs. Indeed, some religious institutions may even be wealthier than some political parties. We need only think about charitable donations and giving in Christian, Buddhist, and Hindu contexts, or consider Islamic Zakat and Islamic financing institutions, including the Vatican Bank, as some examples.

While it is not suggested that all religious institutions are wealthier than nation-states, it is noteworthy that many receive funding from governments in diverse guises, including in ostensibly secular regions like the Western hemisphere. Equally significant is acknowledging the extensive volunteer efforts mobilized by religious communities worldwide in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In short, as long as humans are integral to peace, that which moves them, nourishes them, and serves them, also matters.

Furthermore, if religions are identified as the sources of some human insecurity, and/or violations of rights and dignity, indeed also of terrorism, violence, or extremism, then all policymakers must ask themselves how it is even possible *not to* engage with the religious sectors. How can the symptoms be addressed if the so-called "causes of the illness" are not engaged with?

And yet, judging from the interest at the global headquarters of the largest multilateral institution—the United Nations—recognition of the role of religious actors, and the invitations to engage with them, and to start being seen as potentially compatible or helpful international development partners, only began to appear after 2000. It is wise to acknowledge, therefore, that the understanding of mutual strengths—secular and multi-religious—in multilateral spaces such as the United Nations, which promotes sustainable development, peace and security, and human rights—i.e., the common good—still needs improvement and discernment.

The Common Good

Although some may think that we all understand what we mean by the common good, let me explain what and how I understand and use this term. According to Lee (2024), the "common good" is that which benefits society as a whole, in contrast to the private good of individuals and sections of society. It is often used in the context of political philosophy, politics, and political actions. The idea of the common good suggests that certain benefits, such as security and justice, can only be achieved through citizenship, collective action, and active participation in the public realm of politics and public service. "In effect, the notion of the common good is a denial that society is and should be composed of atomized individuals living in isolation from one another. Instead, its proponents have asserted that people can and should live their lives as citizens deeply embedded in social relationships" (Lee 2024).

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018) expands this understanding of the elements of the common good to include material, cultural, or institutional facilities.

> that the members of a community provide to all members in order to fulfill a relational obligation they all have to care for certain interests that they have in common. Some canonical examples of the common good in a modern liberal democracy include: the road system; public parks; police protection and public safety; courts and the judicial system; public schools; museums and cultural institutions; public transportation; civil liberties, such as the freedom of speech and the freedom of association; the system of property; clean air and clean water; and national defense.

Before getting carried away with the common sense of it all, let us first focus on the practical dynamics and the challenge of achieving the global public or common good. Let's turn our attention to what the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the world's largest international financial institution, tells us about public goods. According to the IMF, public goods should be accessible to all and enjoyed repeatedly ("nonexcludable"), without diminishing benefits for others ("nonrival"). "The scope of public goods can be local, national, or global. They encompass many aspects of our lives: from our natural environment, our histories and cultures, and technological progress down to everyday devices such as the metric system" (Chin 2021).

But we are also warned that public goods are universally undersupplied. Why? Because whether at the national, regional, or global level, the ethos of profit for the provider(s)—whether governmental or non-governmental (and especially for the private sector)—needs to be some form of "profit." Moreover, those who either supply or care for such public goods often do not do so indefinitely. Think about it: a political party elected into government will look after the public good—in certain ways—only as long as it serves in government. Another political party or ruling regime will have a different perspective. You only need to think of how some governments enact or remove certain environmental protection laws and processes to understand the situation.

Yet profit, properly understood, also provides an opportunity that we should not overlook. Much research on human rights, especially on women's rights, points to the fact that efforts to advance women's rights were strengthened at the national policy level once the case was successfully made for how engaging women in the public sector would increase a nation's GDP. It also showed how opening more spaces for women in parliaments, corporations, and financial institutions increased profitability. The case for the economic benefits of peace has long been made. However, the question is: have we countered the profitability of war, especially using the moral leverage of multi-religious collaboration?

Lessons from Decades of Seeking Multi-Religious Collaboration for Peace

"Multilateralism" is defined by Oxford Languages (n.d.) as "the principle of participation by three or more parties, especially by the governments of different countries." While the term is often used to refer exclusively

to governments, it is not meant to be limited to these structures. In fact, based on my experience of working with religious leaders and their institutions, as well as serving in secular civil society spaces, I maintain that multi-religious work—that is, work carried out by more than one religion, religious institution, religious leader, faith-based NGO, or community—faces numerous challenges. These include differing religious institutional agendas, territoriality and competitiveness among different FBOs, the isolated nature of FoRB (freedom of religion and belief) work, and the prevailing ignorance or instrumentalization of "religion" in most multilateral entities.

The truth is that religious institutions existed before secular ones, and are likely to outlive them, although in different forms than their original ones. Effective multilateralist collaboration requires the multi-religious. However, we still lack significant concrete evidence of multi-religious collaboration for the common good, even in times of global crises. Therefore, **multi-religious collaboration for peace continues to be a missing dimension of multilateralism**.

This also means that any lessons learned are a work in progress, just like many of us never stop learning (or should not at least) throughout our lives. For the sake of brevity, only two general learnings will be shared here:

Most religious institutions, whether they exist as centralized entities (for example, the Catholic Church and its affiliated organizations, or the Anglican Communion and its affiliates, etc.) or as satellites in dispersed orbits (for instance, Hindu Ashrams, Buddhist Temples, Ministries of Awqaf/religious endowments, Zoroastrian entities, Jewish coalitions and/or formats thereof, etc.) are in various stages of transition and transformation. Even though each of these institutions tends to perceive itself—and its sacred books/references—as eternally present and concerned with more than just this life, they all have to adapt to the volatility of means, contexts, leadership, and sense of relevance. This implies at least two concrete implications: none of these institutional formats can be relied upon as permanent partners, and none of them are alike. Consequently, knowledge about these actors, as well as engagement with them, must evolve. The methods of partnership or engagement need to be adaptive, and, at all times, a level of humility (rather than the traditional arrogance that sometimes comes with the territory), is a must.

As an example, having a good relationship with the Catholic Church under one Pope, or with Al-Azhar under one Grand Imam, does not

guarantee a lasting commitment from all these institutions on any one particular issue, indefinitely. Likewise, having a wonderful partnership with the Vatican or the regional or national Conference of Catholic Bishops, for instance, or with the Chief Rabbinate in one country, does not guarantee a seamless relationship in which the freedom of thought, conscience, and belief/religion is upheld for all religious communities within the same national boundary.

No single religious institution or body can claim to represent or speak for everyone. In fact, I would argue that **many people of faith find it challenging to perceive their religious leaders or institutions as wholly representative of them on all matters, at all times**. Conversely, relying on engaging with only one religious body or institution and presuming it will cater to all needs reflects a form of religious arrogance.

This underlines the value of consulting with and being knowledgeable about legal, representative, and inclusive inter/multi-religious structures. "Representative" here refers to those platforms that include all faith traditions in a particular country and have formal (i.e., assigned or elected) religious representation from institutions, rather than individual members. **These multi-religious structures not only demonstrate how different religious bodies or communities collaborate (or do not), but also provide critical indicators of civic and political well-being.**

The effectiveness (or lack thereof) of these platforms indicates the level of social cohesion (including how well religious leaders and institutions coexist), the extent of participation in civil society (whether these structures collaborate with or are part of broader civic networks), and even the democratic legitimacy of the government. Why? Because the legal existence of interreligious platforms, as well as the freedom to express their views and carry out their activities, depends on the political regime in power. If these platforms are legally registered and allowed to operate without hindrance, it often reflects how governments permit other civil society actors to exist and serve.

> The resilience of spirituality should underscore the value-added of engaging religious actors in multilateral spaces . . . but how they are engaged requires significant caution, to avoid creating an impression that some religions matter more than others or have a greater say in influencing multilateral spaces than others.[1]

All religious institutions, like other institutions, are composites of their human membership and operations. This means that human weaknesses and errors can shape them and can tarnish their performance, potentially weakening their legitimacy. To assume that religious leaders and/or institutions are above the common fray is to task human beings with what they are not. It is incumbent on all secular entities and actors to understand that no institution stands innocent of any human wrongdoing.

However, this does not imply that these institutions should not be held accountable. Far from it. No institution should be deemed exceptional or exempt from the laws of its own nation or global norms and standards. Yet, several religious institutions and leaders would seek to claim that exceptionalism.

The argument being made here is simple: while we should not expect miracles from these human-led institutions, we must insist on holding them and their leaders accountable as they work together to uphold high standards. However, there is a "catch," so to speak: in order to hold them accountable, one must also actively and consistently engage with them over a long period of time. Wagging fingers from a distance with foreboding judgment is an act of arrogance. Working together and serving others fosters a deeper and better understanding of human weaknesses, as well as an appreciation of the inherent strengths within any entity. Instead of passing judgment from afar and using it to dismiss the entire workings or relevance of an institution—such as the current criticism of UN Peacekeepers and the entire UN system—a legacy of partnership enables a more learned understanding of where weaknesses reside but also where some critical strengths remain.

Working with religious institutions also allows for, if not demands, mutual accountability. This mutual accountability is also required for and by multi- or interreligious structures. In fact, the interreligious space may be even more in need of accountability, as it is also an opportunity to seek disciplined self-reflection among and between all religious institutions, rather than a one-by-one siloed approach. Where religious institutions can establish ties that bind through their respective teachings and interpretations, interreligious (and especially interfaith) structures offer a buffer from fundamentalist tendencies. It is impossible to sustain a fundamentalist (let alone extremist) stance for any length of time when people of faith have to see and work with one another.

Moreover, interreligious coexistence, particularly through joint service to all communities, offers an opportunity to affirm the goodness of one's

own faith and the faith of others. The tendency to hold one another and each other's institutions or entities accountable is often difficult to avoid in an interreligious context, as being on a joint platform inherently involves each person and entity holding a mirror to the other.

All in all, **in order to integrate multi-religious peacemaking into global affairs, it is necessary to collaborate with multi- or interreligious platforms (indeed, multi-stakeholder ones)**. Although these platforms are not the ultimate solution to today's challenges (as no single group or set of institutions can be), **they are integral to civil society and civic consciousness, both of which are essential for effectively safeguarding the common good**.

"Strengthened multilateralism requires spiritual resilience"
(Mr. Danilo Turk, Former President of Slovenia).

Building spiritual resilience may seem to be solely about meditation, reflections, and yoga, and while these are critical components, they also involve working together across religious differences. This can mean building together, celebrating together, or serving one another's needs to ensure no one is left behind. In other words, **building spiritual resilience can be achieved by normalizing an ethos and reality of collaboration inspired by faith, but not limited to those practicing the same faith.**

When the global COVID-19 lockdowns began in February and March of 2020, an emerging trend became clear in the response of nearly all faith-based humanitarian and relief organizations. Each went into overdrive to serve communities suffering the multiple impacts of COVID-19. While this overdrive was visible, necessary, and commendable, few religious institutions, or FBOs, endeavored to work together, even when serving the same communities in the same countries. Consequently, although religious public health and social services were ramped up, multi-religious collaboration to deliver those services was notably lacking.

This trend of not recognizing the value added by collaboration, while understandable—given the extreme challenge (if not "hellish" task) of coordinating multiple, diverse, and substantial institutions—points to a worrying issue. In times of global stress and need, joining hands to serve those facing similar sufferings is an opportunity to build social cohesion. Every ounce of energy and pain expended in these efforts is an investment in the long-term spiritual resilience of the social polity.

However, while necessary, social cohesion as a common good remains elusive in times of polarization. We are living in an age where making war is often seen as a preferred alternative. As if the millions of humans and all living things lost to natural disasters were not enough, world leaders now advocate for the right to defend themselves at the cost of more lives, further land violations, and collective social trauma.

My concluding argument is that as long as war remains more financially lucrative than peace, and as long as money, profit, and short-term political considerations continue to drive those in positions of authority, spiritual and moral appeals alone will not suffice. Our contemporary reality, with conflicts and wars raging across nearly every continent despite the presence of religious institutions and actors for centuries, serves as definitive proof of the inadequacy of moral reasons alone.

It should not be difficult to provide concrete examples of how multi-religious actions are making both qualitative and quantitative positive differences. Instead of organizing more conferences and costly gatherings in luxury hotels, resorts, and cities, it would be worthwhile to invest in studies that document the benefits of working multi-religiously and in a multi-stakeholder manner to address pressing global needs.

Alternatively, governments, intergovernmental organizations, and perhaps even a consortium of private sector entities and universities could consider providing scholarships to faith-based humanitarian and development NGOs, as well as longstanding interfaith organizations, to document their work and assess the overall costs involved. These assessments could include relevant econometric analyses and expert evaluations to understand the potential economic impact of their collective efforts and the consequences of their absence.

We know that many faith-based NGOs, for instance, tackle various critical issues, such as food and nutrition scarcity, inadequate access to comprehensive healthcare and sanitation, limited availability of safe drinking water, lack of affordable housing, insufficient access to quality education and employment opportunities, and the phenomenon of "brain drains" in certain countries, which others perceive as a "migration crisis." The resulting conflicts and wars can and do result from these. All of these are critical and life-saving needs caused by human greed, coupled with a blatant disregard for nature and an increasingly prevalent culture of criminal impunity and disregard for the rule of law.

We know that many of the religious institutions and their affiliated developmental bodies address not only these gaps, but some also speak

to, and many seek to analyze, the fact that these lead to, reinforce, and are in turn compounded by a sense of indignity, all types of inequalities, and multiple forms of coexisting discriminatory attitudes, behaviors, policies, and legislation.

Whether we can induce more evidence-based studies on the roles of religious NGOs and communities in addressing the impact of partnerships in service of the common good, or be able to support such efforts or not, we have to come to terms with reality. All of these needs and crises are happening under the watch of the world's largest religious institutions, religious NGOs, faith leaders, and entire religious communities. Clearly, religions alone are not the answer. Hence, there is an imperative for multi-religious and multi-stakeholder collaborations.

Note

1. Noted as advisement by the author, during a UN Security Council (UNSC) briefing on religious engagement, in 2021.

References

Chin, Moya. 2021. What are Global Public Goods? *International Monetary Fund*. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2021/12/Global-Public-Goods-Chin-basics. Accessed 22 May 2024.

Lee, Simon. 2024. Common Good. *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Accessed 22 May 2024. https://www.britannica.com/topic/common-good.

Oxford Languages. (n.d.). Multilateralism. Accessed 24 October 2023. https://languages.oup.com/google-dictionary-en.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2018. *The Common Good*. Accessed 22 May 2024. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/common-good/.

PART IV

Alternative Approaches—Reconciliation and Forgiveness

CHAPTER 14

Introduction to Reconciliation and Forgiveness

Christine Schliesser

Abstract The topics of reconciliation and forgiveness have emerged as a major idée-force within the last two decades in conflict resolution studies. The issue of human capacity for forgiveness after traumatic experiences is taken up by South African psychologist Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela in her chapter 'Forgiveness is "the Wrong Word": Empathic Repair and the Potential for Human Connection in the Aftermath of Historical Trauma.' Theologian Christo Thesnaar looks critically at the failures and omissions that have accompanied South Africa's reconciliation policies in his chapter 'Alternative and Innovative Approaches to Reconciliation: A South African Perspective,' while theologian and ethicist Christine Schliesser provides a critical reading of Rwanda's current politics of reconciliation in her contribution 'The Politics of Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda.'

C. Schliesser (✉)
Zurich, Switzerland
e-mail: christine.schliesser@sozethik.uzh.ch

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_14

Keywords Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela · Christo Thesnaar · Christine Schliesser · Forgiveness · Conflict resolution · Empathic repair · South Africa · Politics of reconciliation · Rwanda · Genocide

> How do survivors of these atrocities and their descendants live in the same country as neighbors with perpetrators and their families, and achieve the kind of 'reconciliation,' mutual trust, or peaceful coexistence that is necessary for sharing a common future?

This question not only constitutes the starting point of Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela's contribution in Chapter 15 but also serves to guide the reflections in this entire section on reconciliation and forgiveness.

Once primarily found in religious contexts, reconciliation has long since become an established concept in political and historical discourses as well, albeit an increasingly disputed term. Some hail its transformative potential even after experiences of massive human rights violations such as civil war or racial injustice where the aim 'is not only to come to terms with the past, but rather to establish just relationships and conditions as the prerequisite for sustainable peace in the sense of reconciliation' (Enns 2013, p. 33). Others point to reconciliation's potential ambiguity, for instance, when it is used to reinforce existing patterns of societal inequalities and caution. 'If reconciliation is the answer, are we asking the right questions?' (Jansen 2013, p. 236).

This section aims to take up some of the questions surrounding the disputed terms of reconciliation and forgiveness, as they have already shone through previous contributions. How we view reconciliation and forgiveness is intrinsically connected to how we view human beings and human nature. As such, the questions surrounding reconciliation and forgiveness are fundamental in nature, touching at the very core of what it means to be human. At the same time, these questions quickly become very concrete and practical when they are set in specific contexts such as post-apartheid South Africa and Rwanda after the genocide. These two very different African countries not only share histories of violence and gross injustice but also face similar challenges in their current quest for stability, economic progress, and reconciliation. Both countries experienced a turning point in 1994 that will forever mark their countries. For South Africa, the year 1994 brought the end of the apartheid regime with

their first free elections. For Rwanda, the year 1994 brought a genocide to an end and culmination of a civil war. For both countries, the questions surrounding reconciliation and forgiveness are as virulent now as ever before.

Growing up in a black township in South Africa and serving as a psychologist on that country's great experiment in reconciliation and healing, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Gobodo-Madikizela draws on her own experiences of decades of searching for that which can heal people, relationships and entire nations broken apart by mass atrocities. She suggests that 'forgiveness' is the wrong word for describing the experiences of victims and perpetrators. Forgiveness, according to Gobodo-Madikizela, suggests closure, coming to an end in order to move on. What is taking place in victim–perpetrator encounters should rather be described as 'the emergence of the unexpected' that arises from witnessing each other's pains and includes a sense of empathic care for the other. Empathic care and repair go beyond forgiveness. They draw on imagination[1] and reconciliation in the sense of a transformational experience that leaves space for the complicated, the muddy, and the unpredicted. By bringing in interviews and first-hand experiences, for instance, with apartheid government's chief assassin nicknamed 'Prime Evil' (Eugene de Kock), Gobodo-Madikizela makes the case that the human capacity for empathic repair and connection between victims and perpetrators virtually knows no limit.

The South African perspective is further deepened in Chapter 16 by Christo Thesnaar, theologian and pastoral counseling expert. Referring to Nigerian poet Akinwande Oluwole 'Wole' Babatunde Soyinka, Thesnaar likens the South African way of dealing with reconciliation to a 'time bomb' that can explode at any time due to his home country's refusal to address the root problems. Similar to Gobodo-Madikizela, Thesnaar appreciates the process initiated by the TRC, yet points to a number of serious limitations such as the TRC's limited time frame and scope or the lack of assistance to both victims and perpetrators in the process of healing. These problems were left largely unattended, according to Thesnaar, and thus contributed to the ticking time bomb. Thesnaar points to the lasting influence of faith communities in South Africa and calls on them to assume more proactive roles in facilitating healing and reconciliation in society, in particular by listening to and giving voice to the younger generation and by supplementing top-down processes with bottom-up processes. By utilizing two recent examples of reconciliation

endeavors—the re-enactment of the TRC faith hearings and the approach of the Restitution Foundation (RF)—Thesnaar illustrates his argument and examines the strengths and weaknesses of each of these alternative approaches to conflict resolution.

In Chapter 17, shifting the focus from South Africa to Rwanda, my own contribution from the perspective of a theologian and ethicist seeks to analyze Rwanda's current national politics of reconciliation.[2] Rwanda's history is marked by decades of structural and often violent injustice between the minority of the Tutsi and the majority of the Hutu. Civil war starting in 1990 culminated in the fastest genocide of recent history when between April and July 1994, up to 1,000,000 people (mostly members of the Tutsi-minority) were killed. I explore central features of the reconciliation process initiated by Rwanda's current President Paul Kagame, such as the gacaca courts. This traditional and alternative practice of justice relies on a transformational understanding of justice, rather than on a 'Western' sense of retributive justice, and aims for reconciliation and social healing. In my contribution, I furthermore point to the relationship between reconciliation and remembrance. Relying on the work of cultural scientist Aleida Assmann, I argue that the formation of both individual and collective memory—whose stories we remember and how, and whose stories are being forgotten and why—is crucial for reconciliation processes. I examine critically Rwanda's official politics of remembrance that give a clear preference to Tutsi narratives while the stories of countless murdered Hutu oftentimes fall prey to 'active forgetting' (Assmann 2008) and the deliberate destruction of memories.

These three different voices set to explore the manifold questions surrounding reconciliation and forgiveness are united in that they view reconciliation and forgiveness not primarily as results but rather as ongoing processes. These processes do not follow a clear-cut path but rather make a path on the way, facing obstacles and set-backs, yet being driven by the inevitable necessity of facing up to the question of 'How do survivors of these atrocities and their descendants live in the same country as neighbors with perpetrators and their families, and achieve the kind of "reconciliation," mutual trust, or peaceful coexistence that is necessary for sharing a common future?'.

Notes

1. For the role of imagination in conflict resolution, see Mary Zournazi's contribution in chapter 16 of this book, "A Notebook on Peace: Reflections on Cinema and Perception.".
2. For further reflections on the reconciliation process in Rwanda see Bruce Clarke's contribution in chapter 15 of this book, "Genocide, Memory, and the Arts: Memorial Projects in Rwanda of 'Upright Men' and 'The Garden of Memory.'".

References

Assmann, Aleida. 2008. The Religious Roots of Cultural Memory. *Norsk Teologisk Tidsskrift* 109 (4): 270–292.

Enns, Fernando. 2013. Transformative Gerechtigkeit als Möglichkeitsraum zur Versöhnung. *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte* 26 (1): 23–35.

Jansen, Stef. 2013. If Reconciliation Is the Answer, Are We Asking the Right Questions? *Studies in Social Justice* 7 (2): 229–243.

CHAPTER 15

Forgiveness Is 'The Wrong Word': Empathic Repair and the Potential for Human Connection in the Aftermath of Historical Trauma

Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela

Abstract As a psychologist with South Africa's great experiment in national healing, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela argues that 'forgiveness' is the wrong word to describe what takes place in victim–perpetrator encounters. Rather, it is 'the emergence of the unexpected' that arises from witnessing each other's pain—namely emphatic care and repair. Empathy goes beyond forgiveness and serves two functions. First, it seeks to 'restore' the survival of the lost loved one who was murdered by the perpetrator. Second, by showing the kind of caring and containment that prevents disintegration in the perpetrator, the victim creates a new relational experience with him,

P. Gobodo-Madikizela (✉)
Stellenbosch, South Africa
e-mail: pumlagm1@gmail.com

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_15

which reconstitutes the memory of the loss as a positive narrative. First-hand experiences and interviews serve to illustrate Gobodo-Madikizela's position.

Keywords Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela · Truth and Reconciliation Commission · Forgiveness · Empathy · Empathic repair · Victim · Perpetrator · Memory

How do people from different sides of history live together in the aftermath of massive political violence, genocide, and other forms of gross human rights violations? How do survivors of these atrocities and their descendants live in the same country as neighbors with perpetrators and their families, and achieve the kind of 'reconciliation,' mutual trust, or peaceful coexistence that is necessary for sharing a common future? These questions, and others that concern issues of memory, responsibility, and accountability for the past in relation to countries emerging from violent political conflict, have increasingly become major topics of global public debate, especially in countries that are haunted by the past. The number of books, articles, testimonials, public conversations, films, and other forms of artistic representation that portray the traumatic memory of historical trauma and its repercussions across generations have increased in the past few years. It does not matter how far back the tragic histories of violent conflict and oppression go; their memory lives on in descendants of both victims and perpetrators. As a recent example of this living memory, the films dedicated to the enslavement of Americans of African descent have increased, connecting this memory not only to centuries past when slavery was still legal but also to contemporary America, where movements like 'Black Lives Matter' have found their expression in stories that hearken back to past racial oppression. The question is: Does the emotional power of these films resolve the problem of a past that is somehow still felt as disturbingly present?

The insidious and transgenerational impact of traumatic memories that result from devastating political oppression and massive violations of human rights is probably one of the most urgent questions of the twenty-first century. Few topics stake a more compelling claim on humanities research than the legacies of historical trauma—the impact of genocide

and mass atrocities not only on individuals and groups that experienced the violence directly but also across multiple generations of the descendants of survivors. From American slavery, to the genocide of the Armenians, the Anglo-Boer War in South Africa, the Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to apartheid oppression—many societies across the world are haunted by the ghosts of past atrocities. In post-conflict regions where victims and perpetrators live in the same country, and sometimes as neighbors, truth commissions have emerged as a strategy of choice for peacebuilding.

This essay considers the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a response to apartheid-era atrocities. Its main premise is that by opening up a space of public testimony, the TRC not only introduced a new vocabulary of re-humanization in the aftermath of mass trauma and violence; it also created sites for listening, for moral reflection, and for initiating the difficult process of dialogue at community and individual levels.

The first part of this essay is a brief discussion of some of the elements that were central to the work of the TRC. In the second part of the essay, I consider the process of dialogue between victims and perpetrators, and argue that in contrast to the adversarial stance of the criminal justice system, the TRC's invitational approach encouraged perpetrators to face, rather than to eschew guilt. This in turn opened up the possibility for the expression of remorse. I try to show why 'empathic repair,' rather than forgiveness, more appropriately defines the victim's response to the perpetrator's expression of remorse. The third section of this essay is a discussion of the human capacity for imagination and the role that imagination plays in the development of empathy between former adversaries. In the final section of the essay, I introduce the concept of *ubuntu* and show how it is closely aligned with both empathic repair and love. The main point of this discussion is to show that love, empathy, and *ubuntu* are expressions that create pathways to caring for the 'other' as a fellow human being, and that their power lies in their capacity to suspend negative sentiments such as feelings of revenge, which so often lead to repetition of old scripts of hatred and violence.

The starting point in all my work is that if the level of depravity that has been captured most compellingly with Hannah Arendt's phrase 'the banality of evil' (1963) is fostered in an environment in which inhumanity against others thrives, then it should be possible for relationships that

foster thoughtfulness and a sense of being human reproduce themselves in our relational world.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A New Norm of Recognition

The TRC expanded the horizon of what is possible in human relationships by spearheading, as part of the political negotiations, a process of dialogue. This was aimed at fostering a capacity for connecting with former enemies in order to confront and heal a past characterized by moral corruption and widespread violations of human rights. This essay reflects on this unique dimension of the South African story. It seeks to examine the empathic movement that draws victim and villain toward a shared vision of a world in which the 'other' matters, and to explore the foundational role of empathy in this movement toward the other.

By its very nature, and as a quasi-judicial process, the TRC was a dialogic space with the potential to produce emergent forms of subjectivity that opened up the possibility of transformation. The TRC transformed the silence of trauma—the wordless speech of trauma—and restored victims' sense of agency by providing an environment in which victims were able to break their silence in front of a national audience. Being recognized leads to the experience of healthy subjectivity. In a society emerging from political conflict, where the rules of recognition were written into the laws of a repressive state, black people's subject position was bound up with norms of subordination and misrecognition.

In contrast, the norms of recognition established by the TRC were based on a new set of principles that restored victims' sense of agency, and bestowed on them a *sense* of justice. These included, among others, acknowledgment and validation of their suffering, which is so crucial to victims of trauma, and testifying from the standpoint of their own authorship in the presence of a community in which perpetrators were required to give full public disclosure and to confess their crimes. By making their wounds public, recording the atrocities visited on them, and identifying the perpetrators, victims' testimonies helped to both assert and restore their sense of agency.

The Capacity for Empathy: Victims' Intersubjective Encounters with Perpetrators

The TRC approach was unique in that, by adopting an invitational stance rather than an adversarial one, perpetrators were asked to 'give full disclosure' of the crimes they committed in exchange for amnesty.[1] Without the threat of punishment, perpetrators were inspired to admit guilt rather than disown it. Thus, it was possible to face and, for some at least, to *feel* their guilt. This is an important distinction because one can simply 'face up' to what one has done, acknowledging it at an intellectual level, without taking responsibility for the horrific deeds committed and instead externalizing blame. It is this deep sense of guilt—a feeling of brokenness at one's inner core of humanness—that makes remorse, an emotion that makes perpetrators quintessentially human, possible. Remorse can be a painful affect because it involves facing the past and its uncomfortable and internally unsettling truths. Remorse is also an important moment of recognition of the pain that the perpetrator's actions have caused the victim. It is, in other words, an expression of the perpetrator's empathic response to the victim's pain.[2]

The psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut defined empathy as 'the capacity to think and feel oneself into the inner life of another person' (1984). Other definitions of empathy are aligned with this view of empathic responsiveness, for example, Daniel N. Stern's 'affect attunement' (2004). The essence of empathy is the capacity to feel with and to participate in shared reflective engagement with the other's inner life. Most scholars recognize some form of identification with the other at a deeper internal level as central to the capacity for empathy. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, for example, defined empathy as 'the intertwining of our lives with those of others' (1968). For David Black, empathy involves a process of imagination. It is 'a sophisticated act of the imagination, a "trial identification" done by someone who is consciously relating to another's mental state' (2004).

An aspect of empathy that has received scant scholarly attention is the component of care for the other that sometimes emerges in the context of empathic responsiveness. Caring goes beyond 'mirroring' or feeling into the mental state of another. It arises from the moment-by-moment negotiation of the intersubjective relationship between actors as well as from introspection and ongoing mutual reflection, and it involves making sense of the intersubjective experience of empathic resonance. In this desire-to-care-for-the-other aspect of empathy, the empathic response of the victim

is imbued with a quality of wishing to 'rescue' the remorseful perpetrator, as if to affirm his identity as a member of the human community (instead of a 'monster' or 'evil one'). This desire to rescue the perpetrator, I argue, constitutes the fundamental moment, a pivotal point in the intersubjective context in which forgiving feelings emerge.

The word 'forgiveness' is the wrong word for describing what unfolds in these victim–perpetrator encounters. Forgiveness seems to suggest a fixed position or a coming to an end—'I offer you forgiveness so that I can have closure and move on.' There is a subtext here that seems to signify an act of leaving something behind, moving on without looking back. This is evocative of the notion of 'letting go' in the stages theory of forgiveness advocated by Robert D. Enright and his colleagues (1998). Forgiveness should be seen as a transition; as a working through of the pain, suffering, and loss caused by trauma on the part of victims; and the response of remorse by perpetrators as a working through of a range of losses along with the emotions that emerge after confronting one's guilt and shame. Accordingly, a characteristic of this process of 'working through' is the integration of disparate aspects of one's self, which are then owned as part of the self. In other words, the loss that brought about the rupture must be mourned, a process of working through the transition that leads to connecting with another human being. Something else grows in the place of whatever it was that prevented connection to the other—anger, resentment, desire for revenge, and so on. 'Letting go' does not capture this subtlety.

Perhaps what takes place in victim–perpetrator encounters is 'the emergence of the unexpected' (Gobodo-Madikizela 2016). A certain degree of caring for the other evolves from being witnesses to each other's pain—the 'witnessing dance' that brings survivor and perpetrator into step with each other, into the spiral movement of a new intersubjective context that edges them toward the center of possibility and then upward toward the apex of transformation (Gobodo-Madikizela 2008b). The new intersubjective context that emerges allows for integration and containment rather than 'letting go.' Acknowledgment that bears responsibility, that conveys compassion and care, and that is prepared to enter the pain of the other: This is what is crucial for this transformative process.

An example that illustrates this idea of expression of care beyond empathic resonance is the response of Linda and Peter Biehl to their daughter Amy's killers after their appearance at the TRC Amnesty hearings.[3] Amy Biehl was a Stanford University student on a Fulbright

scholarship in South Africa. She was stabbed to death when, as part of her work with a nonprofit organization, she visited a black township in Cape Town with her colleagues from the nonprofit. Her killers' remorseful submission to the TRC led Linda and Peter Biehl to support their amnesty application. When the TRC granted amnesty to the men, Peter and Linda Biehl arranged skills training for them and offered them positions in the Amy Biehl Foundation, which they had established in their daughter's memory. 'I have no hatred in my heart,' Linda said in an interview I conducted with her and her husband. 'All I am concerned about is how these young men can re-enter their community and rebuild their lives.'[4]

As I have noted in my work, this kind of response presents a paradox. Yet it is this stance of hearing the perpetrator's desire—expressed through remorse—for re-admission into the world of shared moral humanity and this 'caring-enough' that helps sustain the perpetrator's remorse and prevents his disintegration. It is a position that goes beyond forgiveness, and it serves two possible functions. First, it seeks to 'restore' the survival of the lost loved one who was murdered by the perpetrator. Second, by showing the kind of caring and containment that can help prevent disintegration in the perpetrator, the victim creates a new relational experience with him, which reconstitutes the memory of the loss as a positive narrative.

The 'caring for' element in empathy is the result of a deeper level of imagination and understanding of the other's experience. This takes 'feeling into' the mental state of the other to another level and asks the question: What should I do about it? Thus, rather than empathy considered simply as 'resonance,' as suggested by neuroscientific insights, the notion of 'empathic repair' might usefully be applied to capture the transformation and potential for healing that emerge from dialogic encounters between survivors and perpetrators (Gobodo-Madikizela 2008a). The perpetrator's transformation stands as a symbol of the victim's capacity (and, more generally, of the human capacity) for imagination and understanding, and of the power of empathic care that is inherent—always a potentiality (Young-Bruehl 2006, pp. 4–5)—in dialogic encounters between victims and perpetrators.

The Role of Imagination in Victim–Perpetrator Dialogue

In considering the possibility of victims' empathy in these post-conflict encounters, it seems that the human capacity for imagination plays a role because imagination suggests constant reflection, co-construction of meaning, and dialogue with self and with the other through language and other subtler forms of communication. The idea that empathy might involve imagination is perhaps best captured by Kohut's notion of 'experience-near,' which suggests an attempt to experience as closely as possible what the other person is experiencing—their pain, their sufferings (1984, p. 187). It is an attempt, a reaching toward an experience not one's own in order to understand what the other is going through. In other words, the act of imagining is not only an approximation of the other's experience but it is also an ethical stance of mutual recognition and a capacity for moral imagination that emerges and develops from the intersubjective engagement that allows the parties in dialogue to be open to one another.

In an earlier section of my essay, I suggested that forgiveness may be described as 'the emergence of the unexpected'—the capacity for the emotional encounter with the other in order to open a new path that generates something completely new and unexpected. To illustrate this point I want to share a South African story, drawn from an encounter between a young woman, Marcia Khoza, with her mother's killer, the apartheid government's chief assassin nicknamed 'Prime Evil,' Eugene de Kock. After visiting de Kock in prison, where he was serving two life terms for some of his crimes for which he was denied amnesty, Marcia Khoza supported de Kock's application for parole, and spoke publicly about forgiving him.

'I had this deep void of emptiness,' Khoza said. 'I carried so much anger to protect myself from falling into the abyss.' Empowered by de Kock's acknowledgment and knowing the details of her mother's killing, and finally finding what she described as 'the missing puzzle in the jigsaw of my life,' Marcia Khoza was able to establish a human connection with de Kock across the lines that divided them. In recounting the story of her meeting with de Kock, she spoke about how meeting him enabled her to empathize with him and his longing for his sons, whom he told her he had not seen for more than twenty years.[5]

I asked her what was most memorable about the meeting with de Kock. She described a moment toward the end of her visit when she became conscious of her knees touching de Kock's under the narrow table across which they sat from each other in the prison. She was drawing closer and closer to him with each response he gave to her many questions, listening to the words yet also listening to his 'inner voice,' trying to work out (to imagine) how he was feeling. At one point, she said, 'I realized that our noses were almost touching, and that we were breathing the same air.'

Breathing the same air—the statement brings into focus the emergent possibilities that are at the heart of these dialogic processes of restorative justice. As a metaphor, the notion of 'breathing the same air' challenges the very concept of forgiveness. What is perhaps necessary is shifting the lens from a focus on forgiveness and reconciliation (concepts that imply a goal) to 'experience' (complicated, enigmatic, muddy, elusive, and unpredictable). I think that much of what happens in these encounters remains implicit, and the word 'forgiveness' falls short of adequately capturing this complexity.

Empathic Repair and the Spirit of *Ubuntu*

The need to build a world in which both self and other matter is at the heart of my exploration in this essay. The trauma induced by years of violence need not lead to repetition of violence, where victims and their descendants become perpetrators of new forms of violence that play out in endless cycles of repetition. The pattern can be broken, the violence transformed, and the trauma transcended. The work of the TRC of South Africa reminds us that while it may not be possible to erase traumatic memory—when 'closure' after such violence and injustice is not possible—trauma's power of repetition can be broken.

In the aftermath of crimes against humanity, individuals and communities of survivors—as well as perpetrators who dare to face their shame and their guilt and transcend it—are searching for ways of being human in order to repair the damage done to communal bonds. Victims and their descendants seek affirmation of their right as fellow human beings worthy of recognition and inclusion as beneficiaries of the privileges that come with a new democracy.

I have suggested that 'empathic repair' might be used to describe the transformative outcomes of victim–perpetrator dialogue. The notion

of empathic repair calls to mind—demands—a broader perspective of responsibility that goes beyond the other, and extends to one's community. It reminds the parties in dialogue of their responsibility to participate in rebuilding their society and to share in the vision of a more humane society (Gobodo-Madikizela 2008a). The TRC, the Rwandan gacaca process, and similar restorative justice processes are all strategies established to create a space for testimony, a space for confrontation and listening, for moral reflection and for initiating the difficult process of restoration of human bonds, and reestablish community ties and social relationships in a previously divided society (Clark 2010).

These sites of testimony, of mutual recognition and shared experience, provide points of identification, entryways into the experience of others, which enable comparison across critical registers of difference. Appeal to the familiar and the familial creates a context in which it is possible to engage empathetic questions, such as 'How old was your daughter/son when... ?' By grounding themselves in what is shared, they create mutual intelligibility. The shared experience of loss, for example, cuts across the distinction of black or white, Tutsi or Hutu, Protestant or Catholic, Israeli or Palestinian. On the terrain of a horrific past, certain statements resonate deeply: 'My son was eighteen years old when he was conscripted into the South African Defence Force during apartheid; he was brought back in a body bag and I wasn't allowed to see him.' 'My son was eighteen when he joined the antiapartheid struggle. He was abducted, tortured, and killed by apartheid security police.'

It is ironic that the same factors that can ignite and perpetuate animosity, fear, and hatred—the love for those killed or maimed by the other—might also suspend those negative sentiments. By providing a way into the experience of the 'enemy,' love and loss may provide a way out of violence. Ultimately, love and loss are what are common and thus in a sense are shared. Love and loss enable healing that opens new possibilities in the aftermath of violence.

At the center of this 'love' is *ubuntu*—a deep sense of caring for the other that is embedded in most traditional African societies (see next two paragraphs for description of *ubuntu*). It is worth noting that the postamble of the South African Interim Constitution of 1993, which outlined the guidelines for the establishment of the TRC, included a reference to 'the need for *ubuntu*.' This clearly conveyed a particular orientation for the work of the TRC, one that was specific to the South African cultural context.

The concept of *ubuntu* is an ethic based on the understanding that one's subjectivity is inextricably intertwined with that of others in one's community. From the perspective of *ubuntu*, all people are valued as part of the human community and worthy of being so recognized. This entails not blind acceptance of others, no matter what they do, but rather an orientation of openness to others and reciprocal caring that fosters a sense of solidarity. *Ubuntu* is often associated with the concept of self 'I am because we are,' which stands in contrast to the Cartesian 'I think, therefore I am.' While recognizing the role of the individual, *ubuntu* values a sense of solidarity with others—the individual always in relation—rather than individual autonomy.

It seems to me, however, that the meaning of *ubuntu* is best captured in the isiXhosa expression '*Umntu ngumntu ngabanye abantu*.' Literally translated, this means, 'A person is a person through being witnessed by, and engaging in reciprocal witnessing of other persons,' or 'A person becomes a human being through the multiplicity of relationships with others.' The meaning conveyed by the expression is twofold. First, subjectivity depends on being witnessed; the richness of subjectivity flows from interconnectedness with the wider community, and from the reciprocal caring and complementarity of human relationships. Second, the phrase conveys the kind of reciprocity that calls on people to be ethical subjects. Mutual recognition is fundamental to being a fellow human being, a relational subject in the context of community. A person with *ubuntu* 'is open and available to others, is affirming to others.... My humanity caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours' (Tutu 1999).

Conclusion

While the precept that one should respect and care for human beings as human beings is true, it has had little sway in curtailing atrocities or waves of vengeance following atrocities. It is as though 'human being'—the face of the other—is too much of an abstraction (and, as the twentieth century has shown, too pliable a notion). What is called for is a movement from the abstract and the generalizable, toward the particular and tangible—despite the fact that recognition of the particular does not necessarily guarantee compassion and empathy.

The work of psychoanalysts writing on the destructive effects of trauma on the development of victims' capacity for empathy provides poignant support for the suggestion that victims may become so dehumanized that

they lose the capacity for empathy (Laub and Auerhahn 1989). Yet it also helps us to see that such a loss need not be permanent. Processes such as the TRC create the ethical space for the reconstitution of empathic sensibilities that may have been damaged by violence, both between individuals and within communities, making an empathic human connection with former enemies possible.

Notes

1. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, para. (a), subsec. (3), sec. 20.
2. For a comprehensive discussion of remorse, see Gobodo-Madikizela (2015).
3. Truth and Reconciliation Commission Amnesty Hearing, Cape Town, July 8, 1997.
4. Linda Biehl, interview by Gobodo-Madikizela (research interview, Cape Town, April 1998).
5. Marcia Khoza, interview by Gobodo-Madikizela (public dialogue event, Bloemfontein, December 2013).

References

Arendt, Hannah. 1963. *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. New York: Viking Press.

Black, David. 2004. Sympathy Reconfigured: Some Reflections on Sympathy, Empathy and the Discovery of Values. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 85 (3): 579–595.

Clark, Phil. 2010. *The Gacaca Courts, Post-genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Enright, Robert D., and Joanna North, eds. 1998. *Exploring Forgiveness*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Gobodo-Madikizela, Pumla. 2008a. Empathetic Repair after Mass Trauma: When Vengeance Is Arrested. *European Journal of Social Theory* 11 (3): 331–350.

Gobodo-Madikizela, Pumla. 2008b. Trauma, Forgiveness and the Witnessing Dance: Making Public Spaces Intimate. *Journal of Analytical Psychology* 53 (2): 169–188.

Gobodo-Madikizela, Pumla. 2015. Psychological Repair: The Intersubjective Dialogue of Remorse and Forgiveness in the Aftermath of Gross Human

Rights Violations. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 63 (6): 1085–1123.

Gobodo-Madikizela, Pumla. 2016. Interrupting Cycles of Repetition: Creating Spaces for Dialogue, Facing and Mourning the Past. In *Breaking Intergenerational Cycles of Repetition: A Global Dialogue on Historical Trauma and Memory*, ed. Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, 113–134. Toronto: Barbara Budrich Publishers.

Kohut, Heinz. 1984. *How Does Analysis Cure?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Laub, Dori, and Nanette C. Auerhahn. 1989. Failed Empathy: A Central Theme in the Survivor's Holocaust Experience. *Psychoanalytic Psychology* 6 (4): 377–400.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1968. *The Visible and the Invisible*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Stern, Daniel N. 2004. *The First Relationship: Infant and Mother*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Tutu, Desmond. 1999. *No Future without Forgiveness*. New York: Doubleday.

Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth. 2006. *Why Arendt Matters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

CHAPTER 16

Alternative and Innovative Approaches to Reconciliation: A South African Perspective

Christo Thesnaar

Abstract Twenty years after the transition in South Africa, the violence of today's student protests resembles that of a ticking 'time bomb' on the brink of explosion. To understand this complex reality, Christo Thesnaar assesses the role of the Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) process during this time. Although throughout the post-TRC period faith communities have been predominantly absent in their calling to reconcile the people of South Africa, this contribution argues that they must take a more proactive role in healing and reconciling the nation. In seeking to find suitable ways to overcome this challenge, Thesnaar's contribution engages critically with two alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation and healing: the re-enactment of the TRC faith hearing, and the approach adopted by the Restitution Foundation (RF).

C. Thesnaar (✉)
Stellenbosch, South Africa
e-mail: cht@sun.ac.za

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_16

Keywords Christo Thesnaar · Reconciliation · South Africa · Violence · Truth and Reconciliation Commission · Re-enactment · Faith communities · Restitution Foundation

Since the early 1990s, South Africa has experienced rapid transitions at every level of society. Owing to recent events that have transpired across the nation, for instance, the latest service delivery protests,[1] the current '#FeesMustFall' and the '#EndOutsourcing campaign' at our universities, accompanied by intense outbursts of anger, violence, and frustration, many have begun to question the extent to which liberation, transition, and the outcomes of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) process have taken place in our country. A number of contemporary artists and academic scholars have referred to this sullen situation as a 'time bomb' with telltale signs of an imminent explosion.

In his lyrics, Stef Bos (2010), a Dutch singer-composer likens the present-day situation in South Africa to that of a *tydbom* (time bomb). He describes the growing gap between the rich and poor, the lack of housing, the unfulfilled promises, and the violence experienced by the majority of people within the country as a time bomb. Kenyan theologian, Julius Gathogo echoes similar sentiments when he refers to a comment made by Nigerian poet Akinwande Oluwole 'Wole' Babatunde Soyinka, who describes the South African way of dealing with reconciliation as a time bomb that can explode at any given moment because the root cause of the problem has not been adequately addressed (2012, p. 81). Within the above-mentioned context, Ranjeni Munusamy's newspaper article headline reads as follows: '#FeesMustFall: Political failure triggers ticking time bomb' (2015a, b). The metaphor also forms part of the urgent warning from the political economist, Moeletsi Mbeki, when he states, 'South Africa is a bomb waiting to explode, all it needs is a little match to spark it and it will go up in flames' (2015). Trust Matsilele describes the bomb as an 'economic bomb' when he refers to Mbeki's warning that a forty percent unemployment rate among black South Africans and a thirty percent unemployment rate among 'Coloured'[2] people are bound to cause some 'tensions, political and social instability with locals venting their anger and frustrations on foreigners' (2015).

It is in this context that theologians are required to engage hermeneutically with this reality in order to fully understand and interpret the

situation. In light of the aforementioned, this contribution seeks to reflect on the following significant points: Firstly, the limitations of the TRC process so as to determine whether there is a connection between the current reality, the limitations of the TRC process, and the apathy of the faith communities toward the process of healing and reconciliation after the TRC ended. Secondly, the role the faith communities should play to facilitate healing and reconciliation in our society; and lastly, two innovative and alternative approaches to reconciliation within the South African context.

Limitations of the South African TRC Process

At the time, the TRC was considered to be one of the most alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation. The major role it played in assisting victims to publicly voice their pain caused by discrimination and injustice is undisputed. However, considering the challenges facing our nation today it is imperative to reflect honestly on the task and process of the TRC in order to identify its connection to the current reality. In this regard, the following limitations are indicated:

Firstly, from the outset the TRC was limited due to the fact that the whole process formed part of a negotiated settlement within the framework of the transition from the apartheid past to a democratic South Africa. Even though the TRC had legal status and was supported by legislation, it was from the beginning limited by its temporary existence.

Secondly, due to its limited time frame (initially two years) it was estimated that approximately twenty thousand out of roughly fifty million victims would appear before the Commission during its existence. Although there is an argument to be made in favor of the TRC as a structured process within this particular transition period of our history emphasizing the symbolic nature of the process, it nevertheless overlooks the lack of a healing process for those who did not have the opportunity to be part of the TRC process. The specific limitation was that there was no official or particular process to assist both victims and perpetrators of apartheid with the process of healing.

Thirdly, very few perpetrators participated in the TRC process, applied for amnesty, or made full disclosure. As a result, a large part of the white community did not attend the TRC hearings. They either remained completely disinterested or were predominantly absent in the process that followed the conclusion of the TRC.

Fourthly, upon completion the TRC made some noteworthy recommendations to the government, civil society, and the faith communities, but these were largely disregarded.[3] During the TRC faith community hearing in East London, the faith communities in particular made specific commitments to heal and reconcile the nation after the conclusion of the TRC. Unfortunately, very few of these commitments were upheld.

The Faith Community as a Role Player

As indicated above, after the completion of the TRC the faith communities did not manifest as key role players with the same vigor as they did to end apartheid. It is thus imperative to be honest and realistic about the proficiency of the faith communities to develop alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation and healing, especially after the termination of the TRC. This complexity was again confirmed during the re-enactment of the TRC faith hearing in 2014.[4] Although the faith communities remain deficient in their ability to be a significant role player in the process of healing and reconciliation, they need to reclaim their ability to understand hermeneutically and interpret the current context (time bomb) in order to contribute to the healing and reconciliation of our nation. Thus, to keep from repeating the same mistakes of the past, or to fall into the trap of developing cheap approaches to reconciliation, the faith communities need to re-establish their theological identity as a key role player in this regard. With this in mind I offer the following suggestions for faith communities to take note of if they want to re-establish their theological identity in the process of seeking alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation.

Firstly, the faith communities should neither underestimate nor hesitate to be role players in seeking alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation, since they are still rated the highest trusted organization in our society at sixty-seven percent (Wale 2013, p. 24).

Secondly, in their endeavor to develop alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation, they will need to develop the ability to engage and contribute in a transdisciplinary space.[5] Thus, the faith communities need to realize that the current challenges facing our society are too enormous to resolve on their own. The quest is for various disciplines, for instance, theology, religion, psychology, sociology, and history, to journey together (this includes doing empirical research together) with no predetermined approach or solution in place.

Thirdly, for theology and religion to have a voice it needs to become public, which necessitates active engagement with society. In this regard, H. Russel Botman, a public theologian, pleads for a critical relationship with society (2011, p. 601). Furthermore, he understands this to be an ethical task of the church. This emphasizes the necessity for faith communities not to engage for the sake of engaging but to be truly committed to the cause, and with their theological knowledge participate in developing alternative and innovative approaches to healing and reconciliation.

Fourthly, the faith communities should endeavor to develop an advocacy agenda for the broader transformation of our society. Thus, they should not view reconciliation as a mere relational process, but instead engage with the contents of reconciliation such as confession, remorse, forgiveness, justice, reparation, and restitution. In a paper on the theology of Botman, Dirk Smit indicated that Botman would frequently, and varyingly, emphasize the need for deep transformation to ensure the restoration of the dignity of all who are struggling in this country (2011, p. 622). Basically, it is about taking responsibility for transformation and being accountable for it (Smit 2015, p. 608).

Fifthly, the focus of the church should be on forth-coming generations. When we think of alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation that will have an impact on the next generation it will have to focus on human dignity, justice, and unity. In this regard, Botman emphasizes that his own generation has brought division, and therefore our obligation is to serve the dignity of people, the dignity of future generations, and the integrity of the environment (2011). This implies 'a world of greater opportunities, a greener world, where wealth is shared, where we do not fight each other at every opportunity, and it must be a world where we learn to deal with conflicts and disputes in ways other than litigation and warfare' (Botman 2011, p. 605).

However, we have to be cognizant of the fact that the present generation has grown exceedingly weary of listening to unfulfilled promises, and as a result, have become more and more frustrated, angry, and violent in the absence of change. They do not trust our current leaders or demand respect and to be treated as equals. Furthermore, more than ever, they want to be heard and listened to, and taken seriously.

It is precisely because of the lack of attentiveness, listening, and understanding that Bishop Kevin Dowling from the Roman Catholic Church pleaded for a theology from below (2014, p. 77).[6] It is all about having our feet firmly entrenched on the ground, and listening to the needs of

people situated at the grassroots of our society. It is these 'stories of the poor [that] are written on their bodies, inscribed in souls and captured in the histories of dispossession and humiliation,' that the church needs to listen to, says Tinyiko Maluleke (2011, p. 89). Sadly, the church has lost her ability to listen to the coming generation. There is a significant lack of understanding and awareness among the leaders of the current generation regarding the needs of the next generation. In this regard, R. Ruard Ganzevoort agrees with Dowling when he proposes the need to develop a theology from below that has the ability to acknowledge the perspectives of those who are marginalized and to develop a theological discourse and resources that support their emancipation (2009, p. 13).

Examples of Alternative and Innovative Approaches

Based on what has been stated thus far, I want to argue that there appears to be a connection between the existing challenges South African society is facing, the limitations of the TRC, and the failure of the faith communities (as one of the main constituencies) to continue as well as commit themselves to the process of reconciliation and healing started by the TRC. Moreover, it is evident from the discussion so far that the faith communities are more than capable, and therefore should contribute to the creation of alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation.

Based on the above reasoning, I want to comment on two recent 'examples' of alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation within the South African context, namely, the re-enactment of the TRC faith hearing and the approach adopted by the Restitution Foundation (RF).

The Re-Enactment of the TRC Faith Hearings

In an attempt to alert the faith communities to the role they need to play in a post-TRC context, a consultation on the re-enactment of the TRC faith hearing was recently held, serving as an example of an alternative and innovative approach to reconciliation.[7] The aims of the re-enactment were to place the process of reconciliation back on the main agenda of all faith communities, to contribute to reconciliation and national unity, and for faith communities to engage with responsible and realistic reconciliation strategies.

Although the re-enactment was in many ways a profound and meaningful experience, it is noteworthy to comment on the re-enactment from the premise of re-establishing its identity as a key role player in the process of healing and reconciliation, as argued earlier.

Firstly, most of those representing the faith communities at the re-enactment were predominantly older men, representing the exclusive gender profile of the leaders of the faith communities. This meant that the voices and narratives of the present generation, especially women, were primarily absent or silent.

The second observation is that there is a clear difference between the content of reconciliation during the time of the transition and the TRC as to what was communicated during the re-enactment. During the re-enactment there was a more prominent attempt to grapple with the issues that are central to the content of reconciliation such as restoration, economic justice, restitution, transformative justice, socio-economic freedom, and transformation. Although these issues were identified, they still lacked advocacy and a clear attempt to engage with these concerns in a transdisciplinary way.

Thirdly, the consultation was a typical exposition of a top-down event, as was the TRC faith hearing where the emphasis was placed on the leaders of faith communities and the official ecumenical bodies, such as the South African Council of Churches (SACC). In this case, it would have been helpful to also invite people, groups, and community organizations that would exemplify a bottom-up representation.

Fourthly, the leaders of faith communities and official faith organizations failed to take responsibility for the limited role they played since the TRC completed its mandate. Instead, they continued to idealize the significant role they played in liberating this country from its apartheid past. There was a clear absence of taking responsibility for the current challenges as well as a firm commitment to participate as public theologians to develop innovative and alternative approaches to healing and reconciliation for subsequent generations.

Could the re-enactment consultation be a true example of an alternative and innovative approach to reconciliation twenty years after the transition in South Africa? Although the re-enactment was of monumental importance in seeking to understand the faith communities' failure to contribute to the development of such approaches, the answer to the above question remains 'No.'

Approach by the Restitution Foundation (RF)

Director of the RF, Deon Snyman, recently described the approach to reconciliation (which includes conflict resolution) by the RF as a community-led reconciliation approach that was developed within a local context, namely, the town of Worcester in the Western Cape (2014).[8]

The mission of the RF is to serve as a catalyst for restitution that would lead to healing in South Africa. To reach this goal they initially decided to use the leaders of church denominations and ecumenical bodies as the vehicle for the process. Snyman explained that the initial strategy was a top-down model for the development of a draft restitution plan for South Africa (that included a just economy, housing, education, land reform, employment, etc.). Soon afterward, they realized that there were limitations that needed to be overcome if they were to reach this goal. One of the limitations was that the ecumenical movement was in dire straits, and across the country there seemed to be little energy geared toward ecumenical work over the last decade. Another limitation was that many of the post-apartheid church leaders did not have the charisma of the apartheid era church leaders, such as Beyers Naudé, Desmond Tutu, Allan Boesak, and Dennis Hurley to provide the impetus and momentum for such a process. In addition, they recognized the need to refocus, and develop a new strategy and approach. Although the mission stayed the same, the vehicle became regular church members or ordinary grassroots people. There was a clear shift from a top-down structure to a bottom-up structure.

This developed into a new approach and strategy called the community-led restitution process, which encompassed two elements: (1) trauma recovery (all of South Africans traumatized by apartheid and colonialism), and (2) socio-economic justice. To support this approach and strategy they developed a 'restitution toolkit' to assist people to understand what restitution entails (Snyman2013). Time was also spent on developing a restitution theory to indicate the difference between restitution and charity, why black consciousness is important within this process, and what the key concepts in the discourse on restitution should be (Hills 2014).

In 2010, the RF became involved with the Worcester community, who was still carrying the scars of the 1996 Christmas Eve bombing at a shopping center (the so-called 'black Christmas'), which left four people dead and seventy injured—mostly black and colored. It was a racially motivated

attack by four fanatical right-wing, white inhabitants of the town. As they all pleaded guilty in the ensuing court case, no opportunity was given to the community to really understand why this act was even perpetrated. One of the accused was a seventeen-year-old boy, Stefaans Coetzee, from a dysfunctional family who received a forty-year prison sentence. Via the restorative justice program, Coetzee indicated that he wanted to meet the survivors of the bombing and explain the reasons for his actions. He repented and asked for forgiveness. As he could not offer any financial restitution, Coetzee hoped that his story might serve as a kind of restitution for the rest of South Africa.

This story became the primary metaphor used to engage all the survivors of the bombing—those affected by it, the perpetrator, and the whole community—within the frame of a restitution project. What was evident from this project was that the white, colored, and black communities in Worcester worked together to make it possible for the survivors to meet the perpetrator and start the process of forgiveness. Coetzee met with more than a thousand people to help them experience healing by admitting his mistake, telling them what had happened, and explaining the reasons for his actions. In 2011, this mobilization increased with local doctors and psychologists suddenly offering to make their services available to survivors for free (most survivors had no counseling after the attack). The Koinonia-project was established (sharing a meal at different homes, and hosts showing their photo albums to their guests). This was followed by a series of healing-of-memories workshops, as well as an annual commemoration day for reconciliation. Although the focus was initially on relational issues, it soon extended to socio-economic issues—restitution financing (2009)—by which money was raised for new businesses for victims with the capacity to be successful but without access to collateral to extend their business.

From the above-mentioned, it is evident that the methodology of the RF can be described as an alternative and innovative approach that works well within a local context. In short, the focus of this approach includes: the participation of partners from all levels and generations in the process; listening to all voices; the presence of all faith communities and all sectors of society; the offenders and victims; actively engaging and facing the core issues of reconciliation such as transformation, restorative justice, reparation, restitution, socio-economic freedom, sustainable development, et cetera. It is therefore a community restitution project with a broader focus than the individual.

Conclusion

This contribution sought to understand the contemporary South African context, as illustrated by the metaphor of a 'time bomb.' It also sought to establish whether there is a connection between the current challenges and the limitations of the TRC as well as the inability of the faith communities to continue with the healing and reconciliation task after the completion of the TRC. However, given this connection and the on-going challenges experienced in our current South African context (time bomb), this contribution advocates for faith communities to put forth active public theologians, with a clear mandate to contribute to the process of healing and reconciliation.

Furthermore, to illustrate the role of faith communities, this contribution reflected on two alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation within the South African context. I argued in favor of the approach adopted by the RF, as it demonstrates how faith communities can cooperate with other role players in society. The main challenge is to ensure that all generations are involved in this process, that subsequent generations are heard, and that their needs are recognized—socio-economic justice, restitution, and transformation—forming part of the broader process of reconciliation. My conviction is that faith communities in South Africa have the ability to develop alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation such as those discussed above. It is the responsibility of theologians to act on this responsibility as they seek to defuse the issues related to the time bomb for our subsequent generations.

Notes

1. Chen et al. describe 'service delivery' as follows: '"Service delivery" is a common phrase in South Africa used to describe the distribution of basic resources citizens depend on like water, electricity, sanitation infrastructure, land, and housing. Unfortunately, the government's delivery and upkeep of these resources is unreliable—greatly inconveniencing or endangering whole communities' (2014). In recent years the number of 'service delivery protests' has increased and has become more and more violent.

2. In South Africa, the term 'Coloured' is a name given by the apartheid government to an ethnic race group composed primarily of persons of mixed race.
3. Cf. 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report,' (2003), 6:589ff.
4. Cf. 'The re-enactment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's (TRC) faith hearing consultation—with a specific focus on reconciliation in a post TRC South Africa' as indicated by Thesnaar (2014), p. 1.
5. Cf. 'The transdisciplinary scientific research approach to reconciliation with an emphasis on the Hölderlin-perspective,' as indicated by Leiner and Flämig (2012), p. 13.
6. Cf. the contribution from the Catholic Church by Bishop Kevin Dowling during the re-enactment of the TRC's faith hearing consultation—with a specific focus on reconciliation in a post-TRC South Africa (2014, p. 77).
7. This consultation was arranged by the Beyers Naudé Centre for Public Theology at the Faculty of Theology, Stellenbosch University, in collaboration with the Desmond and Leah Tutu Legacy Foundation, October 8–9, 2014.
8. RF is a non-governmental organization (NGO) based in Cape Town.

References

Bos, Stef. 2010. *Kloofstraat*. CD. Niemandsland: Netherlands.

Botman, H. Russel. 2011. Revolution, Education and Religion. In *Living Theology*, ed. Len Hansen, Nico N. Koopman, and Robert R. Vosloo, 601–06. Wellington: Bible Media.

Chen, Janice Dean, Jesper Frant, and Rachana Kumar. 2014. What Does 'Service Delivery' Really Mean? *World Policy Blog*. http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/05/13/what-does-service-delivery-really-mean. Accessed on 25 Sept 2016.

Dowling, Kevin. 2014. *Consultation Report*. Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch. October 8–9. Unpublished Data.

Ganzevoort, R. Ruard. 2009. *Forks in the Road when Tracing the Sacred: Practical Theology as Hermeneutics of Lived Religion*. 1–15. http://www.ruardganzevoort.nl/pdf/2009_Presidential.pdf. Accessed on 13 May 2015.

Gathogo, Julius. 2012. Reconciliation Paradigm in the Post-Colonial Africa: A Critical Analysis. *Religion and Theology* 19 (1/2): 74–91.

Hills, Sarah. 2014. *A Theology of Restitution as Embodied Reconciliation: A Study of Restitution in a Reconciliation Process in Worcester, South Africa*. 137–60. PhD diss., Durham University.

Leiner, Martin, and Susan Flämig, eds. 2012. *Latin America between Conflict and Reconciliation*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Maluleke, Tinyiko S. 2011. Reflections and Resources. The Elusive Public of Public Theology: A Response to William Storrar. *International Journal of Public Theology* 5 (1): 79–89.

Matsilele, Trust. 2015. South Africa is a bomb waiting to explode: Mbeki. *CNBC Africa*. http://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/southern-africa/2015/04/24/moeletsi-mbeki-south-africa-unemployment/. Accessed on 24 Oct 2015.

Munusamy, Ranjeni. 2015a. "#FeesMustFall: Political failure triggers ticking time bomb." *Daily Maverick*. http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-10-21-feesmustfall-political-failure-triggers-ticking-time-bomb/#.ViuFnk1UDIU. Accessed on 25 Oct 2015.

Munusamy, Ranjeni. 2015b. 'Making History for the Coming Generation'—On the Theological Logic of Russel Botman's Commitment to Transformation. *Stellenbosch Theological Journal* 1 (2): 607–632.

Smit, Dirk Jacobus. 2015. "Making History For The Coming Generation"—On the Theological Logic of Russel Botman's Commitment to Transformation. *Stellenbosch Theological Journal* 1 (2): 622.

Snyman, Deon. 2013. Reconciliation Toolkit. *Restitution Foundation*. 1–24. http://www.restitution.org.za/wp-content/uploads/Reconciliation-Toolkit.pdf. Accessed on 14 Apr 2015.

Snyman, Deon. 2014. *A Report on the Work of the Restitution Foundation for the Period Jan 2013–March 2014*. Restitution Foundation. 1–12. http://restitution.org.za/wp-content/uploads/Restitution-Foundation-2013-2014-Report.pdf. Accessed on 26 Apr 2015.

Thesnaar, Christo. 2014. *Consultation Report*. Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch. October 8–9.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report. 2003. Vol 6. Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Cape Town, South Africa.

Wale, Kim. 2013. *Confronting Exclusion: Time for Radical Reconciliation, SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey: 2013 Report*. 1–44. http://reconciliationbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/IJR-Barometer-Report-2013-22Nov1635.pdf. Accessed on 15 Apr 2015.

CHAPTER 17

The Politics of Reconciliation in Post-genocide Rwanda

Christine Schliesser

Abstract In 1994, the fastest genocide in recent history left up to 1,000,000 people dead in the small African country of Rwanda. Christine Schliesser provides a critical reading of Rwanda's current politics of reconciliation as a specific way of dealing with the past, indicating both the strengths as well as the weaknesses of these politics. After a brief sketch of the context, Schliesser's contribution delineates the different components of Rwanda's politics of reconciliation such as the gacaca courts. In a third step, she draws the connection between reconciliation and remembrance, arguing that both are inseparably connected. Due to their connectedness, problematic aspects in one area produce negative effects on the other.

Keywords Christine Schliesser · Reconciliation · Politics of reconciliation · Rwanda · Genocide · Gacaca courts · Remembrance

C. Schliesser (✉)
Zurich, Switzerland
e-mail: christine.schliesser@sozethik.uzh.ch

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_17

Josephine is a five-year-old girl with a dazzling smile. It lights up her face even in the photograph. Her hair is done into two neat braids. The captions beneath the picture tell us more details about Josephine: How she loves to sing and dance. That her favorite food is chicken with fried potatoes. And that her eyes were gouged out and her skull crushed with a machete. Her picture hangs on the wall amid countless other pictures of children in a room called 'Tomorrow lost' at the National Genocide Memorial in Rwanda's capital, Kigali.

In 1994, violence exploded in this small country in central Africa called Rwanda. Before the eyes of the world-community standing by, up to 1,000,000 children, women, and men were brought to death (Dallaire 2004).[1] Most of the victims were members of the Tutsi minority (about fifteen percent of the population), yet countless moderate Hutu who refused to take part in the slaughter were murdered as well. Here, it is important to point out that Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa (a small minority of one percent) are not considered conventional ethnic descriptions; rather, they share one language and one culture. Hutu and Tutsi used to be terms of 'wealth' or 'profession': those with more than ten heads of cattle were considered Tutsi and herdsmen, the others were Hutu and farmers. It was the colonial powers—first Germany, and after World War I, Belgium—that cemented the ethnic distinctions with their politics of *divide-et-impera*. Religion sociologist Richard Friedli thus speaks rightly of a "historical responsibility of Europe" with regards to Africa's ethno-political conflicts (2000, p. 138ff.).[2]

In the following, I will provide a critical reading of Rwanda's current politics of reconciliation as a specific way of dealing with the past, indicating both the strengths as well as the weaknesses of these politics. After first sketching out the context, I will briefly delineate the different components of Rwanda's politics of reconciliation such as the gacaca courts. In a third step, I will draw the connection between reconciliation and remembrance, arguing that both are inseparably connected. Due to their connectedness, problematic aspects in one area will have negative effects on the other.

1. The Context: Rwanda and the Genocide

The "fastest genocide in recent history" (Scheen 2014) does not only distinguish itself by its brevity, its thorough preparation, its intensity, and

its preventability—still on the eve of the genocide, commander-in-chief Roméo Dallaire desperately called his superior Kofi Annan for reinforcement of his meager United Nations (UN) troops stationed in Rwanda, in vain—but also by its brutality. Many victims were hacked to pieces with machetes and thrown into latrines to die. Due to the excesses in the Rwandan genocide, sexual violence and mutilation have since become considered and punishable as a genocidal crime ('Akayesu ruling' of 1998). Another characteristic of this genocide is the fact that many of the victims and the perpetrators knew each other as neighbors, friends, or even family.

Rwanda is a small country, about half the size of Switzerland. At the same time, it is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa. This means survivors and perpetrators cannot avoid each other. In this, the situation differs from, for instance, Europe after World War II, with its clear-cut borders that separated the former enemies. In addition, life in Rwanda cannot be lived by oneself, at least not in the rural areas, where most of the population still lives today.Everyday life depends on the help and support of family or village structures, even for seemingly simple tasks such as fetching water. Most often it is the survivors, weakened in body and soul, impoverished materially and socially, who are most dependent on assistance."The material distress increases the deep psychological misery even more, for here we are faced with people that have been grossly mutilated both bodily and emotionally" (Friedli2000, p. 144). A United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) report of 1998 points out that ninety-six percent of the surviving children were affected actively or passively by the massacres, and eighty-four percent had lost their parents or siblings, of which about half had directly witnessed the brutal murders (Gupta 1998). Experiences like these leave their mark. Now is the time, more than twenty years after the genocide that even long-term sentences of major genocidal crimes draw to an end. Perpetrators are released to go home. Oftentimes, their home is the place of their crimes and the home of the survivors. And the place where feelings of fear and suffering, hatred and revenge unite.

Rwanda is a country of low human development, according to the UN Human Development Index. The current index ranks Rwanda 163 of 188. Yet recent years have seen a remarkable progress in terms of economic advance. Current President Paul Kagame has an ambitious goal: to turn Rwanda into nothing less than the 'Singapore of Africa.' And Rwanda is well on her way. Throughout the world, business, bankers, and

investors have started to pay attention to this country. In 2015, Credit Suisse, at that time one of Switzerland's most renowned banks, enthusiastically praised Rwanda's "economic miracle" and excellent opportunities for investment (Ammann 2015, p. 31). Kagame—whose change of constitution in 2015 allows him to stay in power until 2034—is aware of the crucial importance of peace and stability for economic growth and prosperity. Given his country's violent and divisive history, he turned reconciliation into a political target and thus declared a 'National Politics of Reconciliation.'[3]

2. Rwanda's Politics of Reconciliation

Reconciliation, once primarily at home in religious contexts, has long found its way into historical and political discourse. Societies-in-transition employ this term to express their quest for a new beginning, for stability, and a new order after often violent conflict. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) after the end of the apartheid regime is the most well-known example. With its 'National Politics of Reconciliation,' the current government in Rwanda pushes reconciliation on several different levels. On a national level, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) was founded that offers different projects throughout the country. For the 30th commemoration of the genocide in 2024, for instance, journalists from all over the world were invited to visit so-called 'reconciliation villages' to witness how perpetrators and victims work and live side by side. Furthermore, the designations 'Tutsi' and 'Hutu' were banned and a new, common identity forged, expressed in the motto 'We are all Rwandan.'

On a judicial level, the so-called gacaca courts were established. After the genocide, the judicial system was demolished. Most of the judges had been killed, and prisons were over-crowded with up to 120,000 prisoners. Contrary to post-apartheid South Africa, Rwanda had deliberately decided against a policy of amnesty, but insisted on bringing to trial every person involved in the genocide. Yet this would have taken more than 100 years if standard legal procedures were followed. In her search for a solution, Rwanda remembered her own traditional system of alternative justice: gacaca.[4]

Until their official termination in 2012, about 11,000 gacaca courts were spread throughout the country, with respected lay people presiding.

Crimes were classified into three different categories with the first category referring to the planners and organizers of the genocide. They were not tried before the gacacas but transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established in Arusha in 1994. The second category included those who had killed and those who had helped them. Here, the gacacas could impose penalties of up to thirty years. The third category referred to those who had committed property offenses, with the penalties usually consisting of reparation payments.[5]

The gacacas, with their traditional and alternative method of administering justice, having been attracting international attention. Their foundation consists less in a retributive understanding of justice as is prevalent in the Western judicial system. Instead, the gacacas come close to what sociologist Howard Zehr describes as 'transformative justice.' Here, the basis is formed by a relational understanding of crime. "Crime is a violation of people and relationships. It creates obligation to make things right. Justice involves the victim, the offender and the community in a joint search for solutions which promote repair, reconciliation, and reassurance" (2005, p. 37). Healing and the re-establishment of community are among its main goals. This also includes punishment and reparation, but in the end, transformative justice is about reconciliation and renewed relationships.

While the transformative approach must not be overestimated, ethicist Fernando Enns points to its productivity, particularly in the context of civil war or racial injustice. There the aim "is not only to come to terms with the past, but rather to establish just relationships and conditions as the prerequisite for sustainable peace in the sense of reconciliation" (2013, p. 33).

3. Reconciliation and Remembrance

There is one more element that needs to be considered in the context of reconciliation: remembrance. What may seem somewhat cloudy and vague at first glance has real and powerful consequences. An inscription at the National Genocide Memorial in Kigali, the final resting place of more than 250,000 children, women, and men, reads: "Forgetting the past is impossible. Remembering the past is infinitely painful." Here, it is made clear that memories are not only part of the past. What is remembered, what is *not* remembered, and *how* it is remembered have a decisive impact

on both the present and the future. For any thought of reconciliation is preceded by the memory of the injustice suffered. "Without memory we cannot travel the painful road to reconciliation and hope."[6]

Cultural scientist Aleida Assmann shows how memory—individual and collective—is a dynamic construct, formed by multiple active and passive processes of remembering and forgetting (2008, pp. 274–80). For the formation of the culture of remembrance that we can currently witness in Rwanda's reconciliation process, two elements are of particular significance: First, 'active remembering,' that is, the deliberate selection of memories; second, 'active forgetting,' that is, the deliberate destruction of memories. And Assmann points us to yet another relevant aspect in this context: power. "The items that have entered the canon have undergone complex operations of contestation, selection and ascription of value in the context of power struggles" (2008, p. 281ff.). This means that memory is always in danger of being manipulated or misused. It is only a short step from a culture of remembrance to a politics of remembrance. George Orwell illustrates this link in his *1984*, where the 'ministry of truth' follows the motto: "Whoever controls the past controls the future. And whoever controls the present controls the past."

Paul Ricoeur refers here to the innate connection between remembrance and identity. It is due to the "fragility of identity" that there is continual "opportunity for the manipulation of memory" (2004, p. 448). Ricoeur mentions different ways of how memory can be manipulated. First, there is what Ricoeur calls 'thwarted memory,' which finds expression in forgetting and pseudo-memories. In Rwanda, one finds thwarted memories when considering what political scientist René Lemarchand calls the "many blind spots in Rwanda's official memory" (2009, p. 102). One of them is the neglect of the commemoration of those commonly referred to as the 'Hutu moderates' who did not agree with the genocidal policies, protected Tutsi, and many times paid for their stance with their lives. Second, 'manipulated memory' consists of strategically selected and ideological tinted memories. When in 1996 and 1997, for instance, tens of thousands of Hutu refugees were killed in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), they were all conveniently declared *génocidaires*—which they still remain in Rwanda's official telling of the story.[7] Third, there is 'enforced memory.' Here, we find that the ethnicity decree not only bans the use of the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' but also public expressions of ethnic memory. 'Enforced forgetting' is the sister

of 'enforced memory,' with equally problematic consequences for reconciliation. "Enforced ethnic amnesia is the most formidable obstacle to reconciliation, because it rules out the process of reckoning by which each community must confront its past and come to terms with its share of responsibility for the horrors of 1994" (Lemarchand 2009, p. 106). Ricoeur mentions yet another form of exploiting memory: its ritualization, resulting in static, fixed memories.[8] Ceremonies such as the official rituals of the annual genocide commemoration serve to solidify the canon selected for public memory.

It has been seen that the power of remembrance for the formation of the present and the future can hardly be overestimated. All too often, this force is a destructive one when individual and collective identities are formed through the remembrance of atrocities committed by one group against the other. Identities thus become 'identities-in-enmity' (Falconer 1996, p. 472). Here, stereotypes play a significant, though often underestimated role. Stereotypes are value and emotion-laden ascriptions to a group of people. They are resistant to both experience and rational criticisms and can easily be turned into political tools. Stereotypes also constitute a relevant component in the formation of our identity. This is due to the fact that one's own self-perception or 'autostereotype' is constituted also through the perception of the other known as 'heterostereotype' (Hahn 2013). The success of a reconciliation process therefore depends on the willingness of *all* participants to critically question their own stereotypes, that is, both their heterostereotypes and autostereotypes. "There are no victories and no defeats in reconciliation processes. While these processes do include success and failure, their result always pertains to both sides in the same way. If this is not the case, all we are left with is camouflage directed at enforcing specific interests and thus an exploitation of the rhetoric of reconciliation" (Hahn 2013, p. 71).

4. Outlook

Rwanda has come a long way, no doubt about it. And Rwanda has surpassed all expectations and achieved remarkable results, particularly with regards to economic success. Yet Rwanda's current politics of reconciliation begs the question if perhaps its success is measured too closely based on the continuing rise of the gross domestic product (GDP). It

hardly bears thinking what the consequence would be if the economic miracle were to suffer setbacks and scapegoats were needed. It is especially the following two aspects that should concern us.

First, there is Rwanda's official politics of suppressing any authentic ethnicity discourse under the guise of a seeming unity. By doing so, this policy neglects the fact that sustainable reconciliation processes also depend on the critical examination of one's own stereotypes. A brief look into Rwanda's history demonstrates the very urgency of such an endeavor: After independence in 1962, repeated massacres between Hutu and Tutsi claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands victims, culminating in the 1994 genocide. Stereotypes on both sides run deep and—if left unaddressed—will further fuel "anger, hatred, desire for revenge, hostile images and distrust in the cultural deeper layers of collective memory that has been laden with prejudices for decades" (Friedli 2000, p. 142). If left unattended, stereotypes and prejudices fester and can be activated and turned into political tools at any given time. Rwanda's official policy to suppress ethnic identities by decree—"as if one could change society by decree!" (Lemarchand 2009, p. 106)—therefore does not only seem counterproductive, but possibly dangerous. For it burdens Rwanda's fragile presence and future with an incalculable potential for conflict. While the fear to upset the current equilibrium by an open ethnicity discourse is understandable, the price paid for not addressing the past might turn out in the future to be (too) high.[9]

Second, there is Rwanda's problematic official culture of remembrance. Political correctness only allows for commemorating the 'Genocide against the Tutsi.' Both countless murdered moderate Hutu and the atrocities committed by the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) army in 1994 fall prey to what Assmann calls 'active forgetting,' that is, the deliberate destruction of memory. Here, we encounter what Ricoeur calls "the prime danger" for remembrance, "the handling of authorized, imposed, celebrated, commemorated history—of official history" (2004, p. 448). In view of Rwanda, Lemarchand puts it pointedly, "the selectivity of public memory helps nurture ethnic enmities" (2009, p. 105). What is thus missing is a place that allows for the polyphony of memory that provides continuing support for any victim, regardless of ethnicity. Here, a comparison with South Africa and its emphasis on the healing of memories might prove beneficial.[10]

Today, Josephine would be thirty-five years old. It is to be hoped that what can be found written on some of the houses in Kigali will come true: "The future will be kind to us because we will create it."

Notes

1. Roméo Dallaire recounts in this book his experiences during the genocide and points to the failure of the world community, which could have stopped the killings.
2. Unless indicated otherwise, English translations are by C. Schliesser.
3. For a detailed treatment of the politics of societal reconciliation in Rwanda, cf. Friese (2010).
4. Gacaca [ga´tʃatʃa] means 'grass' and refers to the place in the village where court is held.
5. For a detailed discussion of the gacaca courts, cf. Friese (2010), pp. 53–86.
6. Robert Vosloo speaks to the reconciliation process in post-apartheid South Africa (2001, p. 34). For South African perspectives, see the contributions by Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela and Christo Thesnaar in Part III of this volume.
7. In his Congolese history, Stephen Smith estimates the number of Hutu killed in these two years alone at 200,000 (2003, p. 95).
8. Referring to Jacques Derrida, Ricoeur states: "But the simulacrum, the automatic ritual, the hypocrisy, the calculation have often joined in and invited themselves along as parasites to this guilt" (2004, p. 469).
9. This is the argument I have heard repeatedly: "Let us not disturb the current stability and prosperity by criticizing the government's manipulation of collective memory or its lack of attention to basic human rights such as freedom of press or freedom of speech, not to mention the lack of political opposition." Viewed against the background of the extreme violence and chaos of the genocide, this argument does carry considerable force. Yet one cannot escape the worry that a past that is not addressed is bound to repeat itself.
10. Cf. Thesnaar's contribution in Part III of this book, titled "Alternative and Innovative Approaches to Reconciliation: A South African Perspective."

References

Ammann, Daniel. 2015. A Country of Hope. *Credit Suisse Bulletin: Africa, Rise of a Continent* 3:30–45. http://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/index.cfm?fileid=827D3D63-A4DF-79FA-9C2C3FFE89BA7788. Accessed on 15 Dec 2016.

Assmann, Aleida. 2008. The Religious Roots of Cultural Memory. *Norsk Teologisk Tidsskrift* 109 (4): 270–292.

Dallaire, Roméo. 2004. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*. London: Arrow.

Enns, Fernando. 2013. Transformative Gerechtigkeit als Möglichkeitsraum zur Versöhnung. *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte* 26 (1): 23–35.

Falconer, Alan. 1996. Erinnerungen zur Versöhnung führen. *Ökumenische Rundschau* 45 (4): 468–478.

Friese, Sebastian. 2010. *Politik der gesellschaftlichen Versöhnung: Eine theologisch-ethische Untersuchung am Beispiel der Gacaca-Gerichte in Ruanda*. Theologie und Frieden no. 39. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

Friedli, Richard. 2000. Der ethnopolitische Konflikt in Rwanda. In *Die Bedeutung des Ethnischen im Zeitalter der Globalisierung. Einbindungen. Ausgrenzungen. Säuberungen*, ed. Rupert Moser, 133–49. Bern: Paul Haupt.

Gupta, L. 1998. *1998 Rwanda: Follow-up Survey of Rwandan Children's Reactions to War Related Violence from 1994 Genocide*. United Nations Children's Fund Evaluation Report no. 800. New York City. https://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/index_14242.html. Accessed on 15 Dec 2016.

Hahn, Hans Henning. 2013. Mit denen da kann man sich einfach nicht vertragen. *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte* 26 (1): 63–72.

Lemarchand, René. 2009. *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Ricoeur, Paul. 2004. *Memory, History, Forgetting*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Scheen, Thomas. 2014. Der schnellste Genozid der jüngeren Geschichte. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/afrika/20-jahre-nach-dem-voelkermord-staatlich-verordnete-versoehnung-in-ruanda-12882782.html. Accessed on 18 Nov 2016.

Smith, Stephen. 2003. *Le Fleuve Congo*. Paris: Actes Sud.

Vosloo, Robert. 2001. Reconciliation as the Embodiment of Memory and Hope. *Journal of Theology for Southern Africa* 109: 25–40.

Zehr, Howard. 2005. *Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice*. Scottsdale: Herald Press.

PART V

Alternative Approaches—The Arts

CHAPTER 18

Introduction to the Arts

Mary Zournazi

Abstract In this chapter, Mary Zournazi introduces the role of art and poetry in responding to violence, trauma, and social crisis as discussed in the following three contributions. In her own chapter, Mary Zournazi reflects on art as an alternative to retaliation. She explores how artistic expression fosters reflection and justice, drawing from her work Inventing Peace (2013) and Dogs of Democracy (2016). Bruce Clarke examines the Rwandan genocide, showing how his own artworks like Upright Men and The Garden of Memory create spaces for mourning and social healing. Philip McDonagh highlights poetry's political significance, arguing that it reshapes distorted realities and fosters diplomacy. Together, these contributions reveal how art and poetry offer alternative narratives, resist cycles of violence, and nurture the conditions for peace.

Keywords Art · Poetry · Politics · Conflict Resolution · Diplomacy · Peace · Memory

M. Zournazi (✉)
Sydney, Australia
e-mail: m.zournazi@unsw.edu.au; zourna12@gmail.com

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_18

Introduction

One comes not into a world but into a question.
–Emmanuel Levinas

How might art be a way to respond to the cultural habits of violence? This brief introduction will help to situate what I would regard as the positive necessity for art in providing alternatives to violence, and how we might consider the need for it in our everyday lives.

In November 2015, I was among the authors in this collection invited to participate in the 'Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution' conference in Zurich. The conference was organized during a critical time in Europe: with the extreme situation in Syria and the refugee crisis that ensued, and the various social and economic crises experienced across Europe. After a fruitful second day of the conference, I went back to my hotel room and went straight to sleep unaware of what was happening in the world. The next morning, Bruce Clarke—an artist and a conference participant, told me about the coordinated bomb attacks that had happened in Paris during the previous night. Clarke, who is based in Paris, had been up most of the night closely monitoring the events from Zurich.

I was shocked. But at the time, what also surprised me was the level of retaliation in the air mostly presented by the media but also people's everyday mood and reaction. It seemed that there was no alternative or possibility to comprehend the events: France had called a state of emergency and then shortly thereafter launched air strikes on Syria. There had also been a separate attack in Beirut, although there was less reportage about this attack in Europe and in other global media outlets. Given all of this, there is no doubt that the attacks were tragic and violent. At the same time, a response to violence must *not* create or recreate new forms of animosity and fear. What might be the alternatives to violence?

The following day, I gave my paper at the conference on the cultural habits of violence and how to consider the conditions for peace. As it turned out, Clarke asked the first question. For me, it was a serious reflection on the events that had happened in France. He asked: What if people did not respond to the violence? What if people paused? Where might that lead us?

In our book *Inventing Peace* (2013), Wim Wenders and I discussed this idea: What would it mean to pause in response to tragic events?

How might that change the direction of people's anger and mourning at an individual as well as political level? Our book in many ways was a response to 9/11, and we considered the need to work toward a moral and visual language for peace. Because in our view, the over-saturation of information and images around the globe does not offer people the time to understand the effects of violence and war. A critical vocabulary for peace requires time and patience.

What can art bring to situations of violence? How does it provide an alternative means to our usual habits of mind and memory? In my view, art invites a different kind of embodiment and catharsis of experience. It can invite moments of grace, moments of reflection, and moments of forgiveness. In this way, art is like a placeholder to understand and reflect on violence without reproducing it. In the following two chapters, we consider how art can provide alternative possibilities and justice for people in two very different contexts and situations.

In Chapter 19, 'Genocide, Memory, and the Arts,' Clarke brings to light how art is a means for social healing, and how art is a tool for communities to restore dignity and to bring back value and meaning to people's lives. His work is a direct engagement with the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and its legacies. The two primary artworks discussed—'Upright Men' and 'The Garden of Memory'—engage with 'the role of art in a commemorative historical process' and how we remember and mourn tragedy. Both works represent through a visual means what might be considered as an 'unrepresentable' tragedy. In other words, how do you provide a visual means for the anguish and loss of people? Through his artistic response to post-genocide Rwanda, the artworks create a space for memory and mourning in which the immediate effects of violence and retaliation can never allow: the artworks become a 'visual' ground for social justice, the evocation of memory as a 'duty,' and the space for healing in people's lives. Of course, we can never fully comprehend people's experience of genocide, nor the violence that produced it, but we can respond in ways that may generate healing practices and understanding so that violent acts are *never* repeated.

For me, art provides a means to bring the 'unthinkable' and the unrepresentable into our lives and cultures. As I sketch in Chapter 20, 'A Notebook on Peace,' art most often, and in my case cinema in particular, can allow a space to approach and respond with sincerity to events rather than reacting in retaliation with the same force or violence. Specifically, I look at the humanitarian crisis in Greece through my film *Dogs*

of Democracy (2016), and the ways people respond to situations of crisis. And as I discuss in my chapter, to give the 'correct value' to people's lives and to restore their dignity are basic conditions for peace.

This echoes Simone Weil's beautiful words on justice: harm inflicted on people requires that we learn to truly listen and understand the suffering and anguish experienced. She writes:

> *Justice consists in seeing that no harm is done to men. Whenever a man cries inwardly: 'Why I am being hurt?' harm is being done to him. He is often mistaken when he tries to define the harm, and why and by whom it is being inflicted on him. But the cry itself is infallible. The other cry, which we hear so often: 'Why has somebody else got more than I have?', refers to rights. We must learn to distinguish between the two cries and to do all that is possible, as gently as possible, to hush the second one, with the help of a code of justice, regular tribunals, and the police. Minds capable of solving problems of this can be formed in a law school. But the cry, 'Why am I being hurt?' raises quite different problems, for which the spirit of truth, justice, and love is indispensable. . . . (2005, p.93).*

It is this cry that defies any logical reasoning and requires another emotional and reflective space. Art as a *teckne* (skill) in the Greek sense of the word can help to sharpen our vision of the world, and it can help to restore justice through the recognition and reflection on human suffering and the cultural effects of violence.

In addition to the original essays in the collection, this new edition includes Philip McDonagh's chapter 'Poetry and the Politics of the twenty-first Century.' This essay considers how poetry can provide a missing link in current social and political actions and diplomacy. At first glance, one might question the correlation between poetry and politics, but there is a direct and extremely important connection. Poetry, as McDonagh carefully outlines, is a vital vehicle for 'meeting,' a meeting that may open different questions of belief and ways of knowing. Following the theologian and philosopher Martin Buber, it may foster encounters that lead to understanding through the words that shape our images and thoughts, and the dreams that have yet to take on meaning. As McDonagh quotes, poetry has the quality of 'foreknowing the spirit of the events.'

It is in this sense that McDonagh's chapter offers glimpses into reality and action that may cultivate different approaches to understanding, reframing, and transforming a 'distorted social reality,' which has been

exacerbated since the publication of this book by the devastating effects of COVID-19 and the increased violence around the world through wars, including those in Sudan, Ukraine, and Gaza. However, what does this approach to political action require? Poetry can give us the courage to affirm values and trust that political change, like poetry itself, can offer insight into the yearnings and longings we face, whether related to climate, war, or the everyday silences that war creates. Indeed, what McDonagh is asking us to consider, or rather encounter, is that poetry can provide a language to feel and find solace when everything else may be crumbling around us. Drawing from the German poet Friedrich Hölderlin's line, 'poetically man dwells,' this dwelling is a testament to what both humans and non-human beings may endure. The legacy is that through poetical language and action, we may be able to remove judgment from politics and diplomacy and create a space for awe: a language that captures the beauty and sorrow of different accounts of truth.

References

Weil, Simone. 2005. *Simone Weil: An Anthology*, ed. Sian Miles. London: Penguin.

Wenders, Wim, and Mary Zournazi. 2013. *Inventing Peace*. London: IB Tauris.

Zournazi, Mary, director. 2016. *Dogs of Democracy*. Ronin Films. 58 min. http://www.roninfilms.com.au/feature/13955/dogs-of-democracy.html.

CHAPTER 19

Genocide, Memory, and the Arts: Memorial Projects in Rwanda of 'Upright Men' and 'The Garden of Memory'

Bruce Clarke

Abstract Politically engaged artist Bruce Clarke discusses his commemorative and memorial projects 'Upright Men' and 'The Garden of Memory.' Produced in Rwanda in the years following the Tutsi genocide, they are part of a long reflection on the role art can play in a commemorative historical process, with the condition that it arises from an informed position. Along with producing memorial spaces, the intention is to redefine the role of art as a historical discipline by situating the genocide in Rwanda into the public arena, both at home and around the world, so that it cannot be ignored. For Clarke, art is a tool for raising consciousness around this major historical event so often misrepresented in the West and at times subjected to denial theories.

B. Clarke (✉)
Paris, France
e-mail: bruce.clarke3@gmail.com

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_19

Keywords Bruce Clarke · Tutsi genocide · Memory · The arts · Memorial projects · Rwanda · Upright Men · The Garden of Memory

The artistic and commemorative project 'Upright Men' is part of a long reflection on the role of art in a commemorative historical process. The project was born from the desire to produce work-related memorial art forms to be presented during the twentieth commemorative ceremonies of the Tutsi genocide committed in Rwanda in 1994. The ceremonies traditionally take place during what is called the week of mourning from the seventh of April onwards. Particular importance was given to the twentieth ceremony in 2014 since twenty years is a landmark in human memory and a pretext to take stock of how Rwanda is coping in the healing process, psychologically and materially.

The last genocide of the twentieth century began in this small country in the heart of Africa on April 7, 1994. In less than one hundred days, around one million men, women, and children were killed in the indifference of the international community.[1] Looking at such horrors we cannot remain impassive. Memory becomes a duty. Duty to render justice—in a judicial sense—but also through assisting in the crystallization of lived memory into written or artistically represented 'history,' what could be called subjective justice owed to the victims (Ricoeur 2000). The intention is of course to assist in understanding the mechanisms and underlying historical complicities and complexities in the events, but on a more subjective level it is also to assist the individual survivor in continuing to live by placing traumatic experiences into context and within a collective healing process.

As well as producing memorial spaces, the objective of the project was also to place this traumatic event into the public arena so that it cannot be ignored; raising consciousness around this major historical episode so interlinked to European colonial history and simultaneously so often misrepresented in the West. 'Genocide' is generally defined as the will to exterminate part of a population for religious, ethnic, or social reasons and was theorized (even though the word did not exist) from the mid-nineteenth century in Europe and experimented in Namibia (German South-West Africa) for the first time against the Herrero population by the colonial authorities in 1903. It is now commonly accepted that it can only be perpetrated by a state structure with the organizational,

administrative, and military means that the state can mobilize (Lindqvist 1992).[2]

In the particular case of Rwanda, much of the ideology that fed the genocidal state came directly from Europe through the vanguard of the colonizers represented by members of religious congregations such as the White Fathers imposing a biblical reading of what they saw in Rwanda—the Tutsis were a lost tribe of Israel, descending from Abyssinia, guardians of the source of the Nile, et cetera. The notion of 'ethnic groups' had been introduced and codified in 1931 by the Belgian administration, who created ethnic identity cards. This ethnic classification served as the basis in post-independence Rwanda for the persecution of the Tutsi population and ultimately its elimination in 1994. André Perraudin, Archbishop of Kabgayi, published a pastoral letter in 1959 that reinforced the racist theory that the Hutu supremacists were developing (1997). Perraudin had previously advised his private secretary, Grégoire Kayibanda, in his writing of the 'Hutu Manifesto' in 1957—the 'bible' of Hutu Power. Kayibanda, with the benediction of the Belgian authorities, became the first post-independence president. With such ideological support from respected institutions, the first massacres in Rwanda against the Tutsi population in 1959—defined in racial terms as foreign exploiters by the archbishop—were perpetrated with impunity and even encouragement (Carney 2013). The slogans of genocide in 1994 often incited the Hutus to send the Tutsis back to where they came from via the Nile.

Misrepresentation, describing genocide in Rwanda as tribal or ancestral hatred between two communities, has hints of residual racism rather than scientific rigor.

This crime against humanity, long planned and mostly organized under the command of the extremist 'Hutu Power,' took place with the international community remaining largely indifferent in a context of hegemonic games between Western countries in the African Great Lakes region. Some of these countries, the United States (US) in 1998, Belgium in 2000, and the United Nations (UN) have partly recognized their responsibilities in the genocide of the Tutsis.[3] Yet, few concrete actions have been undertaken in favor of the survivors who continue to face the material and psychological consequences as well as revisionist theories or discourses trivializing the crime. Among the most important and obstinate revisionist writers in France, we can cite Pierre Péan and Stephen Smith.[4] Other forms of genocide denial or revisionism are more insidious: writers who talk of a 'double genocide' (the UN recognizes that genocide against

Tutsis in Rwanda is a fact which cannot be disputed. There was no genocide against any other section of the population), or dispute the figures to minimize the events. We can discuss the figures, but the intention and the planning of the genocide are irrefutable. A documentary shown by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 'Rwanda's Untold Story,' largely discredited by historians and scholars, nevertheless permeates into the public awareness.[5] Of course revisionism exists for all historic events, but the difference concerning Rwanda is the blurring of the line. Laws in Europe and the US are enforced against racism and revisionism; when talking of Rwanda, revisionism is often seen as an 'opinion' and not a crime.

The simple fact that so much effort is deployed to discredit the victims and their history indicates the stakes that have been set to rewrite history. It becomes imperative to affirm the memory of the victims in order to remind humanity that despite the expression of goodwill of 'never again' that followed the genocide of Armenians, Gypsies, and Jews, another genocide took place and we remained silent.

But how could we tell the story of an event of such horror executed with such efficiency? What role could art play in the process of commemoration? In general, visual representation is limited to the field of what is representable. Often, images lack decency and respect for the victims and their families. They also contribute to a trivialization of the horrific and ultimately of the horror itself. Is 'Art' able to touch the conscience and help the victims, inducing reverence, respect, and a human sense of the memory of the inhumane? A different type of artistic and perhaps therapeutic 're-presentation' could diminish the unbearable memories repressed in personnel souvenirs. For the artist, an artwork aims to question the spectator, not to give ready-made answers. Art possesses this ability to provoke curiosity and make one think. This is perhaps the best remedy against amnesia. Artwork is not the same as scientific historic work, but artistic representations can be a weapon against forgetfulness and play a complementary role to that of historians.

In August 1994, I traveled to Rwanda to make a photographic report on the problems of post-genocide reconstruction. Later, as a professional visual artist attempting to come to grips with contemporary history, I engaged in various art-related, citizen-based projects. In collaboration with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Rwandan authorities, and civil society associations, I conceived the project 'The Garden of Memory'—a collective memorial

work, currently in progress. Covering an area of one square kilometer, this garden is a place recalling the memory of the victims of genocide, and participates simultaneously in the mourning process of an entire nation. Rwandans are invited to pose a stone during ritual commemoration ceremonies each marked with the name or a mark remembering a missing person.

Confronted with the enormity of what the genocide was, we, as artists, were obliged to rethink the responses concerning forms of art or 'social therapy,' which might have been proposed in other circumstances—other circumstances, by definition, incomparable—genocide goes beyond everything. No science is adequate when faced with the scale of the social fracture existing in Rwanda after such an event. Art, some will say, is even less adequate.

However, the refusal to attempt to deal with the events through art could have been interpreted as ignoring or forgetting them, erasing them from history, indirectly giving weight to revisionist theories.

There was thus a multiple challenge facing us. How would it be possible that a memorial, a 'work of art,' render justice to the enormity of the event: genocide committed against a part of the Rwandan people? Secondly, how could the form of the 'memorial sculpture' be dignified and yet communicate the immensity of the event to as many people as possible?

Lastly, would we be able to integrate into its very creation a commemorative ceremony, a cathartic and pedagogic process involving as many people as possible? And could that process help to heal wounds?

Philosophy of 'The Garden of Memory'

It was necessary to design a 'sculpture' that took account of the following elements:

- The number of victims (approximately one million);
- The space and volume represented by this number;
- Popular perceptions of what art is. A work of art is often seen as elitist, individualist, and could be interpreted as contrary to the sensibilities of a wounded community;
- The importance of community participation in the construction of the memorial. We wanted the construction to be cathartic and help rebuild the social tissue;

- The importance of implicating Rwandan and foreign artists and intellectuals. Firstly, because artistic expertise is essential in the creation of memorials and monuments; secondly, even if the notion seems outdated, there is a moral duty of commitment. A genocide concerns the whole of humanity not just those who have the nationality or the religion of the victims. Since we are part of this humanity, we indirectly negate our own humanity if we refuse actions of recognition and memory by 'leaving it to others.'

The Garden

One million stones, each bearing the name or a distinctive sign of a victim, were to be posed on a site of approximately one square kilometer. The stones posed from a central point gradually opening out toward the periphery, as the 'Garden' becomes larger. In this way, after posing the first stones, more and more people were able to participate in the ceremony without hindering each other. As the stones were placed, the design of the memorial took on a form representing the terraced hills of Rwanda.

The stones were placed by members or friends of the victim's family in the course of commemorative ceremonies conducted by individuals or by members of survivors' associations. The ceremony is a long-term, ongoing process. In the months or years following the institutional ceremonies in April each year, individuals are able to come and place a stone in memory. The garden thus grows on its initial site even after its official inauguration.

Anonymous stones are given the identity of the victims, a marker for memory—individual and collective remembrance of victims (Fig. 19.1).

The 'Upright Men' Project

The 'Upright Men' project proposed to complement the work already in place at the massacre and memorial sites of the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, and to give this work an artistic and international significance. It followed 'The Garden of Memory' and was designed specifically for the twentieth commemoration in 2014, even though it has been developed and continued since.

In Rwanda, the commemoration of the genocide is held every year in April. It plays an important part in the individual and collective grieving process and the perpetuation of the memory of the events of 1994, but

Fig. 19.1 'The Garden of Memory'
Ceremony at the Garden of Memory with young survivors, 2009, Photo: Bruce Clarke

is also a way to fight against renewed genocidal tendencies and other revisionist processes of a historical event. April 2014 marked the twentieth anniversary of the Tutsi genocide. Working with the Rwandan authorities and civil society organizations, the 'Upright Men' project played a role in the 2014 commemorations not only in Rwanda, but also in many cities across Europe.

The principle of 'Upright Men' is to represent in painted form men, women, and children on the outside of buildings, places of memory, and other sites of the 1994 massacres in Rwanda. The figures are larger than life, often six to eight meters high, silhouettes sketched with a strong affirmed presence. They are symbols of the dignity of human beings who lived and died in this barbarous genocide. Victims or survivors, these 'Upright Men' stand with dignity as testimonials to the painful history. The intention is to give presence to the victims, restoring their individuality, and reaffirming their status in the human community. The painted figures, every one different, will be emblems of the nobility of the men, women, and children engulfed by the violence, but who nevertheless, are

still, from a spiritual point of view, upright and dignified. The genocidal project which began with the dehumanizing process of Rwandans themselves has failed: the survivors stand with dignity. The sites of massacres themselves will be marked by the symbolic presence so that no one can forget what took place in the buildings: schools, churches, and municipal buildings—all symbols of moral and political authority.

An international dimension was given to 'Upright Men.' As part of the twentieth commemorative ceremonies of the Tutsi genocide in 2014, it became the visual symbol around which commemorative ceremonies were held in Paris, Lausanne, Geneva, Brussels, and elsewhere. Fifteen cities in all hosted the project, as well as Kigali. The international community was able to pay homage in different ways with the backdrop of 'Upright Men,' remembering their own implication (or not) in the events that led to the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, reflecting on the mechanisms, complicity, and notions of justice for the victims. When there was no possibility to paint directly on buildings, other types of representation of 'Upright Men' were created: large-scale printed images on cloth sheets hung in different places, or light projections of these same figures on building façades, for example, as was done on the Lausanne Cathedral or on historical buildings in Ouida (Fig. 19.2).

Justification

Artistic representations, in all eras or conditions of production, contribute to the construction of memory in such a way that in time, years later, they can become the only records of the event. Artwork has played a testimonial role in historic events throughout humanity relating to personal or collective memory often more than other media. 'It is Guernica [by Picasso] an artwork, which reminds us today, over [seventy] years after it happened, of the tragedy of the small Basque village, not the newspapers of the time or scholarly history textbooks' (Clair 1997).

'Upright Men' and 'The Garden of Memory' arose from what now seems an evident observation: a genocide can take place only when the cultural links that keep society together have been disintegrated. After the genocide, a work of cultural reconstruction, even if it seems futile or derisory, is essential. Beyond the act of making visible and intelligible symbols, culture plays a part together with other metaphorical and spiritual tools in repairing as well as in essential healing processes. It is important to restore cultural forms, a fortiori, by promoting the active

Fig. 19.2 'Upright Men'
Upright Men project as projected on Rwamagama Church. Photo: Bruce Clarke, 2014

involvement of people who become actors and supporters of the creative project.

Mural art is part of a long tradition—from the religious frescoes to contemporary graffiti. Western art has been dominated by murals, especially in the ecclesiastical context. They became a veritable institution in Mexico. Mural art is also used by many contemporary artists; for instance, Ernest Pignon-Ernest made a series of serigraphy images on the walls of churches in Naples, or the famous screen printings of the South African Pietà on the walls of Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban. Far from being iconoclastic, the project of 'Upright Men' belongs to a long tradition while commemorating a contemporary and historic event. These paintings will mark walls with the memory of the victims and the dignity of the Rwandan people.

Furthermore, this technique of public art makes art and history accessible to everyone, including people from outside Rwanda. The reproduction of 'Upright Men' on the facades of important places in the world created a symbolic bridge between the people of Rwanda and the

international community; this is extremely important since our history is intimately linked with theirs. Genocide by definition is a crime against humanity; it therefore concerns everybody without exception. Moreover, certain responsibilities and complicities must be highlighted and recognized in order to collectively honor the victims and affirm the dignity of a people rising from its ashes.

The strength of the artwork comes from the fact that it has been reproduced in many sites. 'Upright Men' embodies the assertion of a people who remain standing and dignified. In Rwanda, these men, women, and children will say to the passersby that here lived and died people who we will not forget. Elsewhere, 'Upright Men' will help to make known the history of the Tutsi genocide and to question the role of the international community by creating a bridge of solidarity between the Rwandans and the world.

Notes

1. The UN figure of victims is around 800,000. The Rwandan government gives the figure of 1,074,017 dead (Republic of Rwanda, Minister of Local Administration, 2002). The real figure is unknown. 'Ethnic' quotas had been fixed by the post-independance governments, and the administration in pre-genocide Rwanda expressly underestimated the Tutsi population in order to limit the number of Tutsis in all walks of life.
2. Lindqvist's work is extremely interesting for the fact that it was published two years before the genocide in Rwanda, but describes the mecanisms in place in other contexts that fit exactly into the Rwanda model.
3. Belgian Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt, in Rwanda (April 7, 1998): 'I confirm that the international community as a whole carries a huge and heavy responsibility in the genocide. Here before you I assume the responsibility of my country, the Belgian political and military authorities.'.
4. Pierre Péan, a leading French journalist close to the spheres of power and their 'services,' in his book *Noires fureurs, blancs menteurs* (*Black Fury, White Liars*), was accused of racism and genocide denial by human rights and anti-racist groups in court in France. Péan was found 'not guilty' because of technicalities. Stephen Smith was a journalist at Libération and then Le Monde. Against all evidence,

Smith, proposes the Machiavelic theory that Paul Kagamé purposely shot down Habyarama's plane knowing that the act would start a genocide and enable him to take power. His articles systematically try to undermine the government in place.

5. A group of forty-eight people, including former president of the International Committee of the Red Cross Cornelio Sommaruga, Bishop Ken Barham, and investigative journalist, author, and professor Linda Melvern, wrote to BBC's Director-General Tony Hall to express concern over the documentary. Their letter claimed that the BBC had been 'recklessly irresponsible' in airing the film, said it contained serious inaccuracies, and claimed part of its content promoted genocide denial (see Baird, 2015).

References

Baird, Dugald. 2015. BBC Rejects Complaint Over Controversial Rwanda Genocide Documentary. *The Guardian*. http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/apr/10/bbc-rejects-complaint-rwanda-genocide-documentary. Accessed on 7 Sept 2015.

Carney, J.J. 2013. *Rwanda Before the Genocide: Catholic Politics and Ethnic Discourse in the Late Colonial Era*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clair, Jean. 1997. *La responsabilité de l'artiste*. Paris: Gallimard.

Lindqvist, Sven. 1992. *Exterminate All the Brutes: One Man's Odyssey into the Heart of Darkness and the Origins of European Genocide*. New York: The New Press.

Péan, Pierre. 2005. *Noires fureurs, blancs menteurs: Rwanda 1990–1994*. Paris: Éditions Fayard.

Perraudin, André. 1997. *Lettre Pastorale de Monseigneur Perraudin, Vicaire Apostolique de Kabgayi, pour le Carême de 1959, le 11 février 1959*. In *Rwanda: un peuple avec une histoire*, ed. C. M. Overdulve, 121ff. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Ricoeur, Paul. 2000. *La Mémoire, l'Histoire, l'Oubli*. Paris: Seuil.

CHAPTER 20

A Notebook on Peace: Reflections on Cinema and Perception

Mary Zournazi

Abstract Mary Zournazi looks at questions of violence and the urgent need to invent a visual and moral language for peace in her chapter, "A Notebook on Peace: Reflections on Cinema and Perception." Her film *Dogs of Democracy* (2016) captures the care and concern people have for the street animals in Athens, a city facing social and economic crises. She touches on the problem of perception, namely that people's perceptions of the world differ from the ways in which people live and experience it. Art most often—and cinema in Zournazi's case—provides the space to approach and respond to violent situations with sincerity rather than reacting in retaliation with the same force or violence. She also reflects on filmmakers who respond to violence without reproducing it.

Keywords Mary Zournazi · Violence · Peace · Art · Cinema · *Dogs of Democracy* · Athens · Perception

M. Zournazi (✉)
Sydney, Australia
e-mail: zourna12@gmail.com

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_20

In 2014, I took my first-ever trip to Athens. I had arrived in the middle of the city and in the middle of a crisis. It was a tense time as the country was in the grips of austerity measures put forward by the European institutions, and the tension was palpable. But at the same time, I became fascinated by another layer of city life: the stray dogs of Athens and the people who take care of them. This relationship with the city and the diversity of its life became the focus and inspiration for my essay-style documentary, *Dogs of Democracy* (2016). In this film, I look at the care and concern people have for the street animals, and I became intrigued by the human capacity for kindness and care, and what this care might say about the ability to respond differently to social and economic crisis.

In many ways, *Dogs of Democracy* is a response to the conditions of violence in everyday life, and it sits within the framework of a larger project I have been involved in with German Film Director Wim Wenders, called *Inventing Peace* (2013). This book we co-authored is our response to the problem of how to deal with violence. We pose the question of *how we look at the world but do not see it*, when there is so much injustice, suffering, and violence? And following from this: what are the ethical and moral consequences of looking but not seeing, and most of all what has become of the notion of peace in all of this? We consider the urgent need to invent a visual and moral language for peace and how this language for peace is directly related to the question of perception.

In this paper, I will sketch some issues around perception and the making of *Dogs of Democracy*, and I will reflect on filmmakers who respond to violence without reproducing it. Art most often, and cinema in this case, can allow a space to approach and respond with sincerity to violent situations rather than reacting in retaliation with the same force or violence. It is some of these techniques or skills that I will explore in this short notebook on peace.

A Method for Peace

The problem of perception concerns how we 'look' at the world, which is often very different from the ways in which we live and experience it. This 'looking' became obvious to me in Greece, and I felt that there was a certain responsibility to provide alternative ways to understand the conditions of austerity and people's everyday suffering. Very often we are struck by the violence or suffering of people and events, but we do not have the means or tools to respond to the suffering and violence. Rather, we often

see it as the legacy of the poor or the dispossessed, something that seems distant and remote to our usual lives. This is part of our cultural habits of violence and its representation.

In the early part of the twentieth century, the French philosopher Henri Bergson wrote about the problem of human habits and perception in response to the scientific thinking and philosophy of his time (1991). Today, his writing gives us a method to consider the problem of suffering and the question of violence. For Bergson, the problem of perception in a philosophical as well as an ordinary sense is that of badly stated questions or problems: humans tend to pose questions that assume 'correct' answers or absolute truths. So while it is necessary to acknowledge the structures of violence that frame so much of our cultural habits and perceptions of peace rather than repeating these habits of mind and memory, we must pose new questions.

So how do we address the question of peace?

Bergson offers some clues. For Bergson, all creative enterprise, all forms of invention, rest in the power to decide, to constitute problems in themselves; that is, to invent what did not exist. For Bergson, there is a difference between inventing and discovery. Discovery is what might already exist, actually or virtually, so it will happen sooner or later. We might say then, as Bergson writes, to invent 'gives being to what did not exist; it might never have happened' (1992, p. 51).

For Bergson, invention comes out of the creative potential of mind and memory. Essentially speaking, life itself is about energy and movement; the material world moves through a continual flow of time (duration), just as the mind inhabits the world of memory and imagination. In this view, our individual lives are quintessentially embodied time, the creative flows and energies that arise out of the *real* as it is lived and actualized. So all worldly experience exists in the realm of time that is indivisible. We are immersed in time that co-exists on different levels and planes of experience (i.e., memories, feelings, and habits), whether we perceive them or not.

Inventing, then, arises out of a different understanding of time and space. Cinema allows for the evocation of different layers of memory and experience. It makes us aware of the perceptions of time; each film is made up of different moments that altogether can transform the space and time of seeing. Seeing here involves all of our senses, memory, and technologies, since to look today is a combination of these factors, the methods or techniques in which we constitute ourselves, our ethical realm, and

our encounters with each other. As the philosopher Gilles Deleuze once noted, cinema is a kind of thinking in action.[1] It is this movement of thought that provides alternative truths and emotional realities, as cinema can change our perceptions toward events whether they be fact or fiction. In this regard, cinema opens the potential for modern ethics as it relates to how we see and how we can make sense of the world.

Let us consider some of these movements or moments of invention that can provide alternative means and conditions for peace.

Techniques for Peace

While I was filming *Dogs of Democracy*, I spent months wandering around the city of Athens following dogs as they led me to different encounters and adventures, and I began to learn from the animals. The dogs provided me with a way of seeing the world that was substantially different to my usual habits and to my usual ways of seeing. It was in the observing and partaking in the dogs' reality that something different changed in mine. I began to crouch down and film them from their height, their eye level—and somehow in this stance I was able to inhabit the space of other (the dog in this case)—and in this stance a bond or relationship was formed. This relationship to the camera and my role as a filmmaker came almost intuitively after many years of respectful watching and learning from the Japanese filmmaker Yasujiro Ozu.

Ozu has a style of filming that allows a certain grace to enter into the cinematic space: most of Ozu's shots 'are done from eye level of somebody sitting on a tatami floor. This is a very defenseless peaceful position' (Wenders and Zournazi 2013, pp. 95–96). From this seated position, a more peaceful and relaxed response to the film provides a certain intimacy and connection with Ozu's characters. Through our *being* with his characters rather than objectifying or judging them, we are invited to partake in a certain generosity and care toward them. For me, this 'caring look' involved the filming of the dogs that became part of a way to tell a story about a humanitarian and economic crisis in Greece. This look is also about the responsibility and respect to what is witnessed and experienced. The philosopher and theologian Martin Buber writes that genuine responsibility for what we see and encounter in this world exists only when there is real responding to each other, for what happens to one, for what is seen, felt and heard.

For Buber, genuine responsibility arises 'between man and man,' but this relationship is not limited to the traffic between humans; it is about *becoming aware* of all things, the world as we encounter it and its sacredness. As Buber writes:

> It by no means needs to be a man of whom I become aware. It can be an animal, a plant, a stone. No kind of appearance or event is fundamentally excluded from the series of things through which from time to time something is said to me. Nothing can refuse to be the vessel for the Word. The limits of the possibility of dialogue are the limits of awareness (2002, p. 12).

Buber's account of becoming aware is to observe, and to observe has a special function in the sense of justice and equality, since to observe involves the whole of an experience, not just getting stuck in the fragments of what we see with our limited vision. Etymologically speaking, observe contains the word to 'serve'; service in this light is not exploitation, but humility and respect. In the context of Greece, this *becoming aware* concerns the need to restore dignity and hope as well as the conditions for democracy. Since we are concerned with inventing peace, we might say this service to reality is the only true function of peace.

'Sincere Witness' to Life

During my research and filming of the dogs in Athens, I encountered several different protests. I would most often film the protests as part of the documenting of the city and the conditions of austerity. I would witness people coming together, gathering in response to the austerity measures, often in joyful and peaceful ways. Toward the end of one particular protest, there was an orchestrated movement of protestors who started to throw petrol bombs, and this led to a clash with the riot police. Essentially what was a moment of the gathering of people in a peaceful way became the discombobulation of a crowd. Television crews and other photographic media moved straight toward the chaos in order to circulate the 'dramatic' event, which time after time we see only as riot police and tear gas at the anti-austerity rallies. What remains in most people's memory is the violence of the situation rather than people's active and often peaceful involvement, and the different layers of people's memory and experience. This could be true of any event or crisis in the world.

To observe details of events and to give what we might call the 'correct value' to things, not as absolute truths, but the details that we might ordinarily refuse to see is a basic condition for peace. As the Russian filmmaker Andrei Tarkovsky writes, 'the cinema image... is basically observation of life's facts within time' (1986, p. 68). In Tarkovsky's view, to be faithful to life's encounters is what matters in spiritual and artistic enterprise; once events or encounters are 'interpreted' without respect for the encounter, there is a loss of the uniqueness of experience, there is no genuine dialogue with the event. He writes:

> . . . one has to observe life at first hand, not to make do with banalities of a hollow counterfeit constructed for the sake of acting and of screen expressiveness. I think the truth of these remarks would be borne out if we were to ask our friends to tell us, for instance, of deaths which they themselves have witnessed: I'm sure we should be amazed by the details of those scenes, by the individual reactions of the people concerned, above all by the incongruity of it all – and, if I may use such an inappropriate term, by the expressiveness of those deaths. . .
>
> A group of soldiers is being lined up to be shot for treason in front of the ranks. They are waiting among the puddles by a hospital wall. It's autumn. They are ordered to take off their coats and boots. One of them spends a long time walking about among the puddles, in his socks which are full of holes, looking for a dry place to put down the coat and boots which a minute later he will no longer need.
>
> Again. A man is run over by a tram and has his leg cut off. They prop him up against the wall of a house and he sits there, under the shameless gaze of a gawping crowd, and waits for the ambulance to arrive. Suddenly he can't bear it any longer, takes a handkerchief out of his pocket, and lays it over the stump of his leg.
>
> Expressive, indeed.
>
> Of course it's not a question of collecting real incidents of that kind as it were against a rainy day. What we are talking about is being faithful to the truth of the characters and circumstances rather than to the superficial appeal of an interpretation in 'images' (1986, pp. 25–26).

When Tarkovsky speaks of the incongruity of death and the examples of our response to the horrible and obscene, what he points to is a care and respect for what is witnessed. The sincerity or respect that follows this kind of faithful observation can create the space for different voices to be heard. In some ways, this sensibility offers a way to respond to violence without violence.

Dogs of Democracy gave me the opportunity to bear witness to the dogs and the people of Athens, and in this witnessing I was able to tell a story about austerity and life on the streets. This became part of a telling a story about the tragedy of the loss of people's dignity and hope in the context of Greece, for it is in the space in which respect toward the difference of people's lives and how they are lived that we can be sincere witnesses for them. Italian filmmaker Federico Fellini once regarded cinema as a 'sincere witness' to people's lives.[2] It is the necessity of this sincere relationship to life, and the genuine responsibility to situations that can guide our practice and responses to them.

In this short notebook of reflections on cinema, perception, and peace, I have suggested that peace is a very concrete engagement with the world, and the conditions for it arise out of our genuine responsibility toward it. From this perspective, peace—rather than being a static idea—is a *continual* process of transformation and change. In the realm of art and its potential, it offers a way to move beyond violence—it can allow us to take the time to respond to events, and to register memory and meaning that we might otherwise refuse to see. And in many ways this capacity to *see* is only limited by our imaginations and our attitude toward how we take care and *look* at the world.

Notes

1. See Deleuze's books on cinema for an interesting reworking of Bergson, and for his unique development of a cinematic language of analysis (1986, 1989).
2. See Fellini's autobiographical film, *Federico Fellini: Un autoritratto ritrovato*, 2000. In Fellini's case, his work involved a certain incongruity and magical realism between the detail of events and experience that helped to sharpen a vision about peoples loves, lives, and tragedies.

References

Bergson, Henri. 1991. *Matter and Memory*, translated by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer. New York: Zone Books.

Bergson, Henri. 1992. *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics*, translated by Mabelle L. Andison. New York: Citadel Press.

Buber, Martin. 2002. *Between Man and Man, translated by Ronald Gregor Smith*. New York: Routledge.

Deleuze, Gilles. 1986. *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, translated by Barbara Habberjam and Hugh Tomlinson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Deleuze, Gilles. 1989. *Cinema 2: The Time-Image, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta*. London: Continuum.

Fellini, Federico. 2000. *Federico Fellini: Un autoritratto ritrovato* (*Fellini Narrates: A Discovered Self-Portrait*). Radiotelevisione Italiana. 68 min.

Tarkovsky, Andrei. 1986. *Sculpting in Time*, translated by Kitty Hunter-Blair. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Wenders, Wim, and Mary Zournazi. 2013. *Inventing Peace: A Dialogue on Perception*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Zournazi, Mary, director. 2016. *Dogs of Democracy*. Ronin Films. 58 min. http://www.roninfilms.com.au/feature/13955/dogs-of-democracy.html.

CHAPTER 21

Poetry and the Politics of the Twenty-First Century

Philip McDonagh

Abstract This chapter examines the public, prophetic role of many poets, from Hesiod in ancient Greece to Thomas Moore, W.B. Yeats, and Seamus Heaney in modern Ireland. The mission of the American poet Robert Frost to Moscow in 1962 is an early example of détente. Poetry can help to supply the 'missing ingredient' in contemporary diplomacy, namely the capacity for cross-cultural deliberation and discernment in a long-term perspective. Poetry can 'foreknow the spirit of events,' opening a window on the future. Poetry is a meeting place; the celebration of poetry complements the day-to-day business of party politics and international bargaining. Poetry is a way of seeing; it allows for complexity. To recognize the 'poetic truth' of a situation is to discern the seeds of change that lie beneath the surface of politics. There is a 'poetic truth' that on all sides, the men, women, and children damaged by conflict are the victims of a situation beyond their control. Therefore, part of our responsibility

P. McDonagh (✉)
Dublin, Ireland
e-mail: philip.mcdonagh@dcu.ie

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_21

is to regain control, reframing and transforming a distorted social reality. Poetry can give us the courage to affirm our deepest values and to trust that political change, like poetry itself, is in the end 'given'.

Keywords Philip McDonagh · Poetry · Politics · Seamus Heaney · Truth · Discernment

Introduction

In her autobiography (in Chapter 4, 'The Trouble with a Book …'), the English writer Jeanette Winterson (2012) tells us about her visits to the public library as a schoolgirl and how poetry provided her with a path to self-respect amid a repressive home environment: "A tough life needs a tough language—and that is what poetry is. That is what literature offers—a language powerful enough to say how it is. It isn't a hiding place, it's a finding place." This "finding place" has been affirmed under the most extreme circumstances, for example, by Primo Levi at Auschwitz and by Osip Mandelstam and Anna Akhmatova under Stalin. Why is poetry a lifeline in times of crisis? Poetry allows an underlying truth to engage with an imposed orthodoxy. In the words of the Irish poet Seamus Heaney (1987, p. 47):

> *What looks the strongest has outlived its term*:
> the future lies with what's affirmed from under.

Homer's *Iliad*, the first Western poem, was composed for recitation during an evening of celebration. It contradicts the flux of time, the apparent meaninglessness of history, and our fear that human life matters very little. In this chapter, I argue that poetry can open a window to the future, offer hope, and even become a pathway toward a global 'culture of encounter' and a reconciled world. First, I will examine the public or prophetic role of a select number of major poets. Second, I will apply the lessons learned from these explorations to the global situation in 2024.

Hesiod as Prefiguring Greek Democracy

From the very beginning of the Western literary tradition, poetry has engaged with the shared public world and grappled with the question, "What kind of reality do we want to live in?" The true poet is identified by his relationship to the Muses. Consider these lines from the opening passage of Hesiod's *Theogony* (Lattimore 1959):

> And it was they who once taught Hesiod
> his splendid singing
> as he was shepherding his lambs
> on holy Helikon …

The encounter with the Muses guarantees the 'givenness' of the poet's vision and provides him with the requisite credentials to assume a public role. The Muses dance by the altar of Zeus. They sing of the gods, celebrating "Zeus, the holder of the aegis, and Hera his lady of Argos, who treads on golden sandals." When Hesiod in the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days* turns to human history ("what is, and what is to be, and what was before now") and to personifications of political ideas such as Justice and Good Order, these themes appear as a continuation of the poet's and the Muses' interest in the gods and the origins of the universe.

We receive joy and consolation from the Muses:

> ... even
> when a man …
> is struck to wonder over the grief
> in his heart, the singer,
> the servant of the Muses …
> makes him presently forget his cares,
> he no longer remembers
> sorrow, for the gifts of the goddesses
> soon turn his thoughts elsewhere.

Through the Muses, poetry is associated with justice and mediation. Hesiod describes how the Muses inspire a certain kind of ruler or judge:

> ... his people
> all look in his direction as he judges
> their cases

with straight decisions, and,
by an unfaltering declaration
can put a quick and expert end even
to a great quarrel:
... when the people
have gone astray in assembly [such rulers]
lightly turn back their actions
to the right direction, talking them over
with gentle arguments …

Poetry is not an experience detached from the norms of ordinary life. The Odyssey gives us a picture of a bard at work, carried away as he plays a stringed instrument to a receptive audience: "… a man gazes on a bard whom the gods have taught to sing songs of loveliness to mortals … they would gladly listen to him forever..." There is a hint of trance, of *being filled with a god* ('enthusiasm'), in the performance of such a poet. The Greeks were always aware that an emotional state can produce a loss of personal equilibrium. By contrast, in Hesiod's encounter with the Muses, there is no suggestion of divine possession, shamanism, altered states of consciousness, magic, hysteria, or the use of hallucinogenic drugs. The inspiration of the Muses leads us toward a deeper understanding of reality, but only on condition that the poet exercises careful discernment in the light of reason. "We know how to say many false things/that seem like true sayings," sing Hesiod's Muses. Our subjective awareness of being in possession of truth is capable of being deceived; the poet's powerful gift is capable of being misdirected. This insight prevents poets from turning themselves into an army of tyrants who argue that "because we are poets, we are always right." A poem can be checked against criteria that we bring to it from other parts of our lives. Reason balances inspiration.

In personifying the source of truth, claiming a personal relationship with that source, experiencing consolation, and directing his attention outwards toward the place of humanity in the world, Hesiod establishes both freedom of conscience and a belief in the possibility of creative action. Poetry, as understood by Hesiod, accompanies the search for explanation and accountability in the community. Hesiod prefigures the Greek polis and Greek democracy.

Thomas Moore and a Lifeline to the Future

The three most influential Irish poets of the past two centuries are Thomas Moore, W.B. Yeats, and Seamus Heaney. These three 'national poets' share with Hesiod the belief in the truth-value and political significance of poetry. They distinguish between a conventional understanding of situations and the poet's insight into the true nature of justice and the hidden seeds of change. All three see poetry as a place of reconciliation, creating points of contact between asymmetrical narratives. Seamus Heaney, like Hesiod, emphasizes the analogy between the 'givenness' of poetic inspiration and the 'givenness' of political change.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, Thomas Moore was famous across Europe and throughout the English-speaking world. It has been said of Moore that "loyalty to the betrayed" is the source of his inspiration. Moore dedicated his long creative life to salvaging remnants of ancient Irish culture following the defeat of the 1798 rebellion. His core strategy involved adapting ancient harp music to poems he had written in English. A distinctive feature of Moore's (1807) thinking was his belief that artistic beauty could ultimately reconcile the oppressor with the oppressed:

> The stranger shall hear thy lament on his plains,
> The sigh of thy harp shall be sent o'er the deep,
> Till thy masters themselves, as they rivet thy chains,
> Shall pause at the song of their captive and weep!

Faced with the near-destruction of Irish identity as previously understood and the practical impossibility of revolution, Thomas Moore's response was to adopt a long-term perspective, using literature as a lifeline to the future. In fact, Moore achieved several difficult feats at once. He preserved the essence of the disappearing Gaelic culture within models provided by English poetry and thereby gave encouragement to those whose "spirit was broken." He established cultural common ground between the dispossessed and the elite, and he promoted a love of Irish culture in the salons and country houses of England. Like his contemporaries, Pushkin in Russia and the Irish apostle of non-violence, Daniel O'Connell, Moore abhorred the uncontrollable destruction that violence could unleash. His generous and 'inclusive' approach is one of the sources of modern Irish identity, which values accommodation

in Northern Ireland and maintains good and close relations with our neighboring island.

W.B. Yeats and the Truce of the Muses

In his Nobel lecture of 1923, W.B. Yeats (1995, p. 559) tells us that a generation earlier, in the 1890s, he thought that Ireland would be like 'soft wax' for years to come, and that literature could help shape its future. Over the next thirty years, Yeats dedicated himself to creating a 'national literature' for Ireland in the English language. He clearly understood his political stance: the necessity of uniting Catholics and Protestants and avoiding hatred toward England.

On the first point, Yeats believed the Irish literary movement should create "a true, cultivated patriotic class," one that "for the first time unites Montagu and Capulet." His interest in Irish traditions and myth was partly about recognizing "village values" as opposed to the values of industrialized urban centers. However, it was also an attempt to discover source material in Irish tradition that was neither specifically Catholic nor specifically Protestant. Writing about another poet, Yeats argued that the folk traditions of Ireland were "living waters for the healing of our nation." An example from Yeats's (2001, p. 27) own work is *The Countess Cathleen*, which draws on folk themes to discuss the impact of famine, rising prices, and the absence of hope on the moral character of society.

Regarding attitudes toward England, Yeats expressed his perspective as one of rising above melodrama and party spirit. In 1900, he wrote, "[T]o transmute the anti-English passion into a passion of hatred against the vulgarity of a materialism whereon England founds her worst life … has always been a dream of mine" (Foster 1997, p. 227). A generation later, Yeats was even clearer. In his autobiographical work *The Trembling of the Veil*, published in 1922, he states the following:

> All the past has been turned into a melodrama with Ireland for blameless hero . . . It was all the harder to substitute for that melodrama a nobler form of art, because there really had been, however different in their form, villain and victim; yet fight that rancour I must . . . (Yeats 1995, p. 206).

In search of "living waters for the healing of the nation" and "a nobler form of art," Yeats developed a vision of the role of literature that echoes those of Thomas Moore, Alexander Pushkin, and Percy Bysshe Shelley in

his *Defence of Poetry* (2003). According to this vision, poetry and literature should inspire people to be their best selves, foster a disposition toward following the truth, and enable gradual political change.

In November 1914, Yeats was the main speaker at an event commemorating the centenary of the birth of Thomas Davis, a poet and political leader. Beside Yeats on the platform were two fellow poets, Patrick Pearse and Thomas Kettle, who held opposing views on the question of recruitment into the British army. Pearse was executed in 1916, while Kettle died on the Western Front later that same year. In this noble company, Yeats (1947) opened his speech with a resounding defense of the mediating role of poetry:

> In Ireland above all nations, where we have so many bitter divisions, it is necessary to keep always unbroken the truce of the Muses.

He argued for generosity toward opponents:

> We struggle for a nation, not for a party, and our political opponents who have served Ireland in some other way may be the better patriots.

At the end of the lecture, Yeats tried to give expression to what, in his perspective, was missing in Ireland:

> ... a light that is the discovery of truth … a sweetness that is obedience to its will.

Similarly, Yeats argues in his Nobel Lecture that the role of the theatre is to "teach reality and justice" in the face of "revolutionary frenzy"—the latter phrase surely an allusion to Bolshevism as much as to events in Ireland.

Yeats's strongest statements about poetry and politics are the negative ones, about what happens when truth gives way to illusion, and reverence for beauty is lost. This famous passage is from 'Meditations in Time of Civil War' (Yeats 1928):

> We had fed the heart on fantasies,
> The heart's grown brutal from the fare;
> More substance in our enmities
> Than in our love...

If the Ireland of Yeats's youth was like "soft wax," what did Yeats make of Irish history as it actually unfolded? The key text is the Nobel Lecture. When Parnell fell from power in Ireland in 1891, "a disillusioned and embittered Ireland turned from parliamentary politics; an event was conceived; and the race began... to be troubled by that event's long gestation." The event in Irish history to which Yeats refers as having a long gestation is, of course, the 1916 rebellion and the unpredictable sequence of happenings up to 1923 when the lecture was given. Somewhat like Pushkin in the late 1820s, Yeats in the 1920s suffers the fate of a prophet who senses that political developments have passed beyond his own ability to influence them. One might ask whether the themes of Yeats's later poetry—his interest in the trends of world history beyond Ireland, his celebration of art and Indian philosophy, his poems of old age—are a reaction to his Irish political experience.

Heaney, Hope, and History

W.B. Yeats (1990, p. 251) includes in his poems of civil war a prayer of hope:

> . . . O honey-bees,
> Come build in the empty house of the stare . . .

The honey-bees were busy in late-twentieth century Irish poetry. Throughout their long careers, Seamus Heaney, Michael Longley, and Derek Mahon protected an interpersonal space free of prejudice, observing the "truce of the Muses" called for by Yeats in 1914 (Yeats 1947). These poets made significant contributions to the moral and political breakthroughs in Northern Ireland, on the island of Ireland, and in relations between Ireland and Britain. Heaney's Nobel Lecture came soon after the IRA cessation of violence in 1994 and not long before the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement of 1998.

Looking at Heaney's career from the perspective of 2024, we can see how it is centered on the years from 1968 onwards, during which a political accommodation was found. This accommodation, achieved with great difficulty on all sides, continues the unfinished political business of Yeats's lifetime. In fact, a trajectory can be traced from Thomas Moore, writing between the disastrous war of 1798 and the famine of the 1840s, through Yeats and the period of 'gestation,' to Heaney and the recent agreements.

Of these three great poets, Seamus Heaney has the most comprehensive and hopeful vision of how poetry can help to transform society.

Two influential poets mentioned by Heaney in his Nobel Lecture are Osip Mandelstam and Anna Akhmatova, key figures in the 'Acmeist' literary movement in pre-revolutionary St. Petersburg. 'Acmeism' sought to distance itself from 'symbolism' and later, from various movements that emerged before, during, and after the revolution in support of the Bolshevik agenda. Mandelstam and Akhmatova did not intend to challenge public authorities, command a particular audience, or promote a specific agenda for change. However, their keen observations of ordinary life made them "disturbers of meaning," as Mandelstam described. They disrupted conventional thinking and, above all, rejected any ideological perspective that would supplant the poet's response to reality (Mandelstam 1991). Heaney reflects on this in his Nobel Lecture (1995, p. 16):

> . . . there are times when a deeper need enters, when we want the poem to be not only pleasurably right but compellingly wise, not only a surprising variation on the world, but a re-tuning of the world itself. We want what the woman wanted in the prison queue in Leningrad . . . asking the poet Anna Akhmatova if she could describe it all, if her art could be equal to it.

What does Heaney mean by "re-tuning the world"? He speaks in his Nobel Lecture of how poetry changes our perception of reality by enabling us to see "the poetic truth of the situation." This change can perhaps be compared to moving from a two-dimensional to a three-dimensional grasp of reality. Conflict alters our temperament. We are tempted to embrace a narrative in which our own side is the main or only victim, and the responsibility to end the conflict lies solely with the 'other,' while we are fully entitled to use violence. In a scenario like this, 'justice' is mostly about pushing back against the other side, the 'enemy,' and holding them accountable. However, when Seamus Heaney brings into one phrase and one picture the "innocent in gaols" and the "police widow in veils," he creates a different perspective. We recognize the commonality between these two iconic groups of victims. This three-dimensional picture, based on 'poetic truth,' disrupts conventional thinking on all sides and opens the door to change. We begin to see that all those affected by the conflict—whether killed, maimed, or harmed—are, to some extent, victims of a shared history. Much of the blame for this

suffering falls on a distorted and shape-shifting social reality that harms everyone. In this situation, our primary responsibility is not to remain helpless prisoners of circumstances. Instead, we are called on to 'envision' and enable a shared future. A mind open to such a reframing of a political crisis would, in Yeats's phrase quoted by Heaney, "hold in a single thought reality and justice." "Reality" is the sad, limiting situation in front of us. "Justice" means primarily the creation of a better future for our children.

On the final page of his epistolary novel *Hyperion*, the German poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843) writes (2019):

> Reconciliation is in the middle of strife, and all things separated find one another again.

The vision that reconciliation starts now, in the midst of conflict, leads to a focus on elements such as the will to reconcile, humanizing the image of the other, fostering a vision of a common future, and trust as a factor in reducing complexity. The 'Hölderlin perspective' as a working definition of reconciliation has a great deal in common with Seamus Heaney's political vision. For Heaney, there are instances in the world of action where 'poetic truth'—the real, inner, or contradictory potential of a given situation—actually prevails. Peace in Northern Ireland was on its way to being realized when Heaney (1990) wrote the famous lines:

> History says, *Don't hope*
> On this side of the grave.
> But then, once in a lifetime
> The longed-for tidal wave
> Of justice can rise up
> And hope and history rhyme.

In Heaney's 1980s collection, *The Haw Lantern,* he portrays a political leader persevering in a course of action in which he truly believes (1987, p. 47):

> I yearn . . .
> to know there is one among us who never swerved
> from all his instincts told him was right action,
> who stood his ground in the indicative,
> whose boat will lift when the cloudburst happens.

In the poem 'From the Republic of Conscience,' written for Amnesty International (1987, p. 13), public leaders are asked:

> . . . to affirm their faith that all life sprang
> from salt in tears which the sky-god wept
> after he dreamt his solitude was endless.

Heaney's (1975, p. 11) vision of the "republic of conscience" and its lonely ambassadors is matched by an equally coherent but contrasting vision of a society that leaves little room for such persons, as described in the poem 'North':

> . . . exhaustions nominated peace,
> memory incubating the spilled blood.

In his Nobel Lecture, Heaney (1995) explicitly rejects the bleak vision of power offered by a speaker in Tacitus, namely that "peace is merely the desolation left behind by the operations of merciless power."

Seamus Heaney's depiction of a brave man, suffering alone until suddenly assisted by a change in circumstances, relies on the 'givenness' of historical change. In both art and politics, personal commitment and integrity are essential, yet ultimately, beauty, peace, and goodness are 'given.' "The songs made me, not I them," asserts Goethe. "It is not I who think," echoes Lamartine, "it is my ideas that think for me." In the concluding part of his Nobel Lecture, Heaney offers a profound account of the interrelationship between poetry and political action. While we may be tempted to believe that power reigns supreme, with everything else mere empty words, poetry stands as a countervailing force. It possesses the capacity to "persuade that vulnerable part of our consciousness of its rightness in spite of the evidence of wrongness all around it..."

'Foreknowing the Spirit of Events'

A revival of the poetic imagination, as understood by Hesiod and Seamus Heaney, can become the essential ingredient in an emerging universal culture. In our co-authored book *On the Significance of Religion for Global Diplomacy* (McDonagh et al. 2021), we describe this potential universal culture as an "axial age for the twenty-first century." In the

rest of this chapter, I will attempt to apply the insights of the poetic imagination to the current global situation.

In his *Defence of Poetry*, Percy Bysshe Shelley (2003) distinguishes between two operations of the intellect: one is the reasoning we use for calculation in a defined context, and the other is poetic reasoning, the realm of the imagination, through which we see hidden connections and place the results of calculation in the right perspective. Shelley anticipates today's debates around Artificial Intelligence (AI), its promises, and its limitations. Perhaps the most obvious limitation of the 'calculating faculty' is that 'computational' reasoning will never enable us to grasp the significance of the present historical moment. According to Shelley (2003, p. 700), "[T]he most unfailing herald, companion, and follower of the awakening of a great people to work a beneficial change … is Poetry." The poet anticipates the future, not in the sense of making exact predictions, but in the sense of "foreknowing the spirit of events."

Osip Mandelstam has a dark sense of the 'spirit of events.' An untitled poem from 1918 has the refrain:

> Your brother, Petropolis, is dying.

These words are addressed to a star, a "wandering fire" or "giant ship" at a terrible height. The point about the "terrible height" is that the star and what it may stand for are too far away to be of use to human beings. The star is "transparent," or *prozrachnaya*, implying ghostliness, a loss of purchase on reality. Since the star does not seem to be efficacious, Mandelstam almost begins to doubt its identity. The poem concludes with a prayer:

> O if you are a star – Petropolis, your city,
> your brother, Petropolis, is dying.

In calling Petrograd Petropolis, Mandelstam evokes the Greek polis and transforms his town of residence into the emblem of a disappearing civilization. War and revolution have brought about an overwhelming deterioration in the surrounding culture. Mandelstam sees himself as living in a very late stage of history, under a drifting or dying star.

Seamus Heaney's historical context is also fraught with difficulties—the sad aftermath of colonialism and the twentieth-century world wars. In his Nobel Lecture, Heaney (1995, p. 19) states, "The documents of

civilization have been written in blood and tears... the inclination is not only not to credit human nature with much constructive potential but not to credit anything too positive in the work of art." Heaney could have easily written the poetry of defeat or despair, of the drifting or dying star. Instead, he writes a poetry of hope, inspired by a belief in the role of human agency and the 'givenness' of historical change. Beginning with a story about St. Kevin of Glendalough, Heaney's Nobel speech endorses what he calls our "love and trust in the good of the indigenous." This trust should "encourage us to credit the possibility of a world where respect for the validity of every tradition will issue in the creation and maintenance of a salubrious political space." The "crediting" of "political possibilities" is analogous to "crediting poetry," the title of his Nobel Lecture.

Seamus Heaney's political standpoint is that many things went wrong during the transition from local indigenous cultures to empires and civilizations. Nevertheless, being humble in the face of the past does not rule out political action. On the contrary, humility is seen as a necessary prerequisite for a period of recollection, of returning to good sources. One of Heaney's most important ideas is that we are "hunter-gatherers of values." This modest ideal highlights the importance of political deliberation and the potential for purposeful action in the public sphere. In the current generation in Ireland, "hope and history" intersect. By reframing our global agenda, we can perceive the timeline of history in a fresh light and strive for a similar transformation. Why not imagine ourselves at the threshold of an epoch? An epoch where 'globalization' marked by 'geopolitical' rivalry gives way to a global community that emphasizes the equitable distribution of life's fundamental goods, while also assuming long-term responsibility for promoting the ecological and climatic conditions essential for life?

The Mission of Robert Frost to Moscow and the End of Existential Mistrust

Multilateral diplomacy today faces complex and urgent challenges, not only in achieving peace among states, but also in navigating and addressing profound currents of change that threaten the survival of the planet. To achieve this, we require new frameworks of engagement. The 'missing ingredient' in contemporary diplomacy is the capacity for cross-cultural deliberation and discernment in a long-term perspective. We

should envisage places of encounter and discernment to complement the day-to-day business of party politics and international bargaining. In such custom-made spaces for discernment, trusted representatives will need to bring 'something of themselves' to the table.

In 1962, President Kennedy launched an initiative with exactly this objective. Responding to a discreet sounding from Moscow, the President sent America's best-known living poet, Robert Frost, on a political mission to the Soviet Union (Reeve 1963). Historically, many poets in diverse languages have served as ambassadors for their countries. Geoffrey Chaucer represented the King of England; Dante Alighieri undertook a mission to the Pope on behalf of a party interest in Florence, and for Pablo Neruda, George Seferis, and Paul Claudel, diplomacy was a career. The difference here is that the Kennedy Administration sent Robert Frost to Moscow precisely in his capacity as a poet. Frost had two interrelated tasks. His first responsibility was to meet with the great poets of the Soviet Union. To this end, Frost gave public readings, received translations of his work from Russian poets, and was invited into people's homes. His second task was explicitly political. To assist with this, Frost was accompanied by a senior US Cabinet member, culminating in a ninety-minute meeting between Frost and Khrushchev.

Frost's Moscow mission anticipated the 1970s conception of détente. The purpose of the visit was to foster a climate of mutual respect, enabling Washington and Moscow to discuss political differences dispassionately and with perspective. Both sides sought to identify shared values. Where this was not possible, they tried to disagree better. The visit took place toward the beginning of what came to be known as the North–South dialogue. Both the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were conscious of their responsibilities toward developing countries. They were also conscious of the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction. The Cuban Missile Crisis took place shortly after Frost's return to the US.

During the Cold War, the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber identified the prevalence of 'existential mistrust' among diplomats. American diplomats, for instance, could not imagine that their understanding of the world would be altered in any way by an encounter with a Soviet counterpart. Looking back at the circumstances of the early 1950s, we find this understandable. However, in the long run, the 'existential mistrust' of adversaries and their supposedly monolithic bureaucracies cannot offer

a pathway to collective agency at the global level. Diplomacy becomes a game of power, resembling the interaction of physical systems.

For many-sided negotiations to bear fruit, personal interactions are a prerequisite. Diplomats must have the freedom to undertake exploratory discussions with counterparts in order to understand their points of view, the dangers they fear, whether they believe changes in position are possible, and whether they see the potential for new beginnings. In other words, we expect diplomatic contacts to enable the interaction, not of physical, but of moral systems. The 'personal, human level,' including trust in particular, becomes crucial. The mission of Robert Frost to Moscow is a perfect illustration of the transition from the diplomacy of 'existential mistrust' to the diplomacy of 'interpersonal communication.'

In recent decades, Europeans and North Americans have seemingly created a number of self-referential codes of conduct that exist somewhat in isolation from one another and from the global community. For example, security doctrines based on nuclear deterrence and vast expenditures on weapons; an apolitical approach to finance that resulted in the 2008 crash; and a 'free' market system that fails to consider externalities and masks unaccountable concentrations of power. Do we possess the humility to return to the roots of our culture and rediscover the importance of values that predate any current ideology and are inherent to poets—values such as interpersonal communication, community, friendship, beauty, trust, mercy, continuity of culture, and the unity of the human family? Once we look beyond the self-referential moral systems into which we are often drawn, we will be better able to conduct a fruitful dialogue with partners in China or Africa, to give just two examples. Other countries have different historical experiences from ours; the more we delve into our own heritage, the more easily we will discover the lateral roots that connect us with other traditions.

If we accept the goal of subjecting our way of life to scrutiny and achieving new forms of historical and cultural literacy, a number of practical conclusions can be drawn in the light of reason, of which I will mention four.

First, we will recognize that effective governance depends on cultural conditions that cannot be generated or guaranteed by once-off decisions: you can't legislate for trust.

Second, this, in turn, implies gradualism. "Time is more important than space," to borrow a phrase from Pope Francis (2013). Our frameworks of engagement must naturally reflect mercy and hope. Mercy,

because we are giving ourselves and others the freedom to respond to the deepest truth of our situation. Hope, because there are steps valid in themselves whose precise consequences cannot be measured or predicted. To quote Heaney (1987, p. 47) again, "the future lies with what's affirmed from under."

Third, to borrow another phrase from Pope Francis, "[T]he whole is greater than the sum of its parts." There is a common life or collective well-being that is more than an accumulation of private interests. Given the present circumstances, the progressive realization of peace cannot disregard the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the practical commitments represented by the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Fourth, we will see that the essence of any emerging global civilization is that our constantly increasing productive and destructive capacity will be accompanied by an equivalent development in the realm of conscience and mutual understanding. Do we in Europe have the courage to ask how Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare, or Pushkin—all of them highly engaged with their contemporary political worlds—would promote mutual understanding? Are we prepared to engage with the cultural artifacts of other civilizations?

'Practice the Art'

To conclude my argument, I want us to visit Socrates on the last day of his life. Socrates has composed a hymn to Apollo and some narrative poetry based on Aesop's fables (Emlyn-Jones & Preddy 2017). In the death cell, we join other disciples in asking Socrates why he has turned to poetry, having never written poems until now. Socrates replies that all his life he has had a dream commanding him to do *mousikē*, the work of the Muses. Previously, he had assumed that philosophy is the greatest kind of *mousikē*. But when his execution was postponed due to the festival of Apollo, he began to wonder whether the dream was instructing him to do *mousikē* in its original sense of composing poetry.

The precise words that came to Socrates in his regular dream are these: "*mousikēn poiei kai ergazou*." The verb "*poiein*," to create, make, or do, is easily understood. The whole phrase is sometimes translated as "do *mousikē* and work at it." But if that is the right translation, what does the second verb add to the first? Seamus Heaney renders the whole phrase by a translation of his own: "practice the art." In the Greek, the second

verb, "*ergazesthai,*" refers to both the habitual exercise of virtue and the habitual working of evil. In the Gospel of St. Matthew, evil men are described as *ergazomenoi tēn anomian,* people who *in the nature of their activity* bring about moral disorder. In the dream of Socrates, the verb "*ergazesthai*" invites us to focus not on a product that is made but on the nature of an activity. The activity in which Socrates engages in the final moments of his life, his poetry, is in itself transformative, a source of life.

Socrates remains calm and compares his composure to that of swans who sing before death. The swans are not in mourning; they are Apollo's birds, prophets with foreknowledge of what lies beyond. Socrates, a fellow-slave of the swans, is consecrated like them to Apollo and possesses the same gift of prophecy. Poetry is the pathfinder's art. It *affirms from under*, uniting *mousikē* and *logos*—the service of the Muses and discursive reason. Poets can support political leaders in bringing justice to the city, setting us on the right trajectory, and helping humanity in its hour of need to recover the sense of being "present at the creation" that Hesiod enjoyed 2700 years ago.

References

Emlyn-Jones, Chris, and William Preddy. 2017. Phaedo (and other works of Plato). Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Foster, R. F. 1997. *W.B. Yeats: A Life, I: The Apprentice Mage 1865 – 1914.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Francis, Pope. 2013. *Evangelii Gaudium.* Apostolic Exhortation. Vatican City: Vatican Press.

Heaney, Seamus. 1975. *North.* Faber and Faber.

Heaney, Seamus. 1987. *The Haw Lantern.* Faber and Faber.

Heaney, Seamus. 1990. *The Cure at Troy.* Faber and Faber.

Heaney, Seamus. 1995. *Crediting Poetry.* Loughcrew: Gallery Books.

Hölderlin, Friedrich. 2019. *Hyperion, or the Hermit in Greece,* transl. H. Gaskill. Awesome Books.

Lattimore, Richmond. 1959. *Hesiod.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Mandelstam, Osip. 1991. *The Collected Critical Prose and Letters.* London: Collins Harvill.

McDonagh, Philip, Kishan Manocha, John Neary, and Lucia V. Mendoza. 2021. *On the Significance of Religion for Global Diplomacy.* London & New York: Routledge.

Moore, Thomas. 1807–1834. *'O blame not the bard!' Irish Melodies.* (Various publishers).

Reeve, F.D. 1963. *Robert Frost in Russia*. Boston and Toronto: Atlantic Monthly Press.
Shelley, Percy. 2003. A Defence of Poetry. In *Percy Bysshe Shelley: The Major Works*, ed. Zachary Leader and Michael O'Neill, 674–701. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Winterson, Jeanette. 2012. *Why Be Happy When You Could Be Normal?* New York: Grove Press.
Yeats, William B. 1928. Meditations in Time of Civil War. *The Tower*. London: Macmillan.
Yeats, William B. 1947. *Tribute to Thomas Davis (pamphlet)*. Cork: Cork University Press.
Yeats, William B. 1990. *The Poems*, ed. D. Albright. London: Everyman.
Yeats, William B. 1995. *Autobiographies*. London: Bracken Books.
Yeats, William B. 2001. *The Collected Works*, vol. II. New York: Scribner.

PART VI

Alternative Approaches—Conclusion

CHAPTER 22

Conclusion: From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation

Martin Leiner

Abstract In a broad sense, reconciliation can be defined as the creation of 'normal' and, ideally, 'good' relationships after grave violent incidents. In the political sphere, such incidents encompass wars, civil wars, genocides, mass atrocities, dictatorship, torture, land grabs, forced displacement, enslavement, exploitation, sexualized violence, colonialism, apartheid, or other egregious human rights abuses. This working definition serves as a starting point. However, the claim that reconciliation is an alternative approach to 'conflict resolution' has been challenged by at least four different positions. In this chapter, I will outline these four positions and explain why I cannot espouse them. I will then provide a brief overview of how reconciliation can work as a new approach to conflict resolution and how reconciliation studies are evolving.

M. Leiner (✉)
Jena, Germany
e-mail: martin.leiner@uni-jena.de

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6_22

Keywords Reconciliation · Justice · Truth · Resilienc · Conflict Resolution · Peace · Relationships

In a broad sense, reconciliation can be defined as the creation of "normal" and, ideally, "good" relationships after grave violent incidents. In the political sphere, such incidents encompass wars, civil wars, genocides, mass atrocities, dictatorship, torture, land grabs, forced displacement, enslavement, exploitation, sexualized violence, colonialism, apartheid, or other egregious human rights abuses. This working definition serves as a starting point. However, the claim that reconciliation is an alternative approach to "conflict resolution" has been challenged by at least four different positions. In this chapter, I will outline these four positions and explain why I cannot espouse them. I will then provide a brief overview of how reconciliation can work as a new approach to conflict resolution and how reconciliation studies are evolving.

The Sources of Reconciliation

The assertion that reconciliation is an *alternative* approach to conflict resolution might imply that reconciliation is something new, but this overlooks its ancient origins. One might question: Hasn't reconciliation existed since the very beginning, as seen in primates making peace with each other? (De Waal 1989).[1] Human rituals have long pursued reconciliation across six fundamental dimensions: (1) with the transcendent religious otherness of God(s), spirits, or death; (2) among fellow human beings, particularly within one's own group; and (3) within oneself, with the otherness within ourselves. Sometimes, (4) reconciliation extends to members of other groups, (5) to the natural environment, such as trees or animals, and (6) occasionally, even the broader human environment outside of direct conflict has been encompassed. The understanding of reconciliation existing within an intricate web of mutually supportive and conflicting relationships has been articulated in recent reconciliation studies (Leiner 2022, p. 40) and appears deeply engrained in native cultures.

Furthermore, within the cultural traditions of the so-called European "West," we find evidence of reconciliation dating back over 2400 years. Greek comedy (Aristophanes, Lysistrata) and passages in the Hebrew

Bible (Leviticus 17; cf. Zempelburg 2019) illustrate the significance of terms that we now translate into English as "reconciliation" or "atonement." With this Greek and biblical tradition, reconciliation projects are sometimes viewed as Western endeavors, aimed at promoting democracy, free markets, and liberal concepts of human rights and societies globally. However, owing to reconciliation's deep roots in the worldviews and practices of indigenous peoples and across various religious traditions, such projects can also be deeply rooted in the Global South, drawing on concepts such as the African *ubuntu* or rituals such as ho'oponopono from Hawaii. Beyond decolonial critiques and Western self-affirmation, the idea of reconciliation after colonialism offers an approach to address the clash of cultures and the enduring post-colonial cultural violence that divides the Global North and the Global South.

In the literature on conflict resolution, the concept of "reconciliation" was not prominently featured before the 1990s. German foreign policy regarding reconciliation after World War II and the Holocaust was seen as a notable exception (Gardner Feldman 2012). According to Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma H. Bennink (2004, p. 11) in their groundbreaking book *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, "only over the past decade [i.e., since about 1994] has the study of reconciliation emerged as a defined area of interest in political science and political psychology.... It evolved out of the recognition that there is a need to go beyond the traditional focus on conflict resolution, to expand the study of peacemaking to a macrosocietal perspective."[2]

The above description, on the theoretical level, reflects the new experiences of the 1990s, particularly the reconciliation processes in South Africa, Rwanda, Northern Ireland, and similar contexts globally. The increased attention to reconciliation in science, coupled with the diverse experiences of reconciliation processes, both successful and unsuccessful, has fundamentally altered our approaches to conflict resolution. Even if many points remain controversial, there is now a widespread consensus that reconciliation plays a crucial role in conflict resolution, emphasizing proactive measures aimed at transforming a culture of enmity into one of cooperation and amity (Assefa 2015, p. 237).[3]

Reconciliation: Mechanism or Approach?

During the last decade, several scholars have endeavored to refine the concept of "reconciliation." Many of these efforts tie reconciliation closely to apology and forgiveness. However, this narrow definition severs ties with numerous other processes essential for fostering improved relationships. While reconciliation through forgiveness may resonate across cultures, adopting a broader understanding of reconciliation as inherently relationship-oriented necessitates considering numerous steps and viewing reconciliation as a long-term endeavor. Therefore, scholars advocate for conceptualizing reconciliation as a comprehensive approach rather than a singular mechanism, asserting that this perspective benefits both practice and theory.

As a general approach, reconciliation implies that, ideally, all factors influencing a relationship marred by violence should contribute to the establishment of normal and positive relationships. Textbooks, city twinning, youth encounters, tourism, national celebrations, memorials, trade regulations, and many other activities can be designed in a way that they are able to foster reconciliation. Reconciliation, as a general approach, should determine the entire project rather than just amend mechanisms that, by chance, are already in place. However, this approach should also maintain a degree of openness.

While measures like "transitional justice" can be seen as part of a reconciliation strategy, two problems should be avoided. First, the desire for reconciliation should not undermine the independence of the possible motivations and the concrete procedures in transitional justice. Second, transitional justice measures should be executed in a manner that either enhances reconciliation or, at the very least, makes it possible. Failure to integrate reconciliation into transitional justice processes can result in fractured societies, as observed in several instances in former Yugoslavia following the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. Viewing reconciliation as a comprehensive approach also suggests that discussions about it hold significant innovative potential.

As with any new approach in the social sciences, reconciliation is a strong and evocative concept. In this sense, reconciliation can be seen as an expansion and reframing of traditional conflict resolution. According to Gardner Feldman (2012, p. 7), "Reconciliation goes beyond the agenda of formal conflict resolution to changing the motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions of the great majority of the society

members regarding the conflict, the nature of the relationship between the parties and the parties themselves." It might provide even broader perspectives to consider reconciliation as an overarching perspective that encompasses conflict resolution as well as other topics such as social cohesion or conflict prevention. Reconciliation, as described in Hegel's *Social Philosophy,* has an impact on the entirety of social life (Hardimon 1994).

Reconciliation as an Idealistic Goal or as an Unmanageable Process?

For some authors, "reconciliation is the 'holy grail' of conflict resolution, often seen as desirable but beyond reach" (Assefa 2015, p. 236). In one version, such criticism means that reconciliation simply happens with time or by chance and cannot be a product of intentional conflict resolution measures. Another version of this criticism understands reconciliation as a goal that is beyond reach in real life. Reconciliation is based on freedom. People must freely decide whether they want to reconcile or not. Sometimes, even if they wish to reconcile, they cannot. But in any case, according to this criticism, something must happen that cannot be planned, organized, or forced to occur. Reconciliation happens through free will, chance, or grace, but it differs from conflict resolution, which includes clear mechanisms that we can apply.

To answer that critic, we must engage on multiple levels. First of all, it should be emphasized that conflict resolution depends on human freedom, chance, and "grace," and the distinction between conflict resolution and reconciliation may be merely a matter of degree of dependence rather than a categorical difference. Both reconciliation and conflict resolution employ specific methods, such as facilitated encounters between perpetrators and victims. These methods can be assessed based on their effectiveness in fostering reconciliation compared to one another.

On another level, it must be clarified whether we understand reconciliation as a process or as a goal, and if it is a goal, whether it can be considered an outcome or if it is utopian. Scholars adopt various approaches. A common perspective involves defining reconciliation as a process and as a goal or outcome. Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004, p. 15) initially described reconciliation as an outcome: "Reconciliation as an outcome consists of mutual recognition and acceptance, invested interests and goals in developing peaceful relations, mutual trust, positive attitudes, as well as sensitivity and consideration for the other party's needs and

interests." Later, they stated that "the concept of reconciliation is not only used in reference to an outcome, but also to connote a process. Genuine and stable relations are achieved through a long process of reconciliation, lasting many years. It encompasses psychological changes of motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions, which are reflected in structural changes; these, in turn, facilitate the process of reconciliation" (2004, p. 22). John Paul Lederach, Johan Galtung, and other researchers, however, prefer the terminological distinction between the German terms *Versöhnung* (reconciliation) as a process on one side and *Versöhntheit* (peace or healed relationships) as an outcome on the other.[4] David Bloomfield (2006, p. 7) adds an interesting practical argument to that scientific choice: the resistance some people—often victims—have toward reconciliation stems from the double definition, as they "suspect a process that might compel them into an end-state, they do not necessarily, or for now, want. They may be forced to make compromises and, in particular, to 'forgive' perpetrators without having first gained sufficient justice for their suffering."

A definition of reconciliation should therefore emphasize the elements we have identified: *Reconciliation can be defined as the overarching approach to conflicts, focusing on processes aimed at rebuilding relationships. Its goal is to foster "normal," "trustworthy," and ideally "positive" and "peaceful" relationships.* Reconciliation addresses past violence and injustice, engages in present reframing and encounters with others, and envisions future possibilities of cooperation, peace, and harmonious interaction. It considers individuals, groups, institutions, societies, states, associations of states, and humanity as a whole. Reconciliation encompasses ethical, psychological, sociological, economical, communicational, historical, linguistic, medical, educational, legal, environmental, artistic, philosophical, and spiritual or religious aspects.

Reconciliation in the Middle of Conflict

One final criticism against the claim that reconciliation is an alternative approach to conflict resolution does not question reconciliation itself, but rather challenges the concept of conflict resolution. The central argument posits that there are few, if any, conflicts that are genuinely resolved and concluded. Instead, what typically occurs is a transformation of the conflict from a violent phase to a nonviolent or less violent one (Miall

2004). If this depiction holds true, then reconciliation, as the German poet Friedrich Hölderlin suggested, is always "in the middle of conflict."[5]

Reconciliation constantly grapples with conflict; it can prevent a conflict from escalating into violence, it can commence amidst ongoing violence and atrocities, and it must continue to address the aftermath of conflict long after the violence has ceased. As an alternative approach, reconciliation stands in opposition to viewpoints that confine it solely to a so-called 'post-conflict' phase, regarding it as a limited mechanism within the broader framework of traditional conflict resolution or transitional justice.[6] Reconciliation happens and evolves in the dynamics of conflicts and their contexts. To consider reconciliation as an approach to conflict resolution therefore implies that conflict resolution itself changes and becomes a long-term project within contexts of conflict.

How Does It Work?

In the framework of this chapter, I can provide only a brief sketch of how reconciliation, as an alternative approach to conflict transformation, operates. When reconciliation serves as the overarching perspective, we can enumerate a list of reconciliation measures and discuss questions of sequencing, which may involve distinguishing several phases within the reconciliation process.

Martin Leiner (2016, p. 185) presented one of the most comprehensive lists of reconciliation measures. He outlined 13 groups of measures, to which we add a 14th measure, specifically number 5:

1. Political and legal provisions (e.g., ceasefires and peace treaties).
2. The establishment of a common security framework (with disarmament, demobilization, reintegration of armed groups [DDR], as well as provisions for crisis management, and the transformation of violent actors into political actors participating in free elections).
3. Apologies and symbolic acts to honor the victims and their needs.
4. Reparation, restitution, and other attempts to restore the losses caused by violence and injustice.
5. Common mourning and other methods to deal with what cannot be repaired (cf. Michel 2021).
6. Cooperation regarding economic, legal, ecological, and international issues, including cases of disaster.

7. Civil society cooperation such as city twinning, youth exchanges, and student exchange programs.
8. Historical engagement through archival access, historical commissions (e.g., German–Czech relations since 1990, Slovak reconciliation since 1993), and preservation efforts via museums and memorials.
9. Engaging with individual memories and narratives, fostered by an individual right to know, truth, and reconciliation commissions.
10. Integrating former adversaries into shared political structures, such as the European Union (e.g., Ireland and the United Kingdom prior to Brexit).
11. Intentional strategies to humanize the image of the other, overcome negative stereotypes, build historical dialogue, establish common schoolbook commissions, and reshape portrayals of the other in media and art.
12. Change the discourse of religious and social leaders regarding the other group.
13. Offering individual medical, psychological, and social support for victims, including trauma therapies, as well as psychological assistance through conflict resolution workshops or training in coping with challenging emotions and embarking on personal journeys of forgiveness.
14. Implementing specific practices for intergenerational transmission of reconciliation (e.g., survivor-witness programs).

Many of these measures can be implemented at various stages of the process.

Reconciliation operates in a phronetic manner by identifying the right time and place to apply which measure(s). Only for a few measures is there a clear imperative for sequencing. In measure 2, DDR measures need to precede the involvement of armed groups in elections. Failure to do so greatly increases the risk of a recurrence of armed conflict, as witnessed, for instance, in 1992 in Angola, where UNITA resumed hostilities after losing the elections. Measure 13 should commence at an early stage, as individuals deeply traumatized by conflict require trauma therapy before progressing toward reconciliation.

Based on these few but crucial rules for sequencing, we can distinguish the following phases: (1) preconditions of reconciliation, (2) a main

phase characterized by intensive reconciliation activities, and (3) long-term reconciliation efforts. The preconditions of reconciliation, and even the main phase, can commence amidst violent conflicts. That was evident in the Colombian peace process, for example (Bouvier 2009), where amid widespread violence, villages such as Caicedo and Granada/Antioquia, and cities like Medellín and Bogotà, united to declare their municipalities "peace communities" and rallied for peace and non-violence under the slogan of "basta ya" ("enough already").

The main phase involves public activities such as agreements, public apologies, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, and the establishment of reparation regulations. Long-term activities require several decades and include measures to prevent the resurgence of violence, educational efforts, and the continuation of networking and peace-building endeavors. With some degree of success in reconciliation processes, networks and ecosystems for reconciliation likely have more time and resources to expand their connections nationally and internationally. Reconciliation processes can benefit from mutual learning and strengthen each other through a process of horizontal scaling up.

Preconditions of reconciliation can be described by the following principles:

Reconciliation Means That All Parties Concerned Must Be Integrated into the Process

One typical problem with agreements is that the non-integrated parties act like spoilers. One classic example is the "Oslo Accords," attacked both by Hamas and Israeli extremists. However, in every conflict, there are also groups who do not desire violence. They may have various reasons for this stance: women, for instance, often play a pivotal role in peace efforts because they do not want to lose their husbands and children. Additionally, there are individuals with economic interests who require peace and stability, as well as mixed families who do not want to find themselves caught in the crossfire. If these groups have a strong and independent voice, there is hope that they can put limits on the spoilers of the peace process who often disproportionately benefit from the media attention they receive through violent acts.

Reconciliation Must Be Promoted Publicly

The easiest situation is when there are popular leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu to advocate for reconciliation. Their leadership likely played a crucial role in South Africa's successful shift from apartheid to democracy. International support, the involvement of popular artists, and a generally supportive attitude from the media have also proven beneficial. Violence and the activities of spoilers against the reconciliation process must be addressed and overcome.

In 2016, during Colombia's referendum on the 'Havana Peace Treaty,' a significant paradox emerged: immediate victims and regions most affected by violence displayed stronger support for reconciliation compared to populations residing far from the conflict. This paradox calls for further research. One possible explanation is that entire societies are "third-order victims" who feel threatened and aggrieved by violence. Furthermore, entire societies have security needs and justice claims that must be respected.

Reconciliation Presupposes Inquiries into the Exact Needs of the Parties Concerned and Preparation Before Entering the Process

In research on conflict resolution, there is a considerable debate about the impact of human needs.[7] During the reconciliation process, people should be given the chance for dialogue within a protected space. They should be asked questions such as: (1) What would indicate an improvement in relationships? (2) How would their ideal reality look? (3) What are their deepest needs?

All parties need not necessarily convene at one negotiation table from the beginning. On the contrary, the practice of Sant'Egidio, as well as studies conducted in the *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* (DFG or German Research Foundation) "Hearts of Flesh not Stone" project, show that it is often helpful to take time working with a single group before involving the other parties[8] (cf. Ferrari et al. 2023).

Reconciliation Requires Particular Attention to Language

Respectful, nonviolent, yet sincere communication of deeper feelings, rather than resorting to superficial, hostile stereotypes, is a central factor in the success of reconciliation. In many cases, employing respectful

language when engaging with all parties involved in a conflict is crucial. Metaphors shape our thoughts and feelings. Therefore, we should carefully reflect on the metaphors we use (Lakoff 2002). Since "reconciliation" might be a problematic word for key actors in the process, it could be beneficial to substitute reconciliation with other words in scientific studies.

For the main phase of the process of reconciliation, three additional points arise:

Reconciliation Is About Justice

One common pitfall in reconciliation is that people may see an opposition between justice and reconciliation. In reality, different justice claims always emerge from the various parties involved in the conflict. Reconciliation aims to reconcile these diverse justice claims. Achieving a convincing reconciliation of justice claims is possible when power imbalances are more or less neutralized in the negotiation process, and when justice is understood as restorative or transformative justice, rather than merely as retribution (Zehr 2015).

Reconciliation Is About Truth

In almost all reconciliation processes, one important need for victims and society is the truth. Victims and society want to hear the truth about what happened. Often, victims cannot end the mourning process until they know what happened to their loved ones. Additionally, victims also seek to share what happened to them, needing public acknowledgment of their suffering. In traditional legal settings, perpetrators may strategically withhold the whole truth to receive a more lenient punishment. If trauma or shame interferes, it is difficult to find one's own voice. To give truth a chance requires careful preparation and reflection about the conditions that each person needs.

Reconciliation Is About Building Resilience

Reconciliation should aim to change the institutions involved in the conflict and establish new institutions, such as organizations for youth encounters, institutes focused on healing memories, or conducting surveys like a reconciliation barometer. Additionally, reconciliation

includes economic development projects for communities most affected by the violence. These measures collectively contribute to creating a new society and fostering a culture of peace.

In later phases of reconciliation, the transmission to future generations and the establishing of social justice and cohesion are crucial. Social programs and revised textbooks that incorporate reconciliation into education not only acknowledge the violence, but also create a culture of commemoration that does not forget the atrocities of the past and convinces future generations that reconciliation is the path to follow.

Because of the complexity inherent in reconciliation processes, contemporary studies on reconciliation are often transdisciplinary. For a significant period, the challenge of measuring reconciliation in the social sciences posed a notable obstacle to reconciliation studies. However, with the proposed definition of reconciliation as the establishment of "normal," ideally "good," or at least "improved" relationships following grave incidents, a pathway to measure reconciliation has emerged. Only individuals involved in reconciliation processes, both victims and perpetrators, can evaluate their relationship and determine whether it has improved or not. One approach is to devise a scale, such as from 1 to 10, allowing those involved in reconciliation to assess their relationship both at the outset and after the implementation of one or more of the previously mentioned 14 reconciliation measures. Additionally, objective measures can include observing behaviors like inviting members of former conflicting groups or analyzing interactions on social media platforms among groups involved in a reconciliation process. However, it is important to recognize that external factors, such as shifts in political dynamics between two nations or outbreaks of violence, have the potential to overturn reconciliation measures.

After having sketched some thoughts on reconciliation as an alternative approach to conflict resolution, it must be emphasized that a variety of concepts of reconciliation are actually needed. This is because reconciliation is an evocative concept that requires new approaches.

Notes

1. It can even be claimed that reconciliation is crucial for the evolutionary success of primates and humans because, without group and family cohesion, the next generation will not receive the required protection.

2. For comparison, see Carol A.L. Prager (2003, p. 1) who states, "The study of reconciliation per se is quite recent." Prager also suggests starting with Martha Minow's (1998) *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*.
3. Assefa (2015) considers reconciliation as an instrument for conflict resolution alongside adjudication, arbitration, negotiation, and mediation.
4. For quotes from Lederach, Galtung, and others, see Bloomfield (2006).
5. For Hölderlin's quote in his novel *Hyperion*, and the application of that concept in research on reconciliation, see Leiner and Flämig (2012, pp. 16–18).
6. The "Agenda for Peace" of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali placed reconciliation in the post-conflict phase. Many transitional-justice researchers have expanded the concept of "transitional justice" to encompass a wide range of initiatives, arguing that it "covers the establishment of tribunals, truth commissions, lustration of state administrations, settlement on reparations, and also political and societal initiatives devoted to fact-finding, reconciliation and cultures of remembrance" (Fischer 2015, p. 325).
7. For a critical summary of the debate on conflict resolution, see Avruch and Mitchell (2013).
8. The DFG-funded project on the suffering of the other in Israel and Palestine had to deal with the situation that, contrary to the researchers' initial plan, the political situation made it almost impossible for direct encounters with members of the opposite group. For a long period, they worked separately within Israeli and Palestinian groups to study documents and discuss the suffering of the other group. Shifra Sagy and Michael Sternberg discovered that this setting yielded significantly better results of empathy towards the other group than direct encounters did. Direct encounters often led to a situation where both groups felt that they had to defend their own nation.

References

Assefa, Hizkias. 2015. The Meaning of Reconciliation. In *The Contemporary Conflict Resolution Reader*, ed. Tom Woodhouse, et al., 236–243. Malden: Polity Press.

Avruch, Kevin, and Christopher Mitchell, eds. 2013. *Conflict Resolution and Human Needs: Linking Theory and Practice*, 2013. Routledge: Abingdon.

Bar-Tal, Daniel, and Gemma H. Bennink. 2004. The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process. In *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, ed. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, 11–38. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bloomfield, David. 2006. *On Good Terms: Clarifying Reconciliation*. Berghof Report no. 14. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2521/pdf/br14e.pdf. Accessed 23 Dec 2016.

Bouvier, Virginia M., ed. 2009. *Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press.

de Waal, Frans. 1989. *Peacemaking among Primates*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Ferrari, Francesco, Martin Leiner, Zeina M. Barakat, Boaz Hameiri, and Michael Sternberg. 2023. *Encountering the Suffering of the Other. Reconciliation Studies Amid the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Fischer, Martina. 2015. Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Theory and Practice. In *The Contemporary Conflict Resolution Reader*, ed. Tom Woodhouse, et al., 325–333. Malden: Polity Press.

Gardner Feldman, Lily. 2012. *Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Hardimon, Michael O. 1994. *Hegel's Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lakoff, George. 2002. *Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think*, 2nd ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Leiner, Martin. 2016. Thinking differently about Identity and Harmony—The Potential of Asian thinking for Reconciliation. In *Asia-Pacific between Conflict and Reconciliation*, ed. Phillip Tolliday, Maria Palme, and Dong-Choon. Kim, 183–203. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Leiner, Martin. 2022. In Response to Wolfgang Dietrich's Article About 'Peace and Reconciliation Studies' or How to Catch a Unicorn? In *Reconciliation, Heritage and Social Inclusion in the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Iyad M. AlDajani and Martin Leiner, 31–46. Cham: Springer Nature.

Leiner, Martin, and Susan Flämig. 2012. Reconciliation in the Middle of Dispute: Introduction to the Series. In *Latin America between Conflict and Reconciliation*, ed. Martin Flämig and Susan Leiner, 7–20. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.

Miall, Hugh. 2004. *Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task*. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/miall_handbook.pdf. Accessed 23 Dec 2016.

Michel, Johann. 2021. *Le réparable et l'irréparable. L'humain au temps du vulnérable*. Paris: Hermann.

Minow, Martha. 1998. *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Prager, Carol A.L. 2003. "Introduction." In *Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts*, ed. Carol A.L. Prager and Trudy Govier, 1–26. Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Zempelburg, André. 2019. *Versöhnung im Judentum*. Marburg: Tectum.

Zehr, Howard. 2015. *The Little Book of Restorative Justice*. Updated. New York: Good Books.

Index

A

abuse, 26, 50, 248

accountability, 26, 43, 50, 53, 151, 164, 230

actors, 4, 7, 24, 41, 46, 47, 50–54, 57, 64, 85, 86, 91, 102, 103, 118, 126, 145–147, 149–151, 153, 167, 215, 257

Africa, 43, 47, 81, 82, 133, 145, 190, 191, 208, 241

amnesty, 167–170, 179, 192, 237

apartheid, 42, 116, 121, 158, 159, 165, 170, 172, 179, 180, 183, 184, 187, 192, 248, 256

arbitration, 43, 47, 259

Arendt, Hannah, 165

art, 3, 5, 6, 13, 14, 24, 202–204, 208, 210, 211, 215, 220, 225, 232, 234, 235, 237, 239, 242, 243. *See also* cinema; memorial art

Assmann, Aleida, 160, 194, 196

Athens, 14, 220, 222, 223, 225. *See also* Greece

atrocities, 76, 104, 158–160, 164–166, 173, 195, 196, 248, 253, 258

awareness-raising, 84

B

barriers, 8, 9, 81, 85, 102, 104

Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov, 4, 11

Bergson, Henri, 221, 225

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, 15, 16, 127, 136

Bosnia, 139, 165, 250

Botman, H. Russel, 181

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 7, 43, 48, 259

Buber, Martin, 204, 222, 223, 240

Burundi, 8, 43, 52, 54, 58, 65, 81, 82, 84, 86, 91, 92

C. Schliesser and M. Leiner (eds.), *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-74905-6

C
cinema, 14, 203, 220–222, 225
citizenship, 54, 147
civil society, 15, 41, 46, 50, 55, 76, 105, 140, 149, 150, 152, 180, 210
civil war, 5, 7, 11, 23, 81, 83, 158–160, 193, 234, 248. *See also* war
Clark, Phil, 125, 172
Cockburn, Cynthia, 71, 74, 75, 88
Coetzee, Stefaans, 185
collaboration, 47, 54, 74, 83, 112, 148, 149, 152, 187, 210
collective
  action, 147
  memory, 118, 160, 196, 214
colonialism, 184, 238, 248, 249
commemoration, 185, 192, 194, 195, 210–213, 258
common good, 10, 30, 112, 144, 145, 147–149, 152–154
community, 6, 24, 43, 50, 84, 87, 98, 99, 101, 102, 105, 106, 112, 113, 117, 126, 138, 141, 147, 149, 165, 166, 168, 169, 172, 173, 179, 183–185, 190, 193, 195, 197, 208, 209, 211, 213, 214, 216, 230, 239, 241
conflict, 2–11, 13, 14, 16, 22, 24, 28, 30, 32, 40, 42–44, 46–48, 50, 55, 56, 64, 65, 76, 80–85, 87–92, 96–103, 105, 113, 114, 116–120, 122, 123, 125, 126, 133–135, 137, 138, 141, 145, 146, 153, 164–166, 170, 181, 190, 192, 196, 235, 236, 248, 253–257, 259
conflict resolution, 2–8, 10, 13, 15, 22, 28, 30, 32, 33, 36, 47, 48, 65, 83, 87, 96, 98, 99, 101, 105, 106, 114, 125, 135, 136, 160, 161, 184, 248–254, 256, 258, 259
conflict transformation, 7–9, 66, 112, 114, 125, 253
cooperation, 83, 112, 138, 249, 252, 253
Côte d'Ivoire, 7, 25, 52, 54–58
COVID-19, 106, 146, 152, 205
culture, 2, 4, 5, 10, 22, 42, 101, 118, 120, 121, 123–125, 146, 148, 153, 190, 194, 196, 203, 214, 231, 237–239, 241, 248–250, 258, 259
culture of encounter, 228
Cypriot, 76
Cyprus, 8, 65

D
Dallaire, Roméo, 190, 191, 197
dehumanize, 173
democracy, 34, 35, 47, 48, 114, 136, 137, 140, 147, 171, 223, 230, 249, 256
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 16, 81, 194
development, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 22, 25, 92, 97, 99–101, 105, 106, 114, 137, 144–147, 153, 165, 173, 183, 184, 191, 225, 234, 242, 258
  sustainable, 147, 185
dialogue, 5, 8, 14, 43, 47, 56, 123, 134, 141, 165, 166, 170–172, 174, 223, 224, 240, 241, 254, 256
dictatorship, 133, 248
diplomacy, 4, 14, 22, 24, 41–43, 47, 75, 87, 101, 113, 132, 204, 205, 239–241
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), 99, 253, 254

discernment, 14, 147, 230, 239, 240
Dogs of Democracy, 14, 204, 220, 222, 225
DRC. *See* Democratic Republic of the Congo

E
empathic repair, 159, 165, 169, 171, 172
empathy, 74, 165–167, 169, 170, 173, 174, 259
enemy, 83, 132, 172, 235
Enns, Fernando, 158, 193
enslavement, 164, 248
equality, 8, 65, 84, 87–89, 91, 92, 97, 100, 104, 223
equity, 99, 100
ethics, 29, 30, 32–34, 36, 37, 126, 127, 132, 141, 222
ethnic cleansing, 165
Europe, 31, 48, 81, 123, 133, 138, 191, 202, 208–210, 213, 231, 242
exploitation, 46, 121, 195, 223, 248

F
faith communities, 12, 144, 179–183, 185, 186
female, 8, 80, 83, 89, 97, 101. *See also* gender theory; women
Flämig, Susan, 5, 16, 187, 259
foreign policy, 10, 144, 249
forgiveness, 3, 5, 11, 12, 126, 136, 141, 158–160, 163, 165, 168–171, 173, 175, 181, 185, 203, 250, 254
France, 3, 13, 57, 202, 209, 216
Frazer, Owen, 117, 124, 126
freedom, 11, 29, 43, 54, 83, 84, 87–89, 136, 147, 149, 150, 183, 185, 197, 230, 241, 242, 251
Frelimo. *See* Mozambique Liberation Front
Friedli, Richard, 9, 10, 113, 114, 117, 121, 123–127, 190, 191, 196
Frost, Robert, 240, 241

G
gacaca, 13, 125, 160, 172, 190, 192, 193, 197
Galtung, Johan, 100, 118, 121, 122, 252, 259
Gandhi, Mohandas, 133
Garden of Memory, The, 13, 161, 203, 210–214
Gardner Feldman, Lily, 3, 249, 250
Gbago, Laurent, 55
Gbowee, Leymah, 5, 76, 102
gender, 3, 6–8, 65, 66, 71, 83–85, 87, 88, 90–92, 104, 183
genocide, 12, 13, 113, 120, 121, 123–126, 158–160, 164, 165, 190–193, 195–197, 203, 208–214, 216, 217, 248
Global North, 249
Global South, 249
government, 6, 22, 23, 25, 26, 41, 45, 47, 50, 52, 56, 76, 84, 105, 112, 134–136, 139–141, 144, 146, 148–150, 153, 159, 170, 180, 186, 187, 192, 197, 216, 217
Greece, 14, 203, 220, 222, 223, 225. *See also* Athens

H
Habermas, Jürgen, 24, 30
Hadjipavlou, Maria, 76
Heaney, Seamus, 14, 228, 231, 234–239, 242
Hesiod, 14, 229–231, 237, 243

history, 4, 10, 12, 15, 29, 40, 41, 57, 96, 118, 144, 160, 164, 179, 180, 192, 196, 197, 208, 210, 211, 213–216, 228, 229, 234, 235, 238, 239
Hitler, Adolf, 34, 135, 136
Hölderlin perspective, The, 5
Holocaust, The, 165, 249
hope, 6, 15, 41, 58, 76, 103, 133, 141, 185, 194, 197, 223, 225, 228, 232, 234, 239, 241, 242, 255
Houphouët-Boigny, Félix, 54
ho'oponopono, 249
human rights, 14, 35, 50, 52, 55, 65, 87, 114, 136, 137, 140, 145, 147, 148, 158, 164, 166, 197, 216, 248, 249
human trafficking, 101
Hutu, 82, 160, 172, 190, 192, 194, 196, 197, 209

I
ICC. *See* International Criminal Court
identity, 74, 91, 113, 117, 168, 180, 183, 192, 194, 195, 209, 212, 231, 238
imagination, 5, 159, 161, 165, 167, 169, 170, 221, 225, 237, 238
imperative, 2, 65, 104, 112, 154, 179, 180, 210, 254
individual memory, 119
injustice, 28, 101, 114, 133, 134, 136, 137, 140, 158, 160, 171, 179, 193, 194, 220, 252, 253
International Criminal Court, 25, 56
intersectional identities, 8, 81, 90, 91
intersectionality, 91
invisibility, 9, 97, 101–103
Ireland, 3, 7, 14, 74, 135, 232–234, 236, 239, 249, 254
Islamic veil, 10, 120, 123, 126
issues, 4, 74, 84, 89, 97, 101, 102, 104, 106, 112, 120, 123, 125, 153, 164, 183, 185, 186, 220
  ecological, 253
  economic, 253
  international, 253
  legal, 253

J
Jansen, Stef, 158
JCRS. *See* Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies
Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies, 4, 15
justice, 6, 7, 8, 15, 24–26, 28, 29, 31–36, 50–58, 65, 76, 81, 84, 89, 92, 99, 125, 134, 137, 147, 160, 166, 172, 181, 183–186, 192, 193, 203, 204, 208, 211, 214, 223, 229, 231, 233, 235, 236, 243, 250, 253, 257, 259. *See also* transitional justice
just peacemaking, 10, 113, 132–134, 137, 138, 140, 141
just war theory, 133

K
Kagame, Paul, 160, 191, 192, 194
Kant, Immanuel, 24, 32, 34, 35, 37
Kayibanda, Grégoire, 209
Kettle, Thomas, 233
King Jr., Martin Luther, 133
Kock, Eugene de, 159, 170, 171
Korostelina, Karina, 4

L
Latin America, 3, 16, 81, 116, 133, 137, 145
Lederach, Angela Jill, 123, 126
Lederach, John Paul, 5, 123, 126, 252

Leiner, Martin, 5, 15, 16, 187, 248, 253, 259
Lemarchand, René, 194–196
Liberia, 7, 8, 65, 76, 80–84, 86, 91, 126
love, 42, 165, 172, 231, 233, 239

M
male, 8, 76, 80, 83, 85, 87, 89, 120. *See also* gender theory; masculine
Mandela, Nelson, 23, 256
marginalization, 86
masculine, 98
mass atrocities, 159, 165, 248
media, 2, 5, 22, 40, 41, 55, 86, 105, 120, 202, 214, 223, 255, 256, 258
mediation, 42–48, 84, 87, 123, 229, 259
mediators, 22, 24, 43–46, 50, 80, 85
memorial art, 208. *See also* Garden of Memory; Upright Men
memory, 4, 12, 118, 119, 123, 160, 164, 169, 171, 194–196, 203, 208, 210–214, 221, 223, 225, 237
metaphor, 35, 171, 178, 185, 186, 257
military, 2, 8, 40, 55–57, 98, 117, 125, 140, 141, 209
military intervention, 2
militia violence, 56, 57
misogyny, 104
Moore, Thomas, 14, 231, 232, 234
Mozambican National Resistance, 23, 42
Mozambique, 7, 41, 42
Mozambique Liberation Front, 23, 42
multilateral, 147, 149, 150, 239
multilateralism, 143, 148, 149
multi-religious, 10, 112, 147–150, 152–154
Multi-Track Diplomacy, 22, 25
Muse/s, 229, 230, 232, 233, 242, 243
Muslim, 101, 113, 120, 138

N
nationalism, 42
NATO. *See* North Atlantic Treaty Organization
negotiation, 3, 4, 6–9, 22–26, 28, 30–37, 43, 45–47, 50, 51, 53, 64, 66, 80, 83–87, 89, 90, 96, 99, 105, 118, 120, 123, 134, 135, 166, 167, 241, 256, 257, 259
NGO. *See* non-governmental organization
9/11, 41, 116, 138, 140, 203
non-governmental organization, 6, 10, 15, 22, 41, 42, 82, 112, 140, 144–146, 149, 153, 154
non-violence, 9, 231, 255
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 140
North, Joanna, 168
nuclear weapons, 134, 139

O
oppression, 103, 164, 165
Ouattara, Alassane, 55, 56
Ozu, Yasujiro, 222

P
pacifism, 133
pandemic. *See* COVID-19
participation, 51, 64, 66, 84–87, 89–91, 97, 104, 137, 147, 148, 150, 185, 211
Party of Côte d'Ivoire African Democratic Rally, 54, 55

PDCI-RDA. *See* Party of Côte d'Ivoire African Democratic Rally
peace
  accords, 86
  education, 80, 90
  negotiations, 7, 8, 64, 66, 80, 83–87, 89, 90
  processes, 4, 5, 8, 48, 64–66, 80–83, 85–88, 90–92, 101, 105
  promotion, 87
  studies, 2, 3, 5, 7, 118
peacebuilding, 4, 9, 22, 25, 50, 51, 64–66, 80, 84, 88, 90, 96, 97, 99–106, 165
peacekeeping, 64, 80, 90, 100
peacemaking
  groups, 114, 140
  practices, 113, 114, 132
Péan, Pierre, 209, 216
Pearse, Patrick, 233
perception, 3, 5, 13, 14, 31, 53, 54, 74, 85, 98, 195, 211, 220–222, 225, 235
perpetrator, 2, 11, 12, 52, 76, 118, 119, 121, 158–160, 164–169, 171, 179, 185, 191, 192, 251, 252, 257, 258
Perraudin, André, 209
poet/s, 14, 159, 178, 205, 228–235, 240, 241, 253
poetry, 14, 15, 204, 205, 228–231, 233–235, 237, 239, 242, 243
policymaker/s, 50, 86, 146
political conflict, 55, 75, 164, 166, 190
politics, 12–15, 24, 42, 43, 50, 54, 55, 58, 71, 85, 124, 135, 147, 160, 190, 194–196, 204, 205, 233, 234, 237, 240
post-conflict, 56, 64, 84, 85, 88–90, 165, 170, 253
power
  economic, 88
  ethnic, 88
  gender, 88
  national, 88
pre-conflict, 88, 90
prejudice, 9, 124, 196, 234
punishment, 167, 193, 257
Putin, Vladimir, 23, 134

R

racism, 209, 210
rape, 76, 98, 103
Rawls, John, 24, 29
reconciliation, 2–6, 8–12, 15, 22, 24, 25, 50, 65, 81, 98, 99, 113, 120–122, 125, 126, 132, 158–160, 171, 178–186, 190, 192–196, 231, 236, 248–253, 255–258
re-enactment, 12, 160, 180, 182, 183. *See also* Truth and Reconciliation Commission
religion, 3, 5, 6, 9–11, 13, 22, 40, 48, 112, 113, 116–118, 127, 144, 145, 149, 150, 154, 180, 181, 190, 212
remembrance, 13, 160, 190, 193–196, 212
remorse, 165, 167–169, 181
Renamo. *See* Mozambican National Resistance
resilience, 15, 145, 150, 152
resistance, 7, 14, 15, 25, 51–58, 92, 133, 252
Resolution 1325, 64, 65, 80, 82, 96, 98, 102–104
responsibility, 6, 10, 14, 45, 114, 126, 127, 136, 164, 167, 168, 172, 181, 183, 186, 195, 220, 222, 223, 225, 235, 236, 239, 240

Restitution Foundation, 12, 160, 182, 184–186
restorative justice, 6, 171, 172, 185
RF. *See* Restitution Foundation
Ricoeur, Paul, 194–196, 208
RPF. *See* Rwandan Patriotic Front
Rwanda, 3, 10, 12, 13, 120, 121, 123, 124, 126, 158–160, 190–196, 203, 207–216, 249
Rwandan Patriotic Front, 196

S
Sant'Egidio, 6, 7, 23, 24, 40–43, 48, 105, 256
Scott, James, 52
security, 2, 10, 31, 85, 89, 102, 104, 138, 139, 144–147, 172, 241, 256
Security Council, 56, 139
slavery, 164, 165
Smith, Stephen, 209
Snyman, Deon, 184
social cohesion, 150, 152, 153, 251
Socrates, 242, 243
South Africa, 3, 12, 42, 116, 133, 158–160, 165, 169, 171, 178, 179, 184–186, 192, 196, 249, 256
spiritual advisors, 146
spoilerism, 51. *See also* spoilers
spoilers, 25, 51, 57, 255, 256. *See also* spoilerism
Stassen, Glen, 10, 113, 132–140
status quo, 8, 80, 81, 87, 92
stereotype, 11, 99, 195, 196, 256
subordination, 166
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 97, 242
swan, 243
Syria, 23, 103, 202

T
Tarkovsky, Andrei, 224
terrorism, 40, 146. *See also* terrorist
terrorist, 22, 23, 40, 41, 125, 138. *See also* terrorism
Track One-and-a-Half Diplomacy, 4, 25
Track One Diplomacy, 4, 6, 7, 41
Track Two Diplomacy, 4, 6, 7, 22, 24, 41–43, 47
training, 22, 84, 105, 140, 169, 254
transitional justice, 2, 3, 5, 7, 25, 50–58, 125, 250, 253
trauma, 8, 11, 74, 153, 164–166, 168, 171, 173, 184, 254, 257
TRC. *See* Truth and Reconciliation Commission
truth, 5, 14, 15, 23, 24, 30, 47, 87, 138, 149, 165, 167, 194, 205, 221, 222, 224, 228, 230, 233, 235, 242, 257
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 12, 56, 125, 159, 165, 166, 178, 192, 255. *See also* re-enactment
Tutsi, 13, 82, 160, 172, 190, 192, 194, 196, 203, 208, 209, 212–214, 216
Tutu, Desmond, 11, 125, 173, 184, 256

U
ubuntu, 10, 125, 165, 172, 173, 249
Uludağ, Sevgül, 76
UN. *See* United Nations
United Nations, 43, 50, 55, 76, 82, 86, 98, 102, 104, 114, 124, 138, 139, 147, 151, 191, 209, 210, 242, 259
United States, 2, 23, 133, 145, 209
Upright Men, 13, 161, 203, 207, 208, 212–216

US. *See* United States

V

victim, 2, 7, 11, 12, 14, 51, 55, 56, 76, 96, 98, 116, 118, 159, 164–171, 173, 179, 185, 190–193, 196, 208, 210–216, 232, 235, 251–253, 256–258
violation, 35, 50, 52, 55, 146, 153, 158, 164, 166, 193
violence, 2, 5, 9, 12, 14, 23, 40, 41, 52, 55–57, 65, 74, 81, 88, 89, 99, 112, 113, 118, 120, 121, 124, 125, 133, 134, 140, 145, 146, 158, 164, 165, 171, 172, 174, 178, 190, 191, 202, 203, 205, 213, 220, 221, 223, 224, 231, 234, 235, 250, 252, 253, 255, 256, 258
  cultural, 119, 120, 249
  sexualized, 248

W

war, 2, 3, 4, 9, 14, 28, 34, 40–44, 46–48, 50, 51, 56, 66, 71, 75, 81, 82, 84, 88, 96–100, 103, 112, 113, 132, 133, 138–141, 145, 148, 153, 203, 205, 234, 238, 250. *See also* civil war
weaponry, 113, 132, 139, 140. *See also* nuclear weapons
weapons of war, 98
Wenders, Wim, 5, 14, 15, 202, 220, 222
women, 4, 5, 7–9, 16, 55, 64–66, 70, 74, 76, 80–92, 96–106, 120, 148, 190, 193, 208, 213, 216, 255. *See also* female; gender theory
women-centered agendas, 8, 66, 81, 89
Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, 80, 86, 92
World War I, 190
World War II, 40, 137, 191, 249

Y

Yeats, W.B., 14, 231–234, 236
youth, 55, 76, 91, 234, 250, 254, 257

Z

Zehr, Howard, 193, 257